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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis aims to show that the concept of style ought to be given greater significance in 
understanding depiction. I argue that if we want to understand pictorial representations we 
must remember that how they depict is crucial to understanding not only why they depict 
what they do, but also why we have the particular kind of experience that they engender.  
 
I develop and defend an account of artistic style that has its basis in the claim that individual 
style is the way in which an artist does something, where this way of doing something is highly 
personal. With this in place I explore and critically evaluate previous attempts at 
understanding pictorial representation, in particular the popular Resemblance View, further 
clarifying the phenomenon of seeing-in along the way. I then modify and develop an account 
of depiction which has its basis in the work of Flint Schier and Dominic Lopes, who argue 
for an ‘Aspect-Recognition’ theory of depiction. The Aspect-Recognition theory, I contend, 
can give us the beginnings of a story about depiction, but while it is pointing in the right 
direction, I show it is still inadequate. I then use the concept of style that I have developed 
and build upon the Aspect-Recognition theory to provide a better account; one that not only 
has explanatory force but also does justice to pictorial diversity and the phenomenology of 
pictorial experience.  
 
Finally, I put this view to work in resolving familiar problems in the philosophy of depiction, 
namely pictorial misrepresentation and pictorial indeterminacy. These remain the most 
persistent difficulties for other theories of depiction. Thus my view not only better describes 
the nature of pictorial experience more generally but is also much better equipped to make 
sense of curious phenomena in pictorial representation.  
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Introduction 
 
 
‘The history of art…may be described as the forging of master keys for 
opening the mysterious locks of our senses to which only nature herself 
originally held they key…Of course, once the door springs open, once the 
key is shaped, it is easy to repeat the performance.’1 
 
One of the many things we have learnt from the work of Ernst Gombrich is that art history 
has a pattern of experimentation, of trial and error, and is laden with conventions and 
expectations that are either met or not met. The mystery of our ability to represent the 
world in pictures, and why we should represent it so differently throughout history, is 
lessened by the observation, immediately following on from the quote with which I began, 
that ‘we respond differently when we are ‘keyed up’ by expectation, by need, and by cultural 
habituation.’2 If this is so, then why has the philosophy of depiction said so little about this 
pattern? If depiction throughout the ages has a narrative of forging paths through changing 
styles, made possible by learning from the art of the past, then what allows the image-maker 
to forge her own path, and to depict the world in her own way, ought to be given a greater 
significance when we attempt to understand pictures and the kinds of visual experiences 
they engender. 
Yet the philosophy of depiction, while it ranges over countless issues concerning the 
way we represent the world in pictures, makes very little reference to artistic style; perhaps 
because the concept is too vague to put to work. However, if it can be made clearer, and 
neater, through philosophical analysis, I think it is of great significance for many of the 
concerns in the philosophy of depiction. Despite the central importance of artistic style with 
regard to understanding and appreciating artworks, determining what exactly the term ‘style’ 
means is no easy task. However, this is the task I set myself in the first chapter, and is one 
that, upon finishing it, will ground all that I go on to say about pictorial representation.  
In Chapter One I discuss the concept of style as critical art historians have 
conceived of it, and introduce and critically evaluate previous accounts of artistic style. The 
first equates style with something akin to formal features or the manner in which something 
is expressed. On this view, style turns out to be a matter of ‘how’ something is said as 
opposed to ‘what’ is said, positing the distinction between form and content as a crucial 
ground on which to define artistic style. I then suggest that this view is inadequate because it 
ignores the fact, pointed out by Nelson Goodman, that often style is a matter of what is said 
as well as a matter of how. 
                                                
1 Gombrich, E.H. Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation. (Phaidon Press Ltd. 
1988), p. 304. 
2 Ibid 
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However, despite my rejection of this formulation of style, I suggest that there is still 
room for the ‘how?’ consideration if we conceive of style as located in the activity of an 
artist. Taking a cue from Kendall Walton’s paper ‘The Products and Processes of Art’3, and 
the account of style given by Jenefer Robinson and Peter Lamarque, I propose that the 
‘how?’ question ought to be pushed back into the act or process of creating artworks, which, 
I contend, can give us a satisfactory account of style. I argue that an artist’s style is a matter 
of the way in which she does something, where this way of doing something is highly personal. 
This, I claim, allows for both form and content to be taken up into an artist’s stylistic 
repertoire. In the final section, I consider a series of objections to my view and reply to each 
one in turn.  
In Chapter Two I consider ways in which we might come to know about an artist’s 
style, which concerns our perceptual experiences of style properties, thus building on the 
account of style I argued for in the first chapter. I make use of recent literature on high-level 
properties to argue that style properties are a species of high-level properties that can be 
visually experienced. I argue that we can visually experience not only low-level properties 
such as shape, colour, or size, but also ‘high-level properties’ such as aesthetic properties. 
However, while I argue for the conclusion that the perception of aesthetic properties is 
possible, I also argue that there is a further species of high-level property that figures in our 
experiences of artworks, namely style properties.  
What little discussion of stylistic properties has occurred has tended to equate style 
properties with aesthetic properties. However, this tendency to run together style properties 
with aesthetic properties is, I claim, a mistake, and in this chapter I demonstrate various ways 
in which they are distinct. Having established this distinction between aesthetic properties 
and style properties, I then give a thorough analysis of the claim that style properties are 
high-level properties, and argue that we can visually experience them. I consider possible 
objections to the claim that style properties are high-level properties, showing that each one 
can be met. I then propose that the conclusions I have argued for in this chapter are 
significant to the philosophy of depiction. In particular they make sense of expertise in art, 
and the way in which a knowledge of artistic style informs our experiences of pictures.  
 Having developed my own account of individual style, and our perception of 
stylistic properties, in Chapter Three I begin an analysis of one of the central features of a 
perceptual account of depiction, namely seeing-in. The main purpose of this chapter is to 
provide the right account of seeing-in in order to ground what I will go on to say about style 
and depiction. While the concept of seeing-in originates in the work of E.H Gombrich and 
Richard Wollheim, recent accounts of seeing-in have taken a pluralistic turn. Dominic Lopes 
                                                
3 Walton, Kendall L. ‘Style and the Products and Processes of Art’, In Berel Lang (ed) The Concept of 
Style, (1979), pp. 72-103 
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argues that seeing-in is a multiple phenomenon and identifies five different kinds of seeing-
in. Dan Cavedon-Taylor identifies a sixth kind, and claims that the space of seeing-in marked 
out by Lopes can be further expanded. In this chapter, Chapter Three, I argue that the 
phenomenon of seeing-in does not divide in as many ways as Lopes and Cavedon-Taylor 
propose. I show that either Naturalism or Twofoldness can accommodate the additional ‘ways 
of seeing-in’ identified by Lopes, and that, if they cannot be so accommodated, then they are 
not genuine instances of seeing-in. I therefore conclude in the first part of this chapter that 
the space of seeing-in ought to be significantly reduced. 
The refinement of this concept then leads, in the second part of this chapter, to a 
discussion of one of the most popular views of depiction, namely the Experienced 
Resemblance Theory. This theory makes use of the notion of seeing-in but seeks to improve 
upon its explanatory role in depiction. I consider the most plausible version of this theory, 
which belongs to Robert Hopkins. His thorough account of the relation between depiction 
and resemblance in terms of what he calls ‘Outline Shape’ is fully explored, and the benefits 
enumerated. However, I propose that there are significant problems with this view, some of 
which stem from its inability to cope with the space of seeing-in argued for in the first part 
of this chapter. In particular I argue that the view cannot explain pictorial indeterminacy, 
inflection, and pictorial misrepresentation.  As such I reject this view and conclude that we 
must look elsewhere for an account of depiction that does justice to the nature of seeing-in 
and the diversity of depiction.  
In Chapter Four I outline and defend a non-matching perceptual theory of depiction, 
namely the Aspect-Recognition theory. This theory has its basis in the work of Flint Schier, 
and has been developed by Dominic Lopes. Lopes’s view centres on the idea that pictures 
present aspects of their subjects, which viewers can recognize since the presentation of those 
aspects engages their recognitional capacities. Thus this chapter also explores the 
phenomenon of recognition, and how it operates, in order to bolster the claim that depiction 
has something to do with recognition. With this in place, on of the central claims of the 
Aspect-Recognition Theory, that depiction need not necessarily be viewpointed, is elucidated 
and it is shown why this view has advantages over the Resemblance View, which was 
rejected in the previous chapter.  
However, I argue that this account needs improvement, since recognitional abilities have 
limits. As such it is possible that they can give out at any moment. Because of this I claim 
that the Aspect-Recognition Theory has a large explanatory gap, namely that it cannot 
explain when and why recognition should fail. To fill this gap, I integrate my account of 
artistic style into the Aspect-Recognition Theory in order to build a better version of it that 
can explain why pictorial recognition is sustained even where depicted subjects are radically 
transformed. I connect my account of individual style with the aspectual structure of 
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depiction, showing that there is room for considering the way in which an artist does 
something in the Aspect-Recognition Theory, and that by doing this we can get a highly 
persuasive theory of depiction. I then show how adapting the theory in this way has certain 
advantages in explaining a puzzle about depiction, namely the puzzle of mimesis, which was 
introduced in Chapter Three. I then consider objections to my account and reply to them, 
and in the final section I critically evaluate Lopes’s theory of picturing as an ‘information 
system’, which further distances my account from his.  
Having adapted the Aspect-Recognition Theory to include my account of style, I put 
this theory to work in the final chapter. I consider the two curious phenomena in depiction, 
namely misrepresentation and pictorial indeterminacy, taking each in turn. In this chapter, 
Chapter Five, I begin by describing what pictorial misrepresentation is not, arguing against a 
definition of misrepresentation that can be plausibly drawn out of Hopkins’s defence of his 
Experienced Resemblance Theory. I argue against this definition by, firstly, arguing that it 
presupposes a resemblance view, and, secondly, that it unnecessarily limits the 
representational capacities of pictures. I go on, via a discussion of pictorial realism, to claim 
that incorrectly ascribing properties to the depicted subject is only a necessary condition for 
misrepresentation. Something else is needed for sufficiency.  
I suggest that misrepresentation is intimately related to artistic style, and formulate this 
into a definition, such that it can provide the required condition with which to correctly 
determine cases of misrepresentation. Thus I demonstrate how the modified Aspect-
Recognition Theory, which gives style its proper significance, can explain pictorial 
misrepresentation. I then introduce possible objections and show that each one can be met. 
Finally, I discuss pictorial indeterminacy, which, like misrepresentation, proved troublesome 
for the Experienced Resemblance Theory. I demonstrate that the view argued for in this 
thesis makes better sense of pictorial indeterminacy by avoiding, unlike the Resemblance 
Theory, a separation between seeing-in and pictorial content. I claim that our perception of 
artistic style preserves the connection between seeing-in and pictorial content, and attribute 
any indeterminacy to the configuration of the pictorial surface rather than to the pictorial 
content. I conclude with a final discussion of the benefits of adopting the view of depiction I 
have argued for, which shows that the concept of style is key to the philosophy of depiction 
and ought to be given a great significance.  
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Chapter One 
The Concept of Style 
 
‘Every artist, and every true connoisseur, possesses a genuine feeling 
of what the term implies, however difficult it might be to express this 
in words.’ (Gottfried Semper)4 
 
 The above comment from Semper concerning the concept of style is one I believe 
neatly sums up the difficulty of defining style. While Hans Georg Gadamer claimed that, 
‘The notion of style is one of the [undiscussed] self-evident concepts upon which our historical 
consciousness is based’5, to me it still has the familiar difficulty one feels when trying to 
resolve any philosophical problem; that when it seems that one’s finger is hovering in just 
about the right place, the finger slips and the spot at which one was trying to pin it down has 
seemingly vanished. Gadamer was right to point out its lack of discussion, but the meaning 
of the term, and thus the concept of ‘style’, is certainly not self-evident. While it is spoken of 
and argued about in many disciplines, its meaning has not been adequately understood, and 
defining it as a concept has proved to be just as difficult.  
Certainly attempts to define style have been made, and it takes little time to find 
passing comments or insightful remarks on the concept that capture something intuitive 
about it. But while it may never be a wholly neat concept, it has not, in my view, been tidied 
up nearly enough to make it a useful concept in the philosophy of depiction, and this is, in 
part, the task I set myself in this thesis. I set myself this task because I think the concept of 
style, once we can get at the root of its meaning, can be brought to bear on many of the 
concerns in the philosophy of depiction. It is, I claim, of great significance in helping us to 
better understand the way we depict the world.  
Indeed, the importance of style with regard to understanding artworks has rarely 
been denied. According to Jenefer Robinson, figuring out the aesthetic significance of a 
painting depends upon figuring out its style and, in particular, its place in the history of 
style.6 Robinson’s claim echoes the thinking of influential art historian Erwin Panofsky who, 
in his work Meaning in the Visual Arts, proposed that even determining the representational 
content - that is the literal subject matter - of a painting depends heavily on knowing what 
style it is in. For him, that the infant portrayed in Roger van der Weyden’s Three Magi is seen 
as an apparition and not as a small child hanging in mid-air is a result of our background 
knowledge of the painting and our ability to correctly locate it in its historical, stylistic, 
                                                
4 Semper, Gottfried. ‘Science, Industry and Art’, In Art in Theory 1815-1900: an anthology of changing ideas. 
Jason Gaiger, Charles Harrison, and Paul Wood (eds) (Blackwell 1942), p. 333 
5 Gadamer, Hans Georg. Wahrhert und Methode. 2nd edition, (Tubingen 1965), p.466  (My emphasis). 
6 Robinson, Jenefer. ‘Style and Significance in Art History’, In The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
Vol. 40. (1981), pp. 5-14 
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context7, while for Wollheim, ‘Style is a precondition of aesthetic interest.’8 Furthermore, as 
is the case for van der Weyden’s painting, stylistic considerations often prevent vast 
misunderstandings of artworks. As Mark Rollins points out in a recent paper, a critic once 
described Woman in Sunlight by Renoir as a woman whose body was depicted as bruised, as if 
it were rotting flesh, rather than as a woman whose body was dappled in sunlight and 
shadows.9 Thus there are also very clear practical reasons why style should be considered 
important.  
However, despite the central importance of artistic style with regard to 
understanding and appreciating artworks, determining the precise meaning of ‘style’ is, as I 
have already warned, no easy task. Indeed, even deciding where to begin when attempting to 
refine a concept that is used so widely and in a motley of distinct ways is, of course, a task in 
itself. However, since I have mentioned that one need not look far to find comments, 
remarks, and helpful insights into the notion of style, I think a good place to start is with 
these observations, so that we might see if there are any common threads that could help to 
weave the concept together. I think there are common threads, and threads that anticipate, 
however slightly, the account of style that I will go on to defend. What follows are a series of 
quotations that attempt to capture some sense of what we mean by the term ‘style’. I will go 
on to comment on them, and try to refine a little of what I think is the shared germ of an 
idea and understanding of style, but I think it works well for the reader to read them in 
succession, without interjection, so that the ideas and insights are given the individual 
attention they deserve.  
 
‘We represent the self in all we make, so that whether we are painting 
a picture or building a house or making a chair, we leave some trace 
of uniqueness on what we make. That trace of uniqueness is our 
style…’  
(Herbert Read: poet, art critic (and anarchist))10 
 
‘The tangled threads of each historical style cannot be combed 
straight, counted, and measured. A theory or a scholarship that 
attempted to do so would quickly destroy that vital essence for which 
works of art are treasured: their unique and inimitable reflection of a 
human personality.’ 
(Paul Zucker: art critic, art historian, and architect)11 
 
 
                                                
7 Panofsky. ‘Iconography and Iconology’. In Meaning in the Visual Arts, pp. 33-35. 
8 ‘Pictorial Style: Two Views’. In The Concept of Style, Berel Lang (ed), (1979), pp. 183-202, p. 188. 
9 Rollins, Mark. ‘Neurology and the New Riddle of Pictorial Style’. In The Aesthetic Mind, Elisabeth 
Schellekens and Peter Goldie (eds), (Oxford University Press 2011), pp. 391-413, p. 392. 
10 Read, Herbert, The Origins of Form in Art, (Thames and Hudson 1965), p. 178 
11 Zucker, Paul. Styles in Painting, (Dover Publications 1963), p. 10 
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‘Style has nothing to do with regions, nations, or schools…it is…a 
compliment to maniera12 and means something close to character or 
personal character.’13 
(Willibald Sauerländer (Art historian) speaking of the views of 
Giovan Pietro Ballori (Art historical biographer) 
 
‘Under the name style a self-sufficient language is evolved which has 
its roots only in the depths of the author’s personal and secret 
mythology.’14 
(Roland Barthes: literary theorist, philosopher, and linguist) 
 
‘The style is the man himself’15 
(Georges-Louis Leclerc, count de Buffon: French naturalist) 
 
What is common to all of the above remarks on the concept of style is a reference 
to an individual and their character or personality. Though it helps us in attribution, style 
seems not to be simply an amassing and cataloguing of recurrent features, it consists in 
something deeper than this; it is related to the person responsible for, and the creator of, 
those features. But the term ‘style’ did not always have a meaning similar to that captured by 
the above remarks. Considering the etymology and evolution of the term is helpful to 
demonstrate that it was a process, a gradual development and seeping into language, that we 
began to think and talk of style in this way.  
The meaning of the term ‘style’ has its origins in the Latin Stilus, meaning simply an 
instrument for writing; hence it had its beginnings in an association with the literary.16 But 
over time the term evolved into one of the most fundamental concepts in art history, related 
no longer to writing in its basic sense, but to individuality. It is documented by Sauerländer 
as being used in this sense, at least in Italy, by 1530, and the individual and personal 
connotations of the term ‘style’ had been established by the second half of the eighteenth 
century.17 What is remarkable about the evolution of the term, despite its connection to ‘a 
way of doing something’ with an instrument, is that the use of the term in relation to 
individuality and personality crept into our language seemingly so naturally that one would 
think we had always spoken in these terms, and furthermore we each appear to understand 
what is meant by it when we talk of the style of this or that artist, or this or that school. 
Looking back to its original meaning serves as a reminder that the term evolved and 
                                                
12 English translation: “Manner”, “Style” 
13 Sauerländer, Willibald. ‘From Stilius to Style: Reflections on the Fate of a Notion’. Art History, vol. 6 
(1983), pp. 253-270. p. 258.  
14 Barthes, Roland. Writing Degree Zero, trans. Annette Laver and Colin Smith, (Jonathan Cape 1967), p. 
10.  
15 Leclerc, Georges-Louis (count de Buffon) Discours sur le style, (Bibliotheque des meilleurs auteurs 
anciens et modernes, (Paris 1983), p. 12  
16 For a helpful discussion of the etymology of the term ‘style’ see: Kubler, George, ‘A Reductive 
Theory of Visual Style’, In The Concept of Style, Berel Lang (ed), (1979), pp. 163-173, p. 166. 
17 Sauerländer, ‘From Stilius to Style: Reflections on the Fate of a Notion’, p. 257-258. 
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transformed along with art and art history, and gained currency as a term embroiled with 
notions of individuality and personality without being subject to much scrutiny, or to being 
something of a ‘self-evident’ concept, as Gadamer proposed.   
Philosophical thinking on the concept of style has, over the last few decades, begun 
to shed further light on what this term might mean, and indeed many accounts diverge from 
this seemingly natural way of talking about individuality. This divergence demands that we 
reopen the case, if there is one, for conceiving of style in this way. I happen to think there is 
a strong case for defining the concept in this way, that is, by tying it closely to individuality 
and the personal, and that the threads of this way of talking throughout history are indeed 
pointing in the right direction. Of course, as there are other accounts on offer, what is 
needed is a critical analysis of those other accounts, and a persuasive argument for 
conceiving of the concept of style in terms of individuality and the personal.  
I think the first and most important step in the analysis of the concept of style is to 
refine the question that is the focus of this chapter. As I see it there are at least two distinct, 
though intimately related, questions that immediately spring to mind when considering the 
concept of style. The first question, which will be the title of the next section of this chapter, 
asks ‘what is style?’ This question demands an investigation into the nature of style itself, 
along with determining what style should be contrasted with, if there are any such 
candidates. The second question has an epistemological nature and can be formulated 
roughly as ‘how can we (the viewer) know, or know about, an artist’s style?’ This question 
only scratches the surface of our understanding of style and prompts further questions 
regarding whether we can perceive an artist’s style, that is whether we can literally ‘see’ a 
style.  
 In this chapter I will mainly be concerned with answering the first question, leaving 
the second question until the next chapter where it will be framed as part of a larger 
investigation into the nature of our experience of art more generally. To answer this first 
question I will spend some time discussing certain traditional views, which equate style with 
formal features or the manner in which something is expressed. Typically on these views, 
style turns out to be a matter of ‘how’ something is said as opposed to ‘what’ is said, which 
presupposes a distinction between form and content upon which a definition of artistic style 
can be constructed. I reject this account of style but suggest that there is still room for the 
‘how?’ question if we conceive of style as inherently connected to the way in which an artist 
does something. The ‘how?’ question, on my account, has significance when it relates to the 
process of creating artworks, which, I contend, can give us a satisfactory answer to our first 
question, namely ‘what is style?’ Thus in this first chapter, in which I give my own account of 
style, I attempt to come somewhat closers than others to placing my finger in just the right 
spot.  
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1.1 What is Style? 
  
The first part of the answer to the question ‘what is style?’ involves 
distinguishing between two types of style, namely ‘general’ and ‘individual’. As it turns 
out, what style is in each case is different. Here I restrict talk of style to pictorial styles 
since Richard Wollheim, one of the principle proponents of such a strict distinction, 
takes pictures as his primary subject. Clearly a distinction between general and individual 
style can be made when we talk about, and when the art historian identifies, pictorial 
works of art. But the nature of this distinction has become a matter of controversy due 
to scepticism about the stability of general style terms. This was prompted by Wollheim’s 
claim that only individual styles have what he calls ‘psychological reality’, whereas general 
styles serve only a taxonomic purpose.18 To have ‘psychological reality’ means that an 
individual style forms part of the artist’s mental store and has a significant influence over 
the way in which an artist works. General styles, however, serve only to organize and 
categorize works. As such, they lack explanatory value.   
Let us look a little closer at the notion of ‘psychological reality’ that Wollheim 
proposes for individual style. ‘The force of the claim that style has psychological reality’, 
Wollheim writes, ‘is that the style-processes that a correct style-description for a given 
artist presupposes are indeed part of that artist’s mental store.’ 19 The term ‘psychological 
reality’ is thus the name given to the contribution of cognitive processes to the act of 
painting, which directly influences the way an artist works. The contention that individual 
styles have psychological reality develops into what Wollheim terms a generative conception 
of style, one that is dependent on the underlying processes or operations within the artist. 
 General styles, on the other hand, according to Wollheim, do not have this 
psychological reality; they are merely taxonomic and devoid of any explanatory value, 
remaining classification tools or a shorthand for art historians. Wollheim subdivides 
general style into three forms: (a) universal style such as classicism, geometrical style, and 
naturalism. (b) historical or period style such as neoclassicism, art nouveau, and social 
realism. And (c) school style such as ‘the style of S’, where the painting is not by S.  
Wollheim builds two theses into his concept of general style.20 The first thesis is 
termed the description thesis, which proposes that general style terms are merely taxonomic 
and do not possess explanatory value. The second is the relativization thesis, which 
proposes that general style terms are relative to the changing points of view of art 
historians and as such are unstable. On this second thesis Wollheim writes, ‘style-
                                                
18 See: Wollheim. Painting as an Art, (Princeton University Press 1987), and Wollheim, ‘Pictorial Style: 
Two Views’. 
19 Wollheim, Painting as an Art, p. 194 
20 Ibid, pp. 183-184 
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descriptions can be written and re-written unconstrained by anything except prevailing 
art historical interests.’ 21 Hence, on this view, general styles are ‘…external to an artist, 
and they are not explicable in terms of some individual artist’s psychology or expressive 
aims.’ 22 As such the distinction between individual and general styles is construed as a 
distinction between what is internal and external to the artist.  
While there is certainly something intuitive about positing the distinction 
between individual and general style as a distinction between the internal and the 
external, the conception of general style argued for by Wollheim is not uncontroversial. 
Jason Gaiger argues that the description thesis, which maintains that attributing a style to a 
painter has no explanatory force in respect of her work, is questionable. He points out 
that this fails to acknowledge the crucial role played by general style terms in 
understanding and interpreting pictures. 23  He finds support for this in Nelson 
Goodman’s claim that the question as to whether concepts of style are merely ‘curatorial 
devices for sorting works according to origin’ is misleading since it assumes that 
‘attribution is alien to aesthetics’, 24 that is as if attribution had no role to play in our 
understanding of artworks as artworks. Indeed, this chapter began with suggestions by 
Robinson25 and Panofsky about the significance of style for understanding artworks. 
Without style attributions using general style concepts we would be unable to understand 
either art now or art of the past, or indeed the ways in which works relate to other works. 
Gaiger claims that art historical and art critical practice is essentially comparative, and seeks 
to understand the place artworks occupy in history alongside the developments, shifts, 
and changes in style, and why those changes occur, which is to understand the place of 
individual artworks within ‘a dynamic structure’.26 
Indeed, in his highly influential work The Critical Historians of Art, Michael Podro 
discusses a change in attitude of those critical historians writing at the end of the 
nineteenth century regarding past art. It became clear that, for critical historians such as 
J.F Herbart, Karl Schnaase, and Gottfried Semper, current art maintained an intimate 
relation to past art, adopting and transforming it so that past art was both developed and 
                                                
21 Ibid, p. 196 
22 Lamarque, Peter. Work and Object: explorations in the metaphysics of art. (Oxford University Press 2010), 
p. 143 
23 Gaiger, Jason. ‘The Analysis of Pictorial Style’, In The British Journal of Aesthetics. Vol. 42. No. 1. 
(2002), pp. 20-36, p. 23 
24 Goodman, Nelson, Languages of Art. (Hackett 1976), pp. 99-112 
25 Jenefer Robinson has also examined the way in which artists make use of general style categories—
in particular and appropriate ways—to bring out an individual expressiveness, which adds further 
point to the claim that general style concepts are not explanatorily devoid. She claims that general 
styles should be thought of as ‘a set of stylistic devices and conventions’, which can be inexpressive 
but can also be used in a way that conveys an artist’s own views, which amounts to the highly 
personal expression found in individual style. Robinson, Jenefer, ‘General and Individual Style in 
Literature’. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism Vol. 43, No. 2, (1984), pp. 147-158, p. 150. 
26 Gaiger, ‘The Analysis of Pictorial Style’, p. 23 
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taken up by current artworks. According to Podro, ‘The past work presents the ‘material’ 
to be transformed by its adaptation in the new work, and new material is absorbed and 
structured by being connected with art of the past.’ 27 Thus past art and past styles form 
an integral part of our understanding of pictures and their relation to their predecessors. 
Past and present are bound up with one another and evolve together. Abandoning these 
considerations and looking at general styles merely as categories that works can be 
subsumed under neglects the importance of present art’s relationship to past art, and 
misrepresents the task of the art historian. Gaiger rightly concludes that, ‘the task of 
comparison, and the establishment of a meaningful context of interpretation, should not 
be seen as an empty project of classification.’ 28 To conceive of general styles in this way 
would fail to recognize their significance in understanding art itself. 
 Gaiger also argues that the relativization thesis misrepresents art-historical practices 
and ‘excludes the possibility of a hermeneutically sensitive search for an increasingly 
correct employment of general style terms.’29 According to Gaiger, the practice of art 
history demands that any changes in the use of a term, or what it encompasses, should 
respond to and better develop previous categorizations. Art historians do not merely see 
their task as taxonomic, rather they perceive their task as what Gaiger describes as a 
‘collaborative and ongoing search’ into the correct identification and usage of style 
categories. In doing this they believe that such categories can tell us something about the 
artwork itself and do not merely reflect current art-historical tastes. General style terms 
thus prove to be an essential tool for attribution and origin, which help us to better 
understand pictures themselves and not just the current preoccupations of the discipline. 
As such the conception of general style is perhaps not as Wollheim proposes. 
However, while Gaiger’s criticisms of Wollheim for his uncharitable relegation 
of general style terms to merely taxonomic purposes are persuasive, the intuition that 
there is something fundamentally different about general style as opposed to individual 
style, which rests on a distinction between internal and external relations to the artist, 
emerges unscathed from Gaiger’s criticisms. While we can certainly accommodate the 
claim that general styles have a crucial role to play in interpreting and understanding 
pictures, we need not abandon the thought that individual style is something more deeply 
connected to the artists themselves. Thus general styles certainly contribute to 
interpretation, and allow us to make sense of pictures that, without the appropriate art-
historical knowledge of style, would be deeply misunderstood. However, they remain 
external to the artist in the sense that they are not necessarily inherently personal.  
                                                
27 Podro, Michael. The Critical Historians of Art, (Yale University Press 1982), p. 68 
28 Ibid, pp. 23-24 
29 Ibid, p. 22 
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While general styles inform and influence each and every artist, it is only when 
they are used to convey something highly personal that they form part of an individual 
style. To quote Jenefer Robinson, though here she is discussing literature, ‘[the artist] 
may adopt the “right” conventions but he does not use them to convey his own 
concerns, views and attitudes.’ 30 That is to say that general styles can form part of an 
artist’s resources in the process of creating their works. They can be used, moulded, and 
pointed to, but it is only when they are used in a way that is highly personal and 
individual to the artist that they form part of an individual style. Taken alone, general 
styles are not internal to the artist; they are not highly personal. Thus again the notion 
that individual style is internal to the artist, while general styles are external to the artist, 
reasserts itself. Of course this claim needs more detail, argument and refinement. As 
such we need to probe deeper into the notion of individual style to see if it really is 
contrasted with general style in this way. What then, is individual style? 
 
 
1.1.1 Individual Style: ‘what’ vs ‘how’ 
 
Let us begin by considering the definition of style as proposed by E.H. Gombrich in his 
entry on ‘Style’ in the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. ‘Style’, Gombrich writes, ‘is 
any distinctive, and therefore recognizable, way in which an act is performed or an artefact 
made.’31 Style, then, is a matter of ‘how’ something is done. Meyer Schapiro, who has offered 
some of the most in-depth analyses of the concept of style, proposed that, ‘the description of 
a style refers to three aspects of art: formal elements or motives, form relationships, and 
qualities…’ 32 Hence, on this view, style is rooted in the formal elements of the work, the 
way in which a subject matter is approached and transformed through formal qualities. Not 
only this, if it is the case that style is the way in which something is done, a matter not of 
what is said but how it is said, there must exist the possibility of choice between a set of 
alternatives. If there were only one way of doing things there could be no such thing as style. 
This sentiment is echoed by Winston Churchill’s reply to a barber who asked him in what 
style he would like to have his hair cut: ‘A man of my limited resources cannot presume to 
have a hair style − get on and cut it.’ (News Chronicle, London 19th December 1958).33 
Indeed, as Stephen Ullmann points out, the notion of synonymy plays a crucial role in the 
                                                
30 Robinson, ‘General and Individual Styles in Literature’, p. 152. 
31 Gombrich, E.H. ‘Style’. In International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, D.L. Stills (ed), Vol. 15. 
(Macmillan 1968), p. 352. 
32 Schapiro, Meyer. ‘Style’, In Anthropologie Today, A.L. Kroeber ed. (Chicago 1953), pp. 287-312,  
p. 287 
33 Gombrich cites this comment in his entry on style. 
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problem of style.34 That two artists could say the same thing but say it in two different ways 
gives us a clear and intuitive grasp on the concept of style. Hence choice, or the possibility of 
a choice, between a set of alternative ways or methods seems to be at the root of our 
understanding of style.35  
 With this intuitive model in place, we seem to have an obvious and clear 
way of describing the individual style of an artist. But perhaps it is not as clear-cut as this 
view supposes. The opening lines of Nelson Goodman’s ‘The Status of Style’ read as 
follows: 
 ‘Obviously, subject is what is said, style is how. A little less 
obviously, that formula is full of faults.’ 36 
 
What are the faults that Goodman is referring to? Firstly, Goodman proposes that 
architecture and non-objective painting, and indeed most music, have no subject, and as such 
their style cannot be a matter of how something is said for there is no ‘something’ to be 
said.37 According to Goodman, these kinds of artworks ‘do’ other things and mean in other 
ways. Secondly, and perhaps more damning to the view of style as form or manner, even 
where the only function of an artwork is saying, as might be the case in some literary works, 
Goodman points out that we shall have to recognize that some features of style will be 
features of what is said rather than the way of saying it.  
As an example, Goodman proposes that if one historian writes in terms of battles 
and another in terms of social changes, when they are writing about the same period, we 
shall have to say that their style is not only a matter of their prose or any other manner of 
saying, but of what is said.38 Furthermore, Goodman writes that, ‘part of a poet’s style…may 
consist of what he says—of whether he focuses on the fragile and transcendent or the 
powerful and enduring, upon sensory qualities or abstract ideas and so on.’39 We must 
therefore accept that, at least sometimes, some features of what is said count as aspects of 
style. 
 Goodman also attacks the central importance of synonymy, calling it a 
‘suspect notion’.40 He contends that very different things may be said in much the same way, 
and as such, synonymy of subject and variation of form, or ways of saying, is not always 
                                                
34 Ullmann, Stephen. Style in the French Novel, (Cambridge University Press 1957) 
35 However, while this seems like an intuitive way of thinking about the concept of style, I do not 
think this is quite right.  To anticipate a point I make later on concerning unconscious style, it seems 
to me that some aspects of an individual style are not chosen despite being inherently personal. 
Thus while it is necessary that there be alternative ways of doing things, the notion of choice, on my 
view, is less important.  
36 Goodman, ‘The Status of Style’, p. 799 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, p. 801 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid, p. 800 
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required to identify a style. Goodman also raises this point in his ‘On Likeness of Meaning’41, 
proposing that no two terms have exactly the same meaning, and he cites Graham Hough’s 
comment that, ‘…the more we reflect on it, the more doubtful it becomes how far we can 
talk about different ways of saying; is not each different way of saying in fact the saying of a 
different thing?’ 42 Hence, the notion of synonymy, and so the possibility of choice between 
alternative ways of saying much the same thing, looks less and less likely to be a candidate on 
which to formulate a definition of style that has its root in the distinction between form and 
content. As such the distinction between stylistic and non-stylistic features has to be drawn 
on other grounds. 
While I agree with Goodman that we have to accept that sometimes some features 
of what is said count as aspects of style, I worry that if we push his example in the other 
direction then we are still forced into a separation of what is said from how it is said. On 
Goodman’s view, it looks as if when both historians are writing about the same thing (in his 
example battles) in the same period then either: (a) they are in the same style, or, (b) their styles 
differ. The problem with the former is that it seems too narrow; we would not want to be 
forced into saying that works that deal with the same subject matter are in the same style. 
But the problem with the latter is that we appear once again to be forced into a ‘how’ vs 
‘what’ distinction as our basis for style, positing the distinction between form and content as 
indicative of style. We cannot, in this example, account for their being in different styles due 
to a difference in subject matter therefore, by implication, if we want to say they are in 
different styles it must be something to do with a difference in form.  
It is true that Goodman’s claim is only that sometimes what is said provides the 
criterion of difference between styles, but presumably when what is said cannot provide this 
difference then the implication is that form will do the work, which posits a distinction 
between form and content. Moreover, it is not obvious to me, even where two works have 
the same subject matter, that what is said is the same. This seems most clear in the case of 
literature, where many writers speak about love but say very different things about it. And in 
painting, two painters may depict a love scene, as such they are ‘talking’ about the same 
thing, but they might be saying very different things about it, and this difference need not be 
due to any difference in the formal features of the works. If this is true then we need not 
look only to form to provide the difference in style between two works with the same 
subject matter.  
                                                
41 There Goodman is concerned with determining the circumstances in which two terms or predicates 
can be said to have the same meaning, and rejecting previous accounts, in particular the view that 
two terms have the same meaning if they have the same extension. He concludes that, 'Theoretically, 
then, we shall do better to never say that two predicates have the same meaning but rather that they 
have a greater or lesser degree, or one or another kind, of likeness of meaning.' Goodman, ‘On 
Likeness Of Meaning', Analysis, Vol. 10. No. 1, (October 1949), pp. 1-7, p. 7 
42 Hough, Graham. Style and Stylistics, (London, 1969), p. 4 
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A converse thought also follows from Goodman’s example, which is that we would 
not want to be forced to say that works that deal with different subject matter cannot be in 
the same style, since this is obviously untrue. Two works could deal with wildly different 
subject matter and still be in the same style, and yet we would also not want, I think, to say 
that what accounts for them being in the same style is solely a matter of formal features; that 
is to say that the subject matter has varied but the form remains the same. I think we ought 
not to restrict style in these cases to purely formal features. As in Goodman’s example of 
poets focusing on the tender or the fragile, two works that have different subject matters can 
be in the same style not simply because of a similarity in formal features, rather it is due to a 
similarity in focus on the aspects of their chosen subject matter. As such, one might think 
that, where they focus on the same aspects they are in the same style. This anticipates, in 
part, the view of depiction that I will develop in Chapter Four.  
The point to be stressed here is that, even if two works deal with different subject 
matters, they can still do so in the same style, and this need not be solely a matter of having 
similar formal features, since their similarity in style may also be a matter of the way in which 
they deal with their subject matter. The subject matter of an artist’s work might vary radically 
and yet the works have a strikingly similar stylistic character. Their sameness of style is not 
restricted to sameness in form. Rather, their sameness in style consists in a sameness of their 
choice of focus, what they exclude from their work as well as what they include, and the way 
in which they do this. This, then, does not posit a strict separation of form and content as 
the basis on which to distinguish or match up styles. 
Goodman’s view, while teaching us important lessons about the role of subject 
matter in determining style, still forces us into a form/content distinction. However, there 
are independently good reasons (that is independent from our concerns about the concept of 
style) to think that we ought not to posit such a strict separation, which I will say more about 
below. Further, our being forced into this distinction seems to rest on a narrow conception 
of an artwork’s content, drawing simply on the subject matter. Hence, if we could get an 
account of a work’s content as being something different from subject matter alone, then 
this would do justice to the thought that sameness of subject matter does not amount to 
sameness in what is said or sameness in style. Similarly, with our ‘same style/different subject 
matter’ case, we can preserve the thought that it is not simply formal features that account 
for their being in the same style, since a more robust view of content might give us a way of 
claiming they are in the same style despite a difference in subject matter.  
I think if we can do this we will be in a better position to resist an account of style 
that rests on the distinction between what is said vs how it is said, that is, a distinction 
between form and content. I think we can, but to do so will involve a digression into a long 
running concern in aesthetics regarding the inadequacy of a separation of form and content 
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such that what is said or expressed in a work could be fully realized in a neat linguistic 
formulation or paraphrase. Indeed it is this concern that will lead us now to better 
understand what exactly the ‘content’ of a work of art is, since there are different ways of 
conceiving of it that go beyond Goodman’s formulation, which seems too thin to account 
for differences in what is said even where artists are talking about the ‘same thing’. 
 
 
1.1.2   Form/Content Unity and Style. 
 
As we have seen, some views about style seem to presuppose a distinction between form and 
content. However, many have argued against this separation. As such, if it turns out that the 
distinction between form and content is not warranted in cases where we are interested in 
artworks as artworks, then there will be no distinction between form and content on which 
to base our concept of style. Is the distinction warranted? Philosophers concerned with form 
and content unity usually take as their impetus A.C. Bradley’s renowned inaugural lecture 
‘Poetry for Poetry’s sake’.43 Bradley’s aim was to challenge two views about poetic value; on 
the one hand a naïve formalism which proposes that the essence, and so the value, of poetry 
lies in its formal properties, and on the other a naïve reductionism about content, which 
proposes that the essence of poetry lies in what it says or communicates about significant 
human concerns e.g. the fall of man. The rejection of these two naïve views leads him to his 
thesis of the unity of form and content. 
 
‘They [the naïve positions] imply that there are in a poem two parts, 
factors, or components, a substance and a form; and that you can 
conceive of them distinctly and separately, so that when you are 
speaking of the one you are not speaking of the other. Otherwise 
how can you ask the question, in which of them does the value lie? 
But really in a poem, apart from defects, there are no such factors or 
components; and therefore it is strictly nonsense to ask in which of 
them the value lies.’ 44 
 
The reason, according to Bradley, that asking whether substance or form is more valuable is 
nonsensical is because in a poem they are one and the same thing. They are identical. To see 
this more clearly we must turn to Bradley’s distinction between ‘subject’, ‘substance’, and 
‘form’. This should also help us refine the notion of content as it has been discussed thus far.  
‘Subject’, for Bradley, is roughly what a poem is about, its subject matter. And this is 
not internal to the poem since other poems or artworks could also have the same subject 
matter. Subject might include monarchs or well-known stories or places, matter that could 
                                                
43 Bradley, A.C. ‘Poetry for Poetry’s Sake’, in Oxford Lectures on Poetry. 2nd edition. (Macmillan 1926)  
44 Ibid, p. 4 
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easily be shared by other poems. Thus the opposite of subject is not form but the whole 
poem itself because, ‘the subject is one thing; the poem, matter and form alike, another 
thing.’ 45 ‘Substance’, for Bradley, or ‘content’, is the way in which that subject matter is 
realized in the poem itself. It is within the poem. The ‘form’, then, is something akin to the 
mode of realization of the subject within the poem; but although we appear to have 
identified three separate elements, for Bradley form and content are numerically identical. In 
effect to speak of one is to speak of the other. This identity of form and content is ‘the 
essence of poetry so far as it is poetry.’ 46 The poem itself is the form-content unity. Thus if 
we are to value the poem as a poem, we must value it as a form-content unity. This also 
applies to pictorial art, since two paintings could depict a landscape, that is they have the 
same subject, and yet differ radically in how they depict it, which is not simply reducible to a 
difference in formal features. The works themselves differ in how their chosen subject 
matter is realised; in what they focus on or choose to leave out, in what they say about their 
subject matter by depicting it in a certain way, all of which is particular to each work and 
cannot be shared by both despite sharing the same subject matter. 
One might talk about the literal subject matter, what can be shared by two works, or 
talk of form abstracted from the work such as rhyme, metre, rhythm, and so on, but this is 
to talk about them purely as formal properties, or subject matters, that could appear in other 
works. To attempt to abstract form as defined by Bradley will not be illuminating since it will 
not capture the particular form-content unity. What Bradley’s definition of form and content 
demands is work-specificity, their realization in a particular work. However we need not 
follow Bradley in his strict numerical identity of form and content. Peter Lamarque claims 
that we can capture this core idea in terms of a unity or mutual dependence.47 The key claim, 
however, is still that neither form nor content can be identified independently of the other. 
 But is it really the case that a work’s content cannot be paraphrased? Can 
we not have a less strict conception of content that doesn’t tie into the mode of realization, 
one that allows a more-or-less close paraphrase to satisfy sameness of content? Lamarque 
recognizes that this possibility rests on a reflection on the sameness of content and what 
would be required for this to occur.48 Lamarque’s contention is that content-identity is 
interest relative such that whether a paraphrase of a poem’s content is the same content 
expressed by the poem depends on the interest brought to the poem itself.49 Thus the 
sameness of content depends on the interest brought to the question of whether the content 
is the same. If our interest is in broad themes such as time or the power of love then we 
                                                
45 Ibid, p. 6 
46 Ibid, p. 15 
47 Lamarque, Peter. ‘The Elusiveness of Poetic Meaning’, In Ratio (new series), XXII (2009), pp. 398-
420, p. 409 
48 Ibid  
49 Ibid, p. 410 
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might indeed find many works that have the same content. However, if we are interested in 
reading poetry, if we are interested in the poem as a poem, then we must acknowledge that 
there is essentially only one way in which a work’s content is expressed. If this is our interest 
then content-identity is lost under any different form. Form-content identity is something 
assumed and demanded by the practice of reading poetry.  
 This is further supported by what is known as the principle of functionality, 
namely that what is found in the poem is there for a purpose.50 The form of expression is 
crucial under this principle. Hence if we extract lines aside from their context, or paraphrase 
them, we do not do justice to their dramatic context in which they have significance and 
function to express meaning. Only the original expression found in the work can do them 
justice.51 We also cannot be indifferent to substitution, that is, replacing one line with 
another that seems to more-or-less capture what was expressed by the original. This is 
because the meaning of a poem is context sensitive and reading poetry as poetry demands a 
sensitivity that is not expected in ordinary language. To substitute lines or abstract parts 
would be to change the meaning of the poem.  
Similarly for pictures, we cannot be indifferent to changes in the visual properties of 
the work, for not only will this affect the visual experience the picture elicits but also the 
appreciative response we have to it. For example, while it is possible to change visual 
elements of a painting by Constable and continue to see it as depicting the same subject, 
those changes fundamentally affect the particular experience we have of the work, and what 
make it a ‘Constable painting’, indeed this painting, and not a painting by someone else. The 
particular configuration of the two-dimensional surface, and the way in which that supports 
a visual experience of the depicted subject, is the work itself, and as such we cannot be 
indifferent to substitution in much the same way we cannot be indifferent to substitution in 
works of literature.  The principle of functionality is as pertinent in the visual arts as it is in 
the literary arts. As Roger Scruton points out, ‘Art provides a medium transparent to human 
intention, a medium for which the question, Why? Can be asked of every observable feature, 
even if it may sometimes prove impossible to answer.’ 52 
 Consequently, if we are interested in artworks as artworks we ought to take 
form-content unity as of great significance for both our understanding of art and our 
experience of it. Form and content are inextricably bound up, and their unity is the artwork 
itself. As Roland Barthes famously put it, 
‘If, until now we have looked at the text as a species of fruit with a 
kernel (an apricot for example), the flesh being the form and the pit 
being the content, it would be better to see it as an onion, a 
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51 Ibid, p. 414 
52 Scruton, Roger. ‘Photography and Representation’, in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic 
Tradition: an Anthology, P. Lamarque & S. Olsen (eds), (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 359- 374, p.368 
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construction of layers (or levels, or systems) whose body contains, 
finally, no heart, no kernel, no secret, no irreducible principle, 
nothing except the infinity of its own envelopes—which envelop 
nothing other than the unity of its own surfaces.’ 53 
 
 How does this relate to the concept of style and the thought that it ought 
not to be drawn on the basis of an opposition, or separation, of form and content? I think 
there are two conclusions to be drawn from this discussion. First, that if we accept form-
content unity then, for those views that presuppose this distinction, there is no significant 
sense of form as distinct from content to base a definition of style on. We cannot simply say 
that form is what constitutes a style since that would be to posit a separation of form and 
content, and further, would ignore the distinctive role that content plays in style.  
Secondly, I think the three-part distinction that Bradley makes can resolve the 
problem that I posed for Goodman concerning works that deal with the same subject 
matter. If we take it that works can have the same subject matter, in Bradley’s sense, we can 
still claim that they are saying different things and are in different styles since their fine-
grained content, understood in Bradley’s sense, is different. It is different because while it 
may deal with the same subject matter, its content at a fine-grained level is determined by 
how this subject matter is realized in the work itself.  Thus we need not look to form where 
subject matter appears to give out in providing a criterion of stylistic difference since works 
dealing with the same subject matter can still be radically different in what they say.  
Indeed a stylistic difference between two works might be possible even where the 
subject matter is broadly the same and the form is broadly the same (a sonnet, a formal 
portrait); the difference resides not in content or form alone but in the unique form-content 
unity. In releasing ourselves from the constraints of talking in terms of form differentiating 
styles of works that have the same subject matter we are not committing ourselves to, nor 
are we forced back into, a form/content distinction. Furthermore, we are still preserving the 
thought that what is said is as important to the concept of style as how it is said, since both 
can form part of an artist’s individual style. However, the challenge now is to fill the gap 
previously filled by form and formal features in our account of style. 
 
 
1.1.3   Individual Style: A ‘Features-Based’ Account 
 
If form vs content (or ‘how’ vs ‘what’) cannot give us a satisfactory account of style 
then what will? One way to get an answer involves turning our attention to how we attribute 
styles to artists. This would give us a combination of all of those features that determine 
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style. If we could get a list of this kind then style would be simply an amalgamation of those 
features that are typical of a particular artist. Our interest, then, is not in form-content unity 
but in correctly identifying stylistic features. This approach seems akin to what Goodman 
proposes as an alternative to identifying style purely with form. For Goodman, style ‘consists 
of those features of the symbolic functioning of a work that are characteristic of author, 
period, place or school.’ 54 Goodman’s account of style is thus features-based and takes a 
taxonomic turn. On this view we need not exclude subject matter such as setting or themes 
since they could be characteristic features that serve to identify when, where, and by whom 
an artwork was produced.  
 A consequence of this view is that stylistic features are identified as 
objective properties of objects such that they can be identified without presupposing further 
knowledge of the objects themselves. Stylistic features are inherent or intrinsic properties. 
However, not all the features that aid us in attribution are stylistic. Goodman excludes things 
such as the literal signature of the artist, the label on a picture, and the chemical properties of 
paint, since these do not contribute to the ‘symbolic functioning’ of the work. They are not, 
‘aspects of what the poem or picture or piano sonata says or exemplifies or expresses.’ 55 
Goodman says little about what is meant by ‘symbolic functioning’, and Dale Jacquette, 
writing on Goodman’s views on style, worries that this in itself may prove the definition to 
be a failure.56  
Putting issues of clarity to one side (we may all agree that artworks symbolize in one 
way or another), there are more difficult problems for Goodman’s account. Consider the 
case proposed by Jenefer Robinson of two perceptually indistinguishable canvases, which 
consist of a field of red crossed vertically by three thin black or white bands. Robinson 
writes that, 
‘One of these is a painting by Barnett Newman and has Barnett 
Newman’s style. The other was produced by me and is an unfinished 
design for my new open plan living room, the thin bands marking the 
positions in the room where I wish to place, respectively, a Japanese 
screen, a long sofa, and an étagère…we cannot tell the works apart 
just by looking at them, yet Barnett Newman’s painting has Barnett 
Newman’s distinctive style, whereas mine has no style at all. Why is 
this?’ 57 
 
The answer Robinson gives is that only the Barnett Newman canvas has aesthetic 
significance, the features of the painting such as the three black or white bands were created 
with a specific aesthetic intention. In Robinson’s room plan the placement of the lines has 
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practical but no aesthetic significance. Robinson adds that while her room plan can be 
looked at as if it were a Barnett Newman, the fact remains that it was not created with any 
aesthetic intention and does not have any aesthetic status. Thus we cannot know whether 
something has a style until we know it has aesthetic significance. Put another way the 
thought is that we cannot know a feature is stylistic until we know what it is a feature of. 
Thus if we cannot know a feature is stylistic merely on the basis of looking, then a taxonomy 
of features that serve to identify a work cannot be of much help in figuring out the style it is 
in. Put simply, we need to know more. On Goodman’s view, the Barnett Newman-like room 
plan has features that would serve to identify Newman as the artist, and so has his style. A 
features-based view of style thus gives us odd results in determining which objects have an 
individual style.  
 Robinson’s argument can be seen to form part of a widespread concern in 
aesthetics with the idea of aesthetic properties, which originated in the work of Frank 
Sibley.58 The claim is that an artwork’s perceptual properties include aesthetic as well as non-
aesthetic ones. Aesthetic properties include things like a sense of mystery and tension, which 
are just as much features or characteristics of works as art as non-aesthetic ones such as dark 
colouring and diagonal composition. They are in the work to be seen, heard, or otherwise 
perceived there, but they are dependent on non-aesthetic properties; they are emergent or 
Gestalt properties. It is because of the dark colouring and diagonal composition of a painting 
that it has a sense of mystery or tension.  
             However, contra Sibley, Kendall Walton argues that aesthetic properties cannot be 
discovered merely by examining the works themselves. We need to know some other facts 
about the origins of works of art, and in particular the category to which they belong.59 
Walton proposes that the aesthetic properties a work seems to have depend in part on which 
of its features are standard, variable, and contra-standard for us, and this will depend on the 
category we perceive the work to be in. Such categories include media, genre, form, and the 
category we are most interested in here, namely style.  
I do not want to claim that stylistic properties are necessarily aesthetic properties; 
some may be and some may not be. In fact the identification of stylistic properties with 
aesthetic properties is something I will argue against in the next chapter. But it may be worth 
pausing here to consider what kind of properties style properties are if they are not aesthetic 
properties. One might think that rather than being aesthetic properties style properties are a 
kind of artistic property, and the vast literature dedicated to distinguishing between the two 
is testament to the importance of the distinction when it comes to understanding the 
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evaluation of artworks.60 What is the distinction? Peter Kivy claims that aesthetic properties 
are essentially structural and sensual properties, and thus artistic properties, ‘concern any 
relevant properties other than the aesthetic’.61 Jerrold Levinson describes an artistic property 
as a property that, while appreciatively relevant, ‘embodies relations to the surrounding 
cultural context as a whole’, and thus not directly perceivable in a work,62 while Tomas Kulka 
describes an artistic property as a ‘complex relation which is in need of further explication.’63 
Examples of artistic properties include originality,64 influentiality, and skilfulness, which, 
according to Kivy, Levinson, and Kulka, are not perceivable in the work itself.  
Might style properties thus count as artistic properties? If, as according to Kivy, an 
artistic property is an appreciatively relevant property, then I see no reason in principle why 
some style properties cannot be artistic properties. However, I do not think style properties 
are necessarily artistic properties; again some might be and some might not be. My way of 
walking, for instance, might be a stylistic property, but it doesn’t seem to be an artistic 
property.65 Further, I am hesitant to categorise style properties as artistic properties if the 
other part of the characterisation of artistic properties is true, which claims that they are 
relations that are not directly perceivable in artworks. Indeed, in the next chapter, I argue 
that style properties can be perceptually represented. Whether the characterisation of artistic 
properties as imperceptible is correct will depend, in part, on the willingness to admit such 
properties into the contents of perception. I think there are good reasons, to be outlined in 
the next chapter, to think that style properties can be perceptually represented. Whether this 
extends to all artistic properties is another question. The arguments that I offer in the next 
chapter may be grist to the mill of someone who wished to claim that imperceptibility is not 
a defining feature of an artistic property. However, should it turn out that one can directly 
perceive artistic properties, then I would have no concerns about subsuming some style 
properties under that category. For now, then, I claim that while style properties are 
aesthetically relevant, they are not necessarily aesthetic properties, and the question of 
whether some style properties are artistic properties I leave open until it is decided whether 
artistic properties can be perceptually experienced.  
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To return to Walton’s discussion of categories, while the discussion here revolves 
around the notion of aesthetic properties, I think there are important lessons to learn from it 
regarding identification of style properties. Lessons that show that Goodman’s view cannot 
be right. Let us firstly elucidate Walton’s notion of standard, variable, and contra-standard 
properties. A standard property is one in virtue of which works in a category belong to that 
category, such that lacking that feature would disqualify works from that category. A variable 
property is a property where the possession or lack of it in a work is irrelevant to whether or 
not a work qualifies for the category. A contra-standard property is a feature whose presence 
tends to disqualify works as members of the category. Thus a painting might have the 
standard feature of flatness, a variable property such as what is depicted, but it could not be 
three-dimensional since that feature will disqualify the work from being a painting. The 
thought then is that the category in which we perceive the work to be in will affect the 
aesthetic properties it seems to have.66 
Walton supports this with his now famous example of a society in which painting 
does not exist but which produces a kind of work of art called guernicas, which are like 
Picasso’s ‘Guernica’ but done in various bas-relief dimensions such that the surfaces 
protrude from the wall. In this society, Picasso’s ‘Guernica’ would be counted as a guernica 
rather than as a painting. Its flatness is variable under the category of guernicas and the figures 
on its surface are standard relative to the category guernicas. Thus the flatness, which is 
standard for us, is variable for members of the other society. 67 
 What follows from this is that the difference between those features which 
are standard and variable for us, and those which are standard and variable for the other 
society, would make a significant difference to our aesthetic reaction to ‘Guernica’ and theirs. 
To us it seems violent, dynamic, and disturbing, but for them it would be cold and lifeless. 
While we take no note of ‘Guernica’s’ flatness, since it is a standard feature for painting, they 
will find it striking and noteworthy, perhaps it might even be thought to be the most 
expressive feature of the work. Thus aesthetic properties like violent or disturbing depend on 
which category we perceive the work as belonging to.  
While this discussion has been limited to aesthetic properties, I think the general 
lesson—that we need to know more about a work before we can understand and appreciate 
it in the appropriate way—applies similarly to stylistic properties. To use Walton’s example, 
while for us Guernica is a painting that has Picasso’s distinctive style, for the society in which 
multiple guernicas are made, Guernica would not have Picasso’s style, it would simply be 
another guernica, and a flat one at that.  
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Of course we might say that all of these guernicas share Picasso’s mode of depiction 
but this looks like a case of having imitated a style rather than of having Picasso’s distinctive 
style. This anticipates an argument concerning imitation of style that will be discussed in the 
final section of this chapter. I think it would be a mistake to say that all of these guernicas have 
Picasso’s individual style, even where they might imitate surface features perfectly. And 
Walton’s example seems to demonstrate this, since, in order to know what features count as 
stylistic, we need to know about an artist’s individual style. Individual style explains the 
stylistic features present in a work. Thus a perfect copying of features would not amount to 
having that individual style, even where it might imitate and share certain features.  
The lesson to be drawn from Walton’s discussion of categories is that we need to 
know more about a work before we can say what style it is in and subsequently identify 
stylistic features. If we remind ourselves of the opening remarks from Panofsky concerning 
misunderstandings and determining subject matter, we can agree that even our seeing a 
subject in a picture can depend on knowing about its style, and, while stylistic features serve 
to help us in attribution and in steering us towards the correct experience of the work, the 
individual style itself is not reducible to those features. Hence a taxonomic view of style that 
roots an artist’s style in those features that serve to identify origin cannot work, since we 
would already need to know which features are relevant to style and which are irrelevant, 
which can only be achieved by knowing more about the artwork itself, such as what style it is 
in. In short, in order to know what style a work is in we would need to identify stylistic 
features, but to identify those features we would first need to figure out the style. Thus style 
is prior to the taxonomy, not identical to it.  
Furthermore, this account of style seems to me to have conflated the two questions 
I proposed at the beginning, namely ‘what is style?’ and ‘how can we identify or know an 
artist’s style?’ Goodman’s view seems to answer only the second question, since it tells a 
story about, and makes sense of, how we attribute styles to artists; but it is style that put 
those features there in the first place. His view seems to make style something of an 
afterthought, something that can be used merely as a tool of classification. A list of features 
may help us determine a general style, which we identified as external to the artist, and to 
attribute styles to artists but it does not get to the core of individual style itself. Thus we 
must look elsewhere to define the concept. 
 
 
1.2 Individual Style: Style as a Way of Doing Something 
 
Thus far we have rejected conceptions of style that draw on the distinction between 
form and content along with features-based accounts of individual style. Hence, an adequate 
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account of style needs to consist not only in the ‘how’ but also in the ‘what’, as unified in the 
work of an artist, and must avoid a taxonomic definition that reduces individual style to the 
stylistic features. But does the ‘how?’ question really have no application in a discussion of 
style, given that its place therein seems so intuitively appropriate? Consider again the 
definition of style proposed by Gombrich: ‘Style is any distinctive, and therefore 
recognizable, way in which an act is performed or an artefact made.’ 68 Read one way we are led 
to the form-content distinction, but read another way we are led to a view that locates artistic 
style in the action of an artist, in the act of creating an artwork.  
One acts-based view of style is that of Kendall Walton’s, and it is one with which 
the view I shall defend shares important similarities. However, my view also contains 
important differences, which I hope will become clear in the following discussion. In his 
paper ‘Style and the Products and Processes of Art’, Walton contends that while we think 
our interest is bound up only in the works of art themselves, when it comes to matters of 
artistic style we ought to be concerned with the manner in which the work was made. 69 One 
motivation for thinking that this is the right way of conceiving of style concerns the way in 
which we treat, and talk about, natural objects, that is objects that are not the products of 
human action. Walton writes that, ‘Poems and paintings are sometimes witty, or morbid, or 
sophisticated, but it is hard to imagine what a witty tulip, or a morbid mountain, or a 
sophisticated lake would be like.’ 70 Furthermore, when these kinds of qualities are present in 
a work of art they are often aspects of the style of the works. In natural objects, however, we 
do not think the same. 71 
 Another motivation for turning our attention to processes rather than 
products is the evident inadequacies of what Walton terms ‘the cobbler model’ of the art 
institution. On this model the art institution has a three part structure: the producer, the 
product and the consumer or, on the cobbler model’s terms, the cobbler, who makes the shoes, 
which are worn by the customer. On this view the entire point of the process consists in how 
well the shoes fit the customer. As such the customer need not concern himself with the 
cobbler’s process of making them. All that matters is the shoes themselves. We can see this 
structure mirrored in the artworld. We have an artist who is the producer, the work of art 
produced, and the appreciator. What reservations should we have about this model 
according to Walton? 
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 The overarching dissatisfaction with this model stems from the thought that 
it focuses too much attention on the work of art, the object, and not enough on the act or 
process of making it.72 Counterexamples to this model immediately spring to mind such as 
performance art and dance, where the focus is almost exclusively on what the artist does. In 
certain performance pieces, or what might be called avant-garde, there is no product at all.73 
The art consists in what the artist does. Similar points could be made regarding readymades 
such as Duchamp’s Fountain. Here the object of interest seems to be not what he made, but 
what he did. We might also consider photography to be a case in which the actions that 
produce the product are of significance, not merely because of the techniques involved in 
photography, but also because of the considerable planning and lengths to which some 
photographers go to get the perfect shot. For example, some of the most fascinating 
photographs by Cindy Sherman are those in which she has photographed herself at a 
seemingly impossible angle, and the incredible ways in which she has transformed herself as 
the subject. Thus when I look at a Cindy Sherman photograph my thoughts are often 
focused on what had to be done, and in what way, in order to produce the image in front of 
me. Thus we cannot expect that a viewer who is interested in appreciating the style of work 
can simply immerse herself in the work alone without any consideration of the artist’s 
actions, since, as we have learnt from Goodman, what is said or done is as important as how 
it is said or done. 
 Thus there are significant reasons to refer to the actions of an artist and the 
process of creation when considering artistic style. And given our talk of the style a work is 
done in, or styles of painting or writing, along with our hesitation to make style attributions to 
natural or non-made objects, it seems right for Walton to deduce that, ‘It is beginning to 
look as though human action has something to do with all style attributions.’ 74 Another 
advantage of an acts-based account of style is that it avoids excluding subject matter or 
content from style considerations since part of an individual’s style may consist in what she 
chooses to do, or say, or depict. However, there remains still an important question 
regarding action. For if style is a way of doing something, what exactly is it that artist’s do?  
What is the action being performed? As Peter Lamarque points out, ‘if a style is a way of 
doing something then what the style is, is logically dependent on what is being done.’ 75 To 
return to Walton’s account of style, he has a particular kind of action in mind, which rests on 
the kind of action he thinks could be visible to a spectator.  
 Walton proposes that, ‘we may begin with the suggestion that we “see” in a 
work the action of producing it, and that the work’s style is a matter of what sort of action is 
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visible (or audible, or otherwise perceptible) in it.’ 76 But this needs modification, for what an 
artist actually did may not correspond with the action we “see” in the work. Thus the idea 
Walton intends to pursue concerns how a work appears to have been made, that is what kind 
of action it looks like the artist performed in making it. It is this appearance of an action, 
rather than the actual action performed which requires reference to the artist and their 
intentions, that is crucial to a work’s style. Walton’s view turns on the idea that the aesthetic 
qualities a work possesses, that is, qualities of style such as exuberance, playfulness, 
morbidity, and so on, are possessed by virtue of appearing to have been made by certain kinds 
of actions.77 Thus the character of a work’s style is intimately related to how it appears to 
have been made. ‘Tentatively’, Walton writes, ‘to be in a flamboyant, sentimental, or timid 
style, is to appear to have been created in a flamboyant or sentimental or timid manner.’ 78 
 Walton’s qualification that style is related to how a work appears to have 
been made, rather than what actions were actually performed, can be seen to answer a 
familiar concern regarding artists’ intentions, namely the intentional fallacy. Monroe 
Beardsley has criticized references to artists’ intentions as a means of validating 
interpretations, proposing that what we should really be talking about are the works 
themselves and not the artists.79 Thus, on Walton’s view, we can translate talk about an 
artist’s intentions into talk about what intentions it looks like the artist had, judging by the 
work itself. Any tension is thus resolved by the distinction between actual and apparent 
artists.  
However, Walton rightly acknowledges that sometimes knowledge about what an 
artist actually did will affect our experience of the work, and indeed how it appears to us.80 
This thought acknowledges the fact that the way things look or sound is often conditioned 
by what we know or believe. This background knowledge need not always be specific 
though. Often common knowledge regarding culture and historical context is simply 
available to us, such that we can successfully determine with accuracy what exactly the artist 
did or tried to do. Thus background knowledge often serves to establish what an artist did, 
as well as changing our perception of what it looks like she did when we attend to the work. 
The point of this qualification for Walton is to demonstrate that how the features of 
artworks appear to have been made, and so the qualities they possess, depends not just on 
the features themselves but on the context and the kind of background knowledge available. 
Hence, although style is not necessarily tied into the actions an artist actually performed, or the 
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intentions they actually had, Walton is prompting us to take note of the fact that there are 
cases in which background knowledge informs what we see. 
Walton goes on to draw the following conclusion from this discussion. He claims 
that flamboyance and timidity, namely those properties linked to apparent artists, are 
expressive.81 And what constitutes being in a certain style is not having an expressive nature, or 
the expression itself, but having certain features such as thin wiggly lines, painterliness, 
balance and so on, which are expressive. Style, then, is not expression but the means of 
expression, which is identified by having expressive features. The expressive features are what 
“do” the expressing in the work.  His account thus locates styles of works firmly in the 
works themselves since the means of expression, tied into the apparent actions of the artist, 
can be read off the work itself. In short, style is a matter of what appears to have been done, 
which results in expressive properties that, on Walton’s view, are stylistic features.  
 I will not continue pursuing Walton’s discussion and his attempt to pin 
down those properties or features in detail; thus far we have enough to establish our main 
concern, namely the kind of action that is being performed. On Walton’s account the action 
he identifies is the apparent action of an artist using her materials and creating the artwork, 
which is visible in the work itself. Thus the action apparent to a viewer would be something 
like the action of dropping paint onto a canvas as opposed to applying it with a brush. To 
the viewer it appears, judging by the work itself, that the painting was painted by the action 
of dropping rather than brushing. Hence Walton’s account of action, and so style, is 
essentially bound up with the use of material and medium.  
 Given that this is the action Walton is referring to when he defines style as a 
matter of how an artist did something, it is not surprising that what we can “see” in a 
painting is an action that concerns only the use of materials. Furthermore, it turns out to be 
the way in which the materials appear to have been used that indicates the style of an artist 
since the way the materials are used is responsible for those features that Walton identifies as 
expressive, namely features such as ‘thin wiggly lines’, painterliness, and balance. Those 
features are expressive but, again, for Walton it is not the expression itself that constitutes 
the style, but rather the means of expression, which is bound up with the kinds of actions 
performed by artists in making their works. For Walton, the kinds of actions performed by 
artists that are visible in a work concern the use of materials. Thus we can say of a painting, 
for example, that ‘it is in a flamboyant style because the paint seems to have been splattered 
onto the canvas rather than brushed on’. Hence statements about style are statements that 
refer to the apparent actions of the artist, to what she appears to have done with her 
materials.  
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 However, while shifting the notion of style into action looks like a positive 
way forward, I don’t think we have come as far as we would like in our attempt to define 
style. The problem for Walton’s account is that by concerning himself only with actions to 
do with use of materials, and so with expressive features indicative of those actions, Walton’s 
view comes dangerously close to the form/content distinction that was shown to be 
inadequate as an account of artistic style. Indeed by selecting features such as ‘painterliness’ 
and ‘balance’ as expressive features indicative of style, we can see that a conception of style 
that talks in terms of formal features has crept in, for an explicit concern with the handling 
of materials leaves no room for considerations of content. 
Walton himself almost explicitly states the absence of content considerations with 
regard to style when he writes that, ‘styles are to be identified not with what is expressed but 
with what in the work does the expressing.’ 82 Hence we seem to have a view of style that 
involves something akin to the claim that style is not what is said but the way it is said. 
Furthermore, as we have seen, the ‘way’ or ‘ways’, he identifies as doing the expressing are 
exclusively formal in their being bound up with the way in which artists use their materials to 
produce a sense of ‘balance’ or ‘flamboyance’. While there is certainly room for 
consideration of the way in which artists use materials in a concept of style, in fact this may 
be highly significant in some cases, it leaves little room for content considerations, which, as 
we have seen, are often a crucial part of an artist’s style. The preoccupation with action 
concerning the handling of materials fails to give the content of works their significance in 
individual style. Thus we are left with the unhappy picture of style we began with.  
 How can we avoid these consequences whilst preserving the thought that 
style is essentially bound up with action or what the artist does? As we saw, my agreement 
with Walton stemmed from his shifting of the ‘how?’ question back into action, which gave a 
reading of Gombrich’s definition a different application. But we also saw that this can easily 
lead us to the form versus content view of style. It can, I think, also lead us to another view 
of style that gives the ‘how?’ question application without positing a sharp distinction 
between form and content. I will spend the remainder of this chapter discussing this view, 
and some modifications of it that, I think, will give us the right account of individual style.  
 
 
1.2.1   Individual Style: Style, Personality, and the Personal 
 
As we saw, one kind of answer to the question of what an artist does is that she 
does things with materials, for example, applying paint to a canvas. Her style, then, becomes 
a matter of how, or the way in which, she applies paint to the canvas. This seems to be 
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roughly the answer Walton proposes in his account. But according to some theorists there is 
also something else an artist does when creating her work, something more than, though 
intimately related to, what she does with her medium. One thing that an artist does, over and 
above applying paint to a canvas in a certain manner, is express something, be it an idea, a 
feeling, or a personality. Her style, then, will be a matter of how she does this; it is the 
pattern of intricate artistic intentions manifested, and identified, in the work.  
This way of thinking about the concept of style is not new, it is anticipated in art 
history, and it is alluded to when many thinkers reflect on the notion of style (not least in the 
series of quotations with which I began this chapter). Moreover, there are very recent 
accounts of individual style, such as Jenefer Robinson’s83 and Peter Lamarque’s84, who 
propose that style is indeed a way of doing something where that way of doing something 
expresses an artist’s personality. They tie individual stylistic features into the manifesting of 
an artist’s underlying psychological states or processes, and as such they are only identifiable 
in relation to them. A distinctive style, for Robinson and Lamarque, is ‘an expression of the 
individual personality of the author (or implied author) of that work.’ 85 This view is also 
affirmed by Nigel Warburton, who uses it to mount a persuasive argument against what he 
calls Roger Scruton’s ‘implicit position’, namely that photographs cannot be art. He writes 
that, ‘Individual style is the style of an individual: it is therefore a distinctive pattern of 
human intentions (or apparent intentions) communicated through works of art and revealing 
an apparent underlying personality.’ 86 Individual style, then, is precisely a matter of the way 
that personality manifests itself in the work. 
This conception of style is heavily intentionalist, and echoes Wollheim’s contention 
concerning the ‘psychological reality’ of individual styles. In his ‘Pictorial Style: Two Views’, 
Richard Wollheim writes that, ‘insofar as we are interested in paintings we are interested in 
the paintings of painters’ 87 and this is because ‘it is…only in the hands of painters that 
painting is expression.’ 88 Consequently if we are interested in artworks we should, in the 
knowledge that they are made, be interested in artists and their actions, and look to these in 
our thinking about individual artistic style. This view of style has the advantage of not 
limiting stylistic features to formal features, and as such it makes sense of the thought that 
individual style consists just as much in what is done as how it is done, since what is done, 
and what has been chosen to be done, is indeed conceptually linked to a way of doing 
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88 Wollheim, Richard. On Art and the Mind, (Harvard University Press 1974), p. 95
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something. This way of doing something, which manifests an artist’s personality, is the 
artist’s style.  
 While I am sympathetic to talk of a way of doing something, and indeed take 
this phrase as getting close to the notion of individual style, I hesitate in appealing to the 
concept of expression as partially constitutive of the concept of style. Thus while the 
view I will go on to develop shares important similarities with the views espoused by 
Lamarque, Robinson, and Warburton, it differs in distancing the concept of style from 
the concept of expression. While I share the view that an individual style is connected to 
the person who made the work that has the style, the concept of expression comes with 
a heavy conceptual burden. The problem that presents itself to this conception of style is 
roughly this: if style is a matter of how an artist expresses herself, of the way in which she 
reveals her underlying psychological states, then should the artist not actually be in the 
state the work purports to express then the work cannot be an expression of that inner 
state. Furthermore, if it cannot be expressive in this way without the correlative 
underlying inner state then it cannot be said to have the correlative expressive, and so 
stylistic, quality. For if expressive features are stylistic features, and expressive features 
are non-contingently related to an artist’s underlying inner states, then, should the artist 
not have that inner state, there will be no genuine expressive feature and as such there 
will be no stylistic feature.  
This is at odds with the fact that there could be cases in which a work seems 
expressive of, say, sadness, where the artist himself does not genuinely feel sad. Indeed 
John Hospers cites records left by artists who created artworks where the expressive 
qualities of the work in no way matched their inner state of mind. For example, he cites 
Poe as giving an account of the ‘cold-blooded calculation’ while writing his infamous 
poem ‘The Raven’.89 Should this be the case, the Expression Theorist would be forced to 
say that the work is not expressive of, say, sadness at all; that we were mistaken. The 
work cannot be in a sad style unless the artist was actually sad himself, for without his 
sadness there can be no expression of sadness and as such there can be no such 
expressive qualities in the work. This has the odd consequence that the expressive 
qualities of an artwork become falsifiable based on information about the artist, which is 
inconsistent with the way we actually treat and talk about them.  
Indeed Alan Tormey has provided a persuasive argument to the point that works of 
art can be ‘expressive’ while not containing expression, and so not committing us in any way 
to claims about the underlying psychological states of the artist. He proposes that the reason 
standard conceptions of art as expression get into the difficulties noted above has its basis in 
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a misunderstanding of the logic of ‘expression’ and ‘expressive’. 90 He proposes that once 
this misunderstanding is removed it is plausible that the presence of expressive properties 
does not entail the occurrence of a prior act of expression. Once expressive properties are 
shown to be independent of previous acts of expression we are permitted to use the concept 
of ‘expressive’ in a way that does not commit us to any facts about artists and their actions. 
Thus statements about the work are not about the person who created it. Tormey captures 
this nicely when he writes that,  
‘…Statements about the expressive qualities of an art work remain, 
irresolutely, statements about the work, and any revision or rejection 
of such statements can be supported only by referring to the work 
itself. ‘That’s a sad piece of music’ is countered not by objections 
such as, ‘No, he wasn’t’…but by remarking ‘You haven’t listened 
carefully’ or ‘You must listen again.’ ’91 
 
Perhaps one might object here that by merely talking of emotion we have 
ignored other crucial things an artist might wish to express. Indeed, Robinson and 
Lamarque talk of artists expressing their personality, values, interests, and aims in their 
artworks. However, given the commitment to the claim that ‘individual stylistic features 
are a manifestation of underlying psychological states’,92 I believe the problem still 
presents itself even if one talks of expressing personalities or values. The problem might 
be posed as follows: if stylistic features are expressive of a personality or a system of 
values then, should an artist not have the personality or value system that the work 
appears to express, it cannot be expressive of that personality or value set and cannot 
have those expressive features. If it cannot have those expressive features it cannot have 
those stylistic features and as such it cannot be in the style we perceive it as being in. 
Moreover, as Lamarque has pointed out, ‘what the style is, is logically dependent on what 
is being done.’93 However, if style is a matter of the way in which an artist expresses her 
personality through her work, then if there is no expression, as would be the case if there 
were no corresponding inner state or personality “behind” the artwork, then there is 
nothing being “done”, and if there is nothing being done there can be no way of doing it 
and as such there can be no style.  
Judith Genova poses this as a significant problem for any account of style that 
locates it in the person making the object, accounts that she groups together under the 
heading ‘The Signature View’.94 She characterises the view as committed to the claim that 
works have the style they have because they are made by a maker that has that style. She 
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poses two problems for this view, which run along the lines of the problem as I phrased 
it above. First, that works may express things like states or feelings that are not possessed 
by the maker, and second, that when we talk of the style of a work we are talking about 
the work and not the person, that the stylistic features belong to the work. As such, 
works literally possess those properties so any statement about them must be a statement 
about the work and not the person who made it. 
We can now see how this problem parallels the problem Walton identifies for 
his account and prompts his move from actual to apparent artists. If we remember, the 
problem for Walton was that sometimes how a work appears to have been made often 
does not tally with how it was actually made. As such, if style were a matter of how the 
artist actually went about using his materials, then we would be forced to conclude that 
statements about the style of a work of art are actually statements about the artist 
himself. And as Walton himself points out, this leaves open the possibility of an 
intentional fallacy lurking in the account. But by moving from actual to apparent artists, 
and making style a matter of how a work appears to have been made, Walton locates 
style firmly in the works.  
Might this move to an apparent or implied author rescue Robinson’s account of 
style as a way of doing something that is expressive of personality? Indeed Robinson 
does make this move in places. In ‘Style and Personality in the Literary Work’ she writes 
that, ‘what is more typically expressed by the style of a work is not the personality of the 
actual author, but of…the “implied author”, that is, the author as she seems to be from 
the evidence of the work.’ 95  This might seem to rid us of the commitments to 
underlying psychological states in conceiving of style.  
However, in this move to an implied author it is concerning how much of the 
very core of a theory that locates style as in part constituted by the expression of a 
personality is lost. The move to an implied author seems innocuous, but when 
considering what proponents of such a view claim about the benefits of the view, namely 
that it makes sense of why style is a highly individual and personal way of doing 
something, it threatens the very plausibility of the view which, I think, stems precisely 
from its connection with the actual artist. It is the artist that has made the work, it is the 
artist who puts their style into their work, and, to repeat Goodman, we cannot act as if 
attribution were alien to aesthetics. Thus, in an attempt to rescue the account from the 
charge of an intentional fallacy about artistic style, the very substance of the account is 
lost. 
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Hence, the view of style as a way of doing something that is expressive of a 
personality faces a dilemma if it is committed to the concept of expression being heavily 
involved in the concept of style. On the one hand the separation of the personality apparent 
in the work from that of the actual person who made the work loses something crucial about 
the account of style as connected with personality; and, on the other, if we preserve the 
connection with expression we end up in serious difficulties concerning a mismatch between 
what is expressed in the work and the actual expression of the artist. Thus the view is an 
unhappy one. However, the view gets some good results, I believe, in conceiving of style as a 
way of doing something. Where it goes wrong is in tying this way of doing something into 
expression, which as I have said comes with a heavy conceptual burden. Thus the view I will 
now develop takes as its starting point the notion of a way of doing something. 
As I see it, there is no reason why a way of doing something need necessarily be tied 
into expression or expressing. One way of doing something might express something; another 
way of doing something might not. My way of sighing loudly while sitting at my desk may express 
frustration or sadness, or it may not express anything, it might be that I haven’t taken 
enough deep breaths for some time, so, after having breathed in heavily that breath needs to 
be forced out again. Nothing particularly expressive is going on here.  
However, the way in which I sigh, expressive or not, is my way of sighing, it is 
particular to me, and in a sense, highly personal. So, while the action of sighing may say 
nothing about my underlying psychological states, it can still be very personal to me. One 
might even say that my way of sighing has my individual style. Of course the move to a 
discussion of artworks and style changes the scope of the lesson to be learnt from my little 
example, but I think the general model holds. When I paint I do something; the way in which I 
do this, whether it be throwing paint or dabbing it, whether I choose humanity as my subject 
matter or trees on a skyline, whether I emphasize the leaves on the trees as contrasted with 
the branches, or give very little detail here or there, or ignore some aspects and hone in on 
others, is highly personal to me and is my individual style, that is my way of doing something. 
‘Ways of doing things’ need not be restricted to formal features, and nor do they have to 
connect up with the concept of expression. One might think of the way that Vermeer 
depicts light on the surfaces of objects, or the way in which Cindy Sherman transforms 
herself before the camera, or the way Rachel Whiteread uses negative space in her work, or 
the way in which Robert Bresson’s ‘models’ move and talk in his films. Artists do different 
things in different ways, and this is inherently personal - this is why we call it an individual 
style.  
Hence, to have an individual style is not necessarily to express anything, though of 
course it might. It is not connected so much to expressing a personality, but to the personal. 
While this way of conceiving of style preserves the connection of the work to the artist who 
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made it, which proved to be an attractive feature of the account that linked style with 
personality, it does not force us to say anything about underlying psychological states that 
the artist might actually have. A further advantage of connecting style with the personal, 
rather than to expression, is that it does better in explaining certain stylistic features that do 
not appear to be related to one’s ‘inner life’ at all. It is plausible that some methods that 
artists employ, or some of the things they do, need not be consciously done. In Indirect 
Language and the Voices of Silence, Merleau-Ponty recounts a slow motion recording of Matisse 
painting, which suggests that not all gestures or activities of painters are intentionally chosen. 
The passage is worth quoting at length and reads as follows: 
 
‘A camera once recorded the work of Matisse in slow motion. The 
impression was prodigious, so much so that Matisse himself was 
moved, they say. That same brush which, seen with the naked eye, 
leaped from one act to another, was seen to mediate in a solemn and 
expanding time—in the imminence of a world’s creation—to try ten 
possible movements, dance in front of the canvas, brush it lightly 
several times, and crash down finally like a lightning stroke upon the 
one line necessary. Of course, there is something artificial in this 
analysis. And Matisse would be wrong if, putting his faith in the film, 
he believed that he really chose between all possible lines that day 
and, like the God of Leibniz, solved an immense problem of 
maximum and minimum.’ 96 
And here is Matisse recounting the same recording: 
 
‘There was a passage showing me drawing in slow motion. Before my 
pencil ever touched the paper, my hand made a strange journey of its 
own. I never realized before that I did this. I suddenly felt as if I were 
shown naked—that everyone could see this—it made me deeply 
ashamed. You must understand this was not hesitation. I was 
unconsciously establishing the relationship between the subject I was 
about to draw and the size of my paper. Je n’avais pas encore commence a 
chanter (I had not yet begun to sing).’ 97 
While it appeared that Matisse’s hand was consciously making choices between 
sets of available actions, no such choice was present to his mind. His actions were 
unconsciously habitual. Thus some of the stylistic features that find themselves as effects 
of an artist’s action may not be choices that are consciously present to the artist himself. 
Some aspects of style may be explicable in terms of external factors or as habits such as 
the way an artist holds their brush or sets up their palette. These features cannot be 
explained in terms of any underlying psychological state, nor can they be the outcome of 
                                                
96 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence’. In Signs, (Northwestern 
University Press 1964), p. 45. I would like to thank Dominic Shaw for drawing my attention to this 
passage. 
97 Cited by Galen A Johnson, The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, (Northwestern University Press 1993), 
p. 21  
 43 
some inner dialogue an artist has with herself. However, they can still form part of the 
way in which an artist does something, which is deeply personal to the artist. The way in 
which one moves one’s hands and skims across a canvas can be highly personal and 
individual to your way of doing something. Thus an account that conceives of style as a 
personal way of doing something can make sense of unconscious or habitual stylistic 
choices and features. 
 Consequently, this view of individual style does better than previous 
accounts by distancing itself from the claims about expression and the manifesting of 
underlying psychological states. It also does better by restricting talk of style to talk of 
the personal rather than personality. However, since it is a modification of the view that 
takes style to be a way of doing something that expresses a personality, perhaps the best 
way of developing it further is to see how it copes with familiar objections waged against 
that view. If my view can do better still then I believe it is the correct account of 
individual style.  
 
 
1.3 Potential Objections 
 
As we saw, one kind of objection centred on the notion that works may express 
things that the maker is not expressing. I believe we have sidestepped this problem by 
releasing individual style from the constraints of expression and statements about the actual 
underlying psychological states of artists. However, Judith Genova poses a second difficulty 
for any view that locates style in the person making the object, namely that when we talk of 
the style of a work we are talking about the work and not the person, that the stylistic 
features belong to the work. As such works literally possess those properties so any 
statement about them must be a statement about the work and not the person who made it. 
Perhaps part of the worry here is that such views seem to make the work an afterthought, 
and that really we are only ever talking about the person who made it every time we say 
something about the work itself. This second objection applies to my account of style, since 
it does not remove the person altogether despite removing a commitment to expression. On 
my account the connection with the artist who made the work is preserved, since style is 
conceived as being inherently personal.  
However, this objection overlooks the possibility that, while style features may 
originate from the person who makes the work, they can still be literally possessed by a 
work. A signature view such as my view need not be committed to the claim that all 
statements about style are only statements about persons and actions, and not about the 
work, since if a work does not actually possess certain properties indicative of a certain 
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style then it cannot be in that style. Genova’s objection seems to assume that the person is 
in some sense invisible in the work. However, style is a highly personal way of doing 
something, and that, I claim, can be visible in the work. The full argument for that claim 
will be the focus of the next chapter, where it forms part of a discussion of the 
perceptible properties of artworks. For now, though, it is not obvious that committing 
oneself to a signature view, where stylistic features are deeply personal and so connected 
to the person who makes the object, means that stylistic features cannot be literally 
possessed by, and visible in, the work. The mere fact that style is deeply personal does 
not mean that works do not possess those highly personal stylistic features. The work 
has this or that individual style because it has been made in a way that is highly personal 
to the artist; in their way of doing something. We cannot sever this connection but nor do we 
need to claim that works do not possess those properties, and so claim that any 
statement about the work is never anything but a statement about the person who made 
it.  
However, Genova has further objections. She claims that, ‘if style does originate in 
character, then art historians have been sorely misled in their talk of Baroque or Classical 
styles.’ 98 The objection seems to be that a view that locates style in personality leaves little 
room for general style considerations, and other factors constitutive of style. However, this 
ignores the already discussed distinction between general and individual styles. While the 
concept of individual style has been developed along the lines of the personal or character, 
nowhere have I claimed that general style must also follow this way of thinking. In fact I 
argued that we ought to preserve the distinction between general and individual styles on the 
basis of an internal/external relation. I claimed, like Robinson, that the only way in which 
general styles can be inherently personal is when they are used in a way that is highly 
individual to the artist. General styles, while they can be used by artists in personal ways, are 
not by definition personal.  
 Further, Genova’s objection seems to beg the question against the signature view, of 
which my view is a species, in claiming that, ‘Individuals express their milieu, their form of 
life, and their artistic training as much as their psychological selves’, since this assumes that 
all those features listed are stylistic ones that fall outside what the signature view identifies. 
However, in order to claim this, and use it as an argument against the signature view, it needs 
to be argued that those features are indeed stylistic. There are many responses one could 
make here. Firstly, it is open to me to claim that if these features are apparently not deeply 
personal or indicative of a personal way of doing something then they are not style features. 
The denial of these features being stylistic is consistent with my view’s claims. What would 
then be needed is an argument to show that my view has overlooked something here.  
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If that response is not satisfactory, and one is inclined to think the features listed 
above are indeed stylistic, then it is also open for my view to embrace these features and 
claim that they too are inherently personal. An artist’s ‘form of life’, while I am not entirely 
clear what Genova means by this, looks like something that could indeed be inherently 
personal. At best, it is not something that need be obviously excluded from an artist’s 
characteristic or personal way of doing something. An artist’s milieu, while it is related to an 
artist’s social environment, is still something that could be very personal in the way in which 
it is dealt with in the work, and indeed how an artist relates to that social environment can be 
inherently personal. Further, artistic training is simply training, practice of technique among 
other things, rather than a prescribed way of creating works. Thus while training may be 
evident in a work, if the work is distinctive in any way it is because the artist has put that 
training into practice in an individual way.  
Finally, another response might be to say that those features listed above, in particular 
artistic training, might be better conceived along the lines of general styles since they are 
external to an artist and can be taught, but again this does not bar each one from being taken 
up by an artist and transformed, realised, and composed in highly personal ways. As such, 
my view can still hold that artistic training is inherently personal, since the way in which it is 
used can be particular to an artist. In short, Genova’s objection requires more argument to 
show that my signature view has overlooked something very significant. But even where 
more argument could be mounted against it I think there are plenty of resources within the 
view of style as inherently personal with which to build a convincing reply.  
Genova’s final objection seems more troublesome. She writes that, ‘artists may change 
their styles often in a lifetime without our having to assume severe personality changes; nor 
is it impossible for a single work to exhibit a highly distinctive style.’ 99 This objection seems 
more difficult for my view to deal with since there are clearly cases of artists changing styles 
(Picasso would be a good example here) throughout their working life. However, why do we 
need to assume there have been severe personality changes on my view? On the one hand, 
it’s entirely possible that artists’ personalities change throughout their lives. But also, it’s not 
clear why all of those changes and ways of doing things cannot be highly personal and 
therefore part of the artist’s individual style. If style is a way of doing something, where that 
way of doing something is highly personal, then of course artists may do different things at 
different periods of their life. However, all of these different ways of doing something can 
still be highly personal. As such, multiple styles do not threaten the conception of individual 
style as highly personal, since all of those styles will be highly personal to the artist. 
                                                
99 Ibid. 
 46 
Thus when Picasso moved through his Blue Period to his Rose Period, we do not 
have to assume that he had a severe personality change.100 What we can say, however, is that 
the way in which he made his work has changed. Further, that each work created is in 
Picasso’s style because the way in which he has made his work is still highly personal in its 
being a way of doing something. Moreover, we can group works together or set them apart on 
the basis of these considerations. We can say styles have changed, or developed, or emerged 
on the basis of these considerations. In short, Picasso may have done very different things 
but the way in which he did them was deeply personal and individual to him. 
But what of the single work that has a highly distinctive style? Well, firstly if it is by 
one known artist and is seemingly in a different style then we can still say that it has that 
artist’s individual style since, as we have already established, doing different things does not 
mean they cannot be done in highly personal ways. However, what are we to make of an 
anonymous single work? This makes the example slightly trickier. Nevertheless, it seems to 
me that in such an event we could still talk of this work as having an individual style that is 
highly personal even if it stands alone. There does not seem to be anything that would 
prevent us from saying that it has a certain style on the basis of the way in which the work 
has been made, and what it focuses on or leaves out, or the way in which it deals with this or 
that subject matter, even if we did not know who had made it. We could say of this work, 
then, that it has a distinctive style on the basis of the way in which the artist did something, 
which is highly personal. We need only focus on the work and what has been done, and the 
way in which it was done, to say that it has an individual style. As such, Genova’s objection 
seems unproblematic in the event of there being a single work with a highly individual style. 
Furthermore, one might think that if another anonymous single work cropped up, and it 
shared this highly personal way of doing something, then we at least have a prima facie case 
for attributing the works to the same author.101  
The final potential worry I wish to address concerns the widely discussed 
problem of forgery and imitation in the arts. The definition of style proposed by 
Robinson and Lamarque, one that has its roots in the psychological underpinnings of an 
artist, potentially gives us a good result regarding forgeries by capturing the intuition that 
while on the surface forgeries and originals are indiscernible there remains something 
fundamentally different about them. According to Lamarque, in one sense forgeries can 
exactly imitate the individual style of an artist and yet in another, deeper, sense they fail 
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altogether.  The reason they fail, why they are ‘worlds apart’,102 is precisely because 
individual style is grounded in personal expression. This suggests a clear-cut reason why 
forgeries and imitations cannot stand in the place of their originals, why they cannot be 
in the same style. ‘The reason’, according to Lamarque, ‘is that in both cases the style has 
been cut away from its expressive grounding, that underlying sentiment that makes it the 
style it is.’ 103 and this result seems like a good one, and one that my own account should 
be able to produce. 
I think it can, and the reason it can rests on my view’s claims about style being 
related to a way of doing something. As Lamarque has pointed out, a way of doing something is 
logically dependent on what is being done. Hence, I contend that in creating an artwork and 
in imitating or forging an artwork very different things are being done. In the latter case the 
imitator or forger is only imitating the surface features, what is being done is very different, 
and if what is done is different, then the way of doing it is different. As such, a forgery or 
imitation cannot have the individual style of the original artist. Only the original artist’s way of 
doing something is highly personal. The forger or imitator can perfectly mimic a style but they 
cannot have the same individual style of the artist. The style is, to use Lamarque’s phrase, 
‘imitated not originated.’ 104  What is deeply personal about an individual style cannot be 
reproduced. Consequently I believe my account can give a good result regarding our 
intuitions about the fundamental difference between forgeries and originals without tying the 
concept of style so closely to the concept of expression, which, as we saw, posed difficulties 
for Robinson and Lamarque’s views. 
To conclude, I have argued that both definitions of style based on a distinction 
between form and content and definitions that are features-based fail to answer the question 
‘what is style?’ as it pertains to individual style. I have suggested that style ought to be 
considered as a way of doing something that is not solely concerned with the handling of 
materials, or concerned with the way in which artists express themselves, which involves a 
necessary connection to an artist’s underlying psychological states. I have argued that 
individual style is a way of doing something, where that way of doing something is deeply 
personal and individual to the artist. I argued that my view of style can cope with the 
potential worries identified and can do much better than previous views in accommodating 
certain stylistic features that do not obviously result as an effect of a conscious choice. By 
considering these worries I have shown that my view is a welcome revision of a style as a way 
of doing something definition. Style, then, is still a question of ‘how?’ The task now is to answer 
the other question I posed at the beginning of this chapter, namely ‘how can we (the viewer) 
know, or know about, an artist’s style?’ Answering this question will give us a better 
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understanding of our perceptual experiences of artworks more generally, and how the 
conclusions I have reached in this chapter will prove significant for central problems in the 
philosophy of depiction.  
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Chapter Two 
Style Properties as Perceptible Properties 
 
Can we visually experience not only properties such as shape, colour, or size, but also so-
called ‘high-level properties’? I think we can, and such properties include the properties we 
are interested in here, namely style properties. The concerns in this chapter are twofold. 
First, I argue for the claim that aesthetic properties are perceptually represented, that the 
properties represented in perceptual experience outstrip low-level properties such as colour, 
shape, solidity, etc., and, second, to argue that style properties are also high-level properties 
that can be represented in perceptual experience, albeit they might not necessarily be 
aesthetic.  
I will introduce the notion of high-level properties, and the arguments in favour of 
including them in the possibility space of what can be represented in perception, namely 
phenomenal contrast arguments, and cases of aspect switching.  I then consider the most 
plausible objections to these arguments, which pose alternative explanations for the contrasts 
and switches. I respond to these objections and demonstrate that positing high-level 
properties as being responsible for the phenomenal contrast is in fact the best explanation of 
the contrast. As such we ought to concede to a more generous account of the admissible 
contents of perception, and conclude that high-level properties can be represented in 
perception. 
However, while I wish to motivate the claim that aesthetic properties can be 
represented in perception, I distance myself somewhat from others in their treatment of 
aesthetic properties and style properties. This is because what little discussion of stylistic 
properties has occurred has tended to equate style properties with aesthetic properties. While 
it is clear that properties such as ‘delicate’ or ‘vivid’ are aesthetic, it is not obvious that all 
stylistic properties are aesthetic. This tendency to run together style properties and aesthetic 
properties is understandable since style properties seem to resemble aesthetic properties, i.e. 
high-level properties, more than low-level properties, and style properties have an aesthetic 
significance. However, in doing so, the very nature of style properties, and our perception of 
them, has been neglected and as such has not been given the significant treatment it 
deserves. In Chapter One I considered whether style properties might count as artistic 
properties, and claimed that insofar as they are aesthetically relevant they may indeed be 
instances of artistic rather than aesthetic properties. However, I also claimed that we ought 
to hesitate on this categorization given the characterization of artistic properties as properties 
which are not directly perceivable in works. This is because I think that style properties can 
be perceptually represented. This chapter therefore gives a thorough analysis of this claim, 
building on the conclusions drawn concerning artistic style in the previous chapter. 
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The significance of the conclusions drawn in this chapter centre on the notion that 
the perception of style properties as a species of high-level property explains why expertise in 
art often leads to a more appropriate experience of what a picture depicts, thus showing a 
connection between those properties we see the picture as having, namely stylistic properties, 
and that which a picture is seen as depicting. In short, if style properties are perceptible, and 
the art expert is more perceptually attuned to them, then it should come as no surprise that 
the expert has less trouble ‘perceptually figuring out’ pictures that are indeterminate, 
inaccurate, or, in terms of the most plausible alternative to the theory of depiction I will go 
on to develop, do not resemble the objects they purport to depict. As such, the 
representation of high-level properties in perception provides some of the material with 
which to explain our perceptual experiences of depictions.  
 
 
2.1 What Kinds of Properties Can We Visually Experience? 
 
How limited are the limits of the phenomenal content that can be represented in my 
visual experience? Put another way, when I look at a tomato the phenomenal content of my 
visual experience involves the representation of redness and roundness, but does it also 
represent the property of ‘being a tomato’, a so-called ‘high-level’ property? Those who 
answer negatively to the latter have been branded conservatives about which properties can be 
represented in perceptual experience.105 Those who hold a conservative view align with a 
long tradition of claiming that the properties that we can visually experience are strictly low-
level.106 Hence we can only experience properties such as colour, shape, size, motion, and 
spatial properties. The phenomenal character of, for example, visual experience is limited to 
these properties. As Tim Bayne puts it, ‘The phenomenal world of the conservative is an 
austere one.’ 107 What is at stake here then is deciding on the richness of the contents of 
one’s perceptual experiences.  
However, those holding a more liberal view of the admissible contents of perception 
have challenged this tradition of austerity regarding phenomenal content. Those who are 
more liberal are high-level content theorists, and claim that we can not only visually 
experience low-level properties but also so-called ‘high-level’ properties. Examples of high-
level properties include properties such as the property of ‘being graceful’, or of belonging to 
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a certain biological kind e.g. ‘being a pine tree’, or natural kinds e.g. water, or of being in a 
certain mental state. In contrast, conservatives hold that we can represent these kinds of 
high-level properties but only at the level of belief; as such our awareness of them is post-
perceptual rather than represented in perceptual experience. One way of construing the 
conservative position is in terms of an inferential story; we see a movement and, on the basis 
of a background belief formed in virtue of previous experiences of this particular movement, 
judge that the movement is graceful. For the liberal however, the high-level property 
‘gracefulness’ is represented in our visual experience; there is no need for a post-perceptual 
judgement or a background belief to justify any judgment about the gracefulness of this 
particular movement. The perception is enough on its own. Why should there be such wide 
disagreement, and what is really at stake if you are a liberal or a conservative about 
perceptual content? 
One important consequence of branding oneself a liberal or a conservative concerns 
the relation between perception and belief. If one is a liberal about perceptual content then 
one will be more tolerant of perceptual experiences that can, by themselves, justify 
propositions. Take our previous example of judging that a movement is graceful. For a 
conservative about perceptual content, it is a background belief, based on previous 
experiences of a particular movement, which eventually justifies the belief in the proposition 
‘this movement is graceful’. However, as we saw, for the liberal no post-perceptual 
judgments are required, the perception itself is justification enough for one believing that 
‘this movement is graceful’. Thus whether one is a liberal or a conservative about 
phenomenal content has implications for one’s commitments concerning perception and its 
role in justification. 108 At this stage we must not presuppose that one view is correct, 
however, as we shall see, the liberal view makes much better sense of certain perceptual 
experiences that might appear to be justifying all on their own, i.e., the perceptual experience 
is enough to justify a belief in a proposition. Such experiences include aesthetic experiences, 
or experiences that involve, in some way yet to be determined, aesthetic properties. Thus, 
without begging the question against the conservative, I suggest at this stage that one might 
prefer to be a liberal in order to explain aesthetic experience, but let us first turn to the 
arguments for the perceptual representation of high-level properties in experience. 
The arguments for high-level perceptual content are often grounded in the 
phenomenology of visual experience. John Searle uses the notion of aspect-switching to 
argue that the visual phenomenology is different depending on which aspect one is 
experiencing, and this change cannot be accounted for by low-level visual experience.109 
Perhaps the most persuasive argument for high-level property perception though is Susanna 
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Siegel’s  ‘phenomenal contrast’ argument,110 which aims to establish that that we visually 
experience biological kind properties (K-properties). In virtue of acquiring new recognitional 
capacities—for example, learning how to recognize pine trees— Siegel argues that the high-
level property ‘being a pine tree’ can be perceptually represented, which changes the overall 
phenomenology of one’s experience when in the presence of pine trees. This is contrasted 
phenomenologically with the experience before acquiring the recognitional capacity. This 
change in overall phenomenology, Siegel argues, is best explained by a change in the 
phenomenology of the visual experience, which is in turn best explained by a change in the 
properties represented in one’s visual experience. One’s experience of a pine tree after one 
has learnt to recognise pine trees differs from previous experience of pine trees because 
one’s visual experience now involves representing a high-level property i.e., the property of 
being a pine tree (a biological kind property). I will quote Siegel’s argument in full below 
because its exact form is important. It’s important because those who resist it tend to deny at 
least one of its premises. Her argument runs as follows: 
‘Let E1 be the sensory experience had by a subject S who is 
seeing pine trees before learning to recognise them, and let E2 be the 
sensory experience had by S when S sees the pine trees after learning 
to recognise them. E1 and E2 are sensory parts of S’s overall 
experiences at each of these times. I’m going to call the premise that 
is unproblematic if the cases are convincing premise (0): 
 
(0) The overall experience of which E1 is a part differs in its 
phenomenology from the overall experience of which E2 is a 
part. 
 
Claim (0) is supposed to be an intuition. It is the minimal intuition 
one has to have, for the argument to get off the ground. 
 
(1) If the overall experience of which E1 is a part differs in its 
phenomenology from the overall experience of which E2 is a part, 
then there is a phenomenological difference between E1 and E2. 
 
(2) If there is a phenomenological difference between the sensory 
experiences E1 and E2, then E1 and E2 differ in content. 
 
 
(3) If there is a difference in content between E1 and E2, it is a 
difference with respect to K-properties represented in E1 and 
E2.’111 
 
Thus, according to Siegel, the reason why the two experiences differ is due to a change in the 
properties represented in the visual experience. This change cannot be attributed to a change 
in low-level properties, since those remain the same both before and after one acquires the 
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recognitional capacity for pine trees. As such, the phenomenal contrast must be due to the 
representation of high-level properties in E2, in this example K-properties. 
There are many ways in which one might attempt to block the moves from (1)-(3), 
and it is possible that someone might deny (0). A conservative might say that there is some 
‘before’ and ‘after’ difference, but this is a difference in the beliefs formed, as such it is not 
an experiential difference. Hence, there would be no difference in qualitative character. 
However, as the minimal intuition I cannot see why one would want to deny this. While it is 
only an intuition that there is an experiential difference, and there are troubles with arguing 
from intuition, it is a particularly strong one. One case in which I think this minimal intuition 
is stronger is Siegel’s case of learning a new language. Siegel writes that: 
‘When you are first learning to read the script of a language that is 
new to you, you have to attend to each word, and perhaps to each 
letter, separately. In contrast, once you can easily read it, it takes a 
special effort to attend to the shapes of the script separately from 
its semantic properties.’ 112 
 
The minimal intuition here is that the experiences are qualitatively different. Having had 
experiences of learning new languages, I suspect that most will agree that there is some 
qualitative difference after one is competent at a new language. While I do not claim that this 
intuition undermines the conservative view altogether, I think the onus is on the 
conservative to make a strong case here for there being no qualitative difference at all 
between the ‘before’ and ‘after’ experiences.  
Let us grant the minimal intuition (0), how might an objector respond? The most 
common strategy is to deny the phenomenal contrast argument any explanatory force, either 
by rejecting one of its premises or by attempting to show that there are alternative 
explanations for the contrast. As such, what is needed for the conclusion that high-level 
properties are represented in E2 is that it be the best explanation for the phenomenal contrast 
between E1 and E2; and this, as we shall see, is no easy task. 
 
 
2.2 Objections to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument 
2.2.1 Non-Sensory Phenomenology 
 
One way of blocking the move from (1)-(3) would be to deny premise (1), which 
would be to deny that the phenomenological changes are sensory. As Siegel herself notes, 
there are many different kinds of phenomenology, of which sensory phenomenology is only 
one. One could then claim that the changes between E1 and E2 rely on non-sensory 
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phenomenology, and if that is so there is no reason to accept premises (2) and (3), which in 
turns means that one need not posit high-level properties. One way in which one could 
explain the difference without appealing to sensory phenomenology is to appeal to cognitive 
phenomenology. On this model, once one has gained the recognitional capacity for pine 
trees, an appropriately formed belief could do the work in changing the phenomenology 
between E1 and E2. One proponent of this kind of strategy in relation to object recognition 
is Michael Tye,113 to whom Tim Bayne attributes a doxastic model of object recognition.114 
This view claims that a background belief can account for the phenomenal difference. How 
might one respond to this claim, and secure the notion that the contrast is sensory? 
If one is not convinced by Siegel’s pine tree case, one might be convinced by Tim 
Bayne’s detailed contrast argument, based on a case of agnosia. Associative visual agnosia is 
an impairment which involves a loss of, or inability to apply, a recognitional capacity to a 
stimulus that is accurately perceived. Thus while there is no failure in the visual system, 
subjects are unable to identify the object or its function. For example, a subject may have no 
difficulty in perceiving the form of a key but they cannot recognize it as such, and when 
asked what the object is, or is for, they may be entirely unsure or give incorrect answers. 
Subjects can, however, normally perceive the colour, shape, and location of the object, and 
they can categorize it correctly, as is evidenced by the fact that subjects can adequately spot a 
match with visually identical objects. 
 According to Bayne, this impairment involves a difference in the phenomenal 
character of visual experience, citing H-L. Teuber’s claim that associative agnosia involves ‘a 
normal percept stripped of its meaning.’ 115 Hence, what it is like to see a key for the visual 
agnosic differs from what it is like for you or me to see a key. What accounts for this 
difference? As is evidenced by the visual agnosic’s ability to match visually identical objects, 
their perception does not differ from ours in virtue of a difference in the perception of low-
level properties. Rather, what the visual agnosic lacks is the ability to recognize and 
perceptually categorise objects. Thus it is a difference in high-level content. The visual 
agnosic does not see the high-level property of ‘being a key’ despite their visual system 
remaining functionally intact. What explains the difference between the visual agnosic’s 
experience and yours or mine, is a loss of some perceptual content that is normally present 
in perceptual experience, and, since it cannot be a loss of low-level content, it must be a loss 
of high-level content, and, crucially, the sort of high-level content that is normally represented 
in perceptual experience. 
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Why might this phenomenal contrast case be more plausible? One reason to think it 
is more persuasive than Siegel’s pine tree argument is that it is harder to deny premise (1) and 
claim that the phenomenal contrast is due to a change in non-sensory phenomenology. As 
we saw for the pine tree case one could claim that an appropriately formed belief could 
account for the difference in phenomenology between E1 and E2, but Bayne’s case seems 
less susceptible to this explanation.  
The reason it is less susceptible is because, according to Bayne’s analysis of the 
empirical data from Rubens and Benson, inserting the appropriate belief cannot reinstate 
object recognition for the patient with visual agnosia. Bayne suggests that if a patient who 
could not recognize a pipe as a pipe were told that the object in front of them were a pipe 
then they would judge the object before them to be a pipe i.e., form the belief that the object 
they were looking at is a pipe. However, further analysis of the empirical data shows that if 
the patient is now told that in fact the object before them might not be a pipe, they still 
retain their belief that it is a pipe and yet their experience of it as a pipe is not retained. Thus, 
according to Bayne, ‘Perceptual recognition is not simply a matter of believing that such and 
such a type of object is present whilst enjoying low-level experience.’116 If one accepts 
Bayne’s conclusions then one is led to the conclusion that it is high-level property 
perception, and not an appropriately formed belief, that causes the phenomenal contrast. 
Bayne’s contrast case thus makes other phenomenal contrast arguments more 
plausible, since it demonstrates that there is a phenomenal ‘layer’ missing in the visual 
agnosic’s case that would usually be present in a normal perceiver. Thus the best explanation 
of phenomenal contrast between experiences E1 and E2 is that high-level properties are 
represented in E2, that is, the experience one has after gaining a recognitional capacity. 
Though of course this is too quick. While Bayne’s case resists explaining phenomenal 
contrasts in terms of non-sensory phenomenology, this is only to reinstate premise (1) of 
Siegel’s argument, not the argument itself. For one can still resist the move from (2)-(3), and 
offer alternative explanations.  
 
 
2.2.2   Differences in Attention and Aesthetic Properties 
 
One alternative explanation for the phenomenal contrast concerns differences in 
attention, which can make phenomenal differences between E1 and E2. This would tackle both 
premise (2), which posits a difference in content between E1 and E2, and also threatens premise 
(3) since one need not claim that the phenomenal difference between E1 and E2 is due to a 
difference in the properties represented in each experience. Richard Price denies that the 
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phenomenal differences between E1 and E2 are due to differences in content, and argues for 
what he calls the ‘non-content’ view.117 On this view there are alternative explanations for the 
phenomenal contrasts that do not involve any differences in the properties represented. One 
such alternative is to claim that differences in patterns of attention can do the work in explaining 
why E1 and E2 differ phenomenally.  
To argue for the non-content view, Price discusses cases of aspect-switching, such as the 
infamous duck/rabbit figure. According to Price, aspect-switching is accompanied by a shift in 
patterns of attention towards a figure such as the duck/rabbit. For example, when looking at the 
duck/rabbit figure under the ‘duck aspect’, one’s attention is distributed differently from when 
one is looking at the figure under the ‘rabbit aspect’, and this difference in patterns of attention 
makes for a phenomenal difference between the two experiences. Price also discusses the 
Kanizsa triangle figure (fig. 1 below), claiming that:  
 
‘When one sees it as composed of a white triangle superimposed on 
black circles, it seems that one attends to the straight lines between 
the three black circles that would be the edges of the white triangle. 
When one sees it as composed of three black circles with wedges cut 
out of them, then one attends to these circles alone without attending 
to the straight lines that would be the edges of the white triangle.’ 118 
 
Applied to Siegel’s pine tree example, one might say that a perceiver’s patterns of attention in 
E2 are distributed differently over the scene in front of them than they were in E1, which is the 
experience they had before they acquired the recognitional capacity for pine trees. After they can 
recognise pine trees they attend to the scene differently, perhaps honing in on the shape of the foliage, 
which justifies their judgement that the tree before them is indeed a pine. This difference in attention is 
enough to make a phenomenal difference between E1 and E2. As such we need not posit high-level 
properties to explain the phenomenal contrast.  
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(Fig. 1) Kanizsa Triangle 
 
 
Aspect-switching is thus inherently related to patterns of attention.  
However, it’s unclear that Price’s view can play the explanatory role he wants it to 
regarding aspect switches. Price himself acknowledges that it is possible to aspect switch 
without any difference in patterns of attention, and further that one can focus one’s attention 
and yet still undergo an aspect switch, which means that differences in attention cannot 
explain the switch. For example, when looking at the Kanizsa triangle, I can attend to the cut 
out circles with great effort and yet, as will be discussed in detail in the next chapter 
concerning seeing-in, the recognitional aspect constantly reasserts itself; try as I might the 
triangles enter my visual experience. The switch seems mandatory, suggesting that shifts in 
attention may not account for the phenomenal difference.   
 While this response primarily concerns Price’s account of aspect-switching, it has 
significance for phenomenal contrast arguments since it puts pressure on the idea that 
patterns of attention can do the work in causing a phenomenal difference between 
experiences. This is so because, as the main method of argument against high-level property 
perception, Price’s account of aspect-switching cannot establish the conclusion he wants. 
Thus, to return to Siegel’s example, a shift in one’s pattern of attention after one has gained a 
recognitional capacity is not obviously the best explanation for the phenomenal contrast. It 
could be something else, i.e. representing a high-level property in E2. 
 However that is only to say that it is not obviously the best explanation, it does not 
rule it out altogether. Ruling it out requires a different strategy, which I will pursue using a 
different kind of example given by Price himself. The example that Price uses is the 
Dalmatian Figure (fig. 2 below). He writes of it that, ‘Changing one’s patterns of attention 
towards a figure can cause a phenomenal difference to occur…Initially, one’s attention is 
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evenly distributed over the shapes in the picture. After one sees the Dalmatian in the middle 
of the picture, one attends to the specific outline of the Dalmatian.’ 119 
 
 
(Fig. 2) Dalmatian 
 
The part of this explanation that is unclear to me is the causal story Price is telling 
regarding the phenomenal difference. While it is true that once one sees the Dalmatian one 
can focus one’s attention on its configuration, it’s not clear that it is at this point that a 
phenomenal change has occurred. Presumably what allows one to focus one’s attention in 
the first instance is seeing the Dalmatian in the picture, and having this recognition, having 
this aspect dawn upon oneself, is presumably where the experience changes phenomenally. 
As we saw with the Kanizsa triangle, the shift is more mandatory than shifts in patterns of 
attention can account for, and similarly in the Dalmatian image the Dalmatian appears 
instantly. For Price, it is ‘after one sees the Dalmatian’ that ‘one attends to the specific 
outline of the Dalmatian’. If it is not a difference in attention that causes the change though, it 
looks difficult to say that the phenomenal difference is accounted for by attention itself, 
since presumably the experience’s phenomenal character changes as soon as one sees the 
Dalmatian, not when one changes one’s patterns of attention towards it, since this comes 
after the switch according to Price.  The mandatory nature of aspect-switching seems to 
undermine the explanation of the phenomenal change in terms of patterns of attention. To 
be clear, what I am not denying is that patterns of attention can make a phenomenal 
difference, what I am questioning is whether the phenomenal change hasn’t already occurred 
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according to the description of the case given by Price. If it has occurred already then, at 
least in this case, patterns of attention again look explanatorily weak.  
However, while Price is not clear on whether he takes voluntary or involuntary 
attention to be primarily responsible for the shift, he could appeal to the notion of 
involuntary attention to explain aspect-switching. In that case, one’s attention is involuntarily 
drawn to a certain aspect of the image e.g. to the aspect under which one sees the rabbit 
rather than the duck. Thus the distinction between voluntary and involuntary attention can 
provide a reply for Price. Further, the explanatory force of patterns of attention for Siegel’s 
pine tree case looks plausible.  
According to Price, after one learns to recognize a pine tree one will attend to the 
features of pine trees that distinguish them from other trees. ‘Acquiring a recognitional 
disposition for pine trees will cause one’s patterns of attention to shift when one looks at a 
grove containing pine trees and other sorts of trees.’ 120 In this example the causal story is 
clearer; it is acquiring the recognitional capacity that causes one’s patterns of attention to shift, 
which then accounts for the phenomenal difference between E1 and E2. As such, during E2, 
one’s attention is focused on the low-level properties of the scene before you differently, 
which accounts for the phenomenal contrast. The question, ‘what are you attending to 
differently?’ has a clear answer. So Price’s account seems plausible, for pine trees at least. 
However, it looks less plausible for aesthetic properties, which I will now use to put 
pressure on Price’s account. While the property of being a pine tree might not be 
represented in perception, an aesthetic property could be. For aesthetic properties it is not 
clear that shifts in patterns of attention, voluntary or involuntary, caused by acquiring a 
recognitional capacity, rule out the representation of high-level properties as, at least in part, 
responsible for the phenomenal contrast. For liberals about the content of perception, 
aesthetic properties look very promising as an example of a high-level property. One reason 
for this is that the inferentialist story that posits a background belief as providing justification 
for one’s belief that, say, a movement is graceful, looks less plausible for aesthetic properties.  
This is so because it seems difficult to determine what background beliefs would do 
the work here. Something we have learnt from the work of Frank Sibley is that one cannot 
reason from one’s past experiences of certain combinations of low-level properties being 
graceful to the conclusion that this current combination of low-level properties is also 
graceful. As Sibley puts it, ‘…there are no sure-fire rules by which, referring to the neutral 
and non-aesthetic qualities of things, one can infer that something is balanced, tragic, joyous, 
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and so on. One has to look and see.’ 121 Aesthetic properties, then, are grist to the liberal’s 
mill.  
To return to the question ‘what are you attending to differently?’ for the pine tree 
case, it is plausible that one is attending to low-level properties differently. However, in the 
aesthetic case, say of a graceful movement or a serene landscape, one may indeed attend to 
low-level properties differently but this does not seem to be enough to say that a movement 
is graceful, since there are no set rules about combinations of low-level properties that would 
amount to a judgement that this movement before me right now is graceful. In the pine tree 
example the question ‘what are you attending to differently?’ after one has acquired the 
recognitional capacity seems readily answered with ‘low-level properties’, ones associated 
with pine trees such as shape (of the foliage), texture (of the bark), colour (of the foliage and 
bark), and so on. That question is not so easily answered in the aesthetic case given the lack 
of rules about low-level properties warranting aesthetic judgements. The rules for 
recognizing pine trees are much simpler than the rules for recognizing gracefulness. Indeed, 
as Jerrold Levinson notes, our talk of aesthetic properties better fits with the view that we do 
experience them as having a look or appearance, rather than our ascription of aesthetic 
properties referring to multiple non-aesthetic qualities that an object possesses. He writes 
that, ‘When we ascribe an aesthetic property it seems that what we are ascribing, at base, is 
an emergent way of appearing, and not a range of ensembles of disparate traits.’ 122 As such, 
in the aesthetic case, one’s attention may indeed be distributed differently over a scene in E1 
and in E2, but what one is attending to, low-level or high-level properties, is not yet decided.  
One way to decide this is to refer back to the method of argument. Remember that 
in each stage of Siegel’s argument, and Bayne’s agnosia case, there is no change in low-level 
properties. This meant that any change must be attributed to a different source (for Siegel 
and Bayne the source was the representation of high-level properties, for Price the source 
was a change in attention). Preserving this method, we can say that in the aesthetic case there 
is no change between E1 and E2 in the low-level properties represented in experience. 
However, as we have seen, attending to low-level properties in the aesthetic case cannot give 
us reasons to say that a movement is graceful, since there are no rules about which 
combinations amount to gracefulness. As such, it does not matter whether one’s attention is 
voluntary or involuntary since no amount of attending will result in the judgement that a 
movement is graceful. Thus the reply that the attention is involuntary will not do the work in 
the aesthetic case. Unlike the pine tree case there are no low-level properties associated with 
the ‘category’ of being graceful, such that we can attend to them differently after gaining a 
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recognitional capacity. Attending to low-level properties in the aesthetic case will not work in 
the same way as it did for the pine tree case. Thus, while our attention may have shifted 
between E1 and E2, so too must the properties represented in our visual experience. If it is 
not low-level properties we are attending to in E2 in the aesthetic case, it must be high-level 
properties.  
As such, shifts in patterns of attention do not rule out high-level property 
representation in the aesthetic case, and further, high-level property representation is 
seemingly required to make sense of Price’s attentional difference account, since a difference 
in attention requires that there is something being attended to. It cannot be low-level 
properties being attended to in the aesthetic case, so for Price’s claims about attention to go 
through we need to posit high-level properties. As such, Price’s claims about attention 
cannot rule out the representation of high-level properties in the aesthetic case, and in fact 
work to support the claim that such content is represented in E2.  
What I do not deny is that there may be some role of attention in aesthetic 
experience. Indeed one often has to ‘look and see’, and focus on parts and pieces that give 
rise to an aesthetic experience, but this is to attempt to direct one’s attention towards 
aesthetic properties that are already there, over and above low-level ones, and to reveal them. 
This is, as Hopkins points out, ‘The heart of critical discussion…’ it is ‘…the activity of 
pointing out features of the object to one’s audience. It is to direct the attention of one’s 
companion so that her experience reveals some of the object’s features to her.’123 That those 
features are experientially revealed suggests they are already present, over and above low-level 
features; it is simply that they are not yet represented in one’s perceptual experience. Once 
they are represented the phenomenal content of the experiences shifts to include high-level 
properties.  
To summarise, my arguments against Price have been twofold. First, I argued that 
cases of aspect-switching do not have the explanatory force required to motivate Price’s 
claim that shifts in patterns of attention cause phenomenal differences. In showing this to be 
the case I suggested that this weakens the argument against high-level property perception, 
given that it is one of the main ways in which Price tries to motivate his claim that patterns 
of attention have explanatory force in phenomenal contrast arguments.  
Second, I used the case of aesthetic properties to demonstrate that, even if Price’s 
claims about attention are plausible for biological kind properties, they do not put pressure 
on the aesthetic case. I demonstrated that the object or focus of one’s attention in the 
aesthetic case is unlike the pine tree case in that it cannot be only low-level properties one is 
attending to. I then claimed that an attentional difference might have occurred but that this 
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requires that high-level properties be represented in E2. As such, high-level properties being 
represented in perception, and so included in the phenomenal content of such experiences, 
cannot be ruled out by Price’s account of attention in accounting for the phenomenal 
difference between E1 and E2 in the aesthetic case, and further, that the representation of 
high-level properties in E2 is the best explanation of there being a difference at all between 
E1 and E2. 
 
 
2.2.3    Aesthetic Properties and Emotions 
 
However, there is still a further strategy for resisting Siegel’s argument, one that 
applies to aesthetic properties such as being graceful, balanced, delicate, and so on. As such, 
the liberal view is troubled even when it is aesthetic properties at issue. We can run a Siegel-
type phenomenal contrast argument for the aesthetic case. Let E1 be an experience before 
one has gained the recognitional capacity for graceful movements, and E2 be the experience 
one has after one has gained this recognitional capacity. For the liberal employing the 
phenomenal contrast argument, the phenomenal difference between E1 and E2 is due to a 
difference in properties represented. In E2 the property ‘graceful’ is represented in one’s 
visual experience, which changes the overall phenomenology of the experience of which E2 
is a part. How might a conservative resist this conclusion?  
According to Jesse Prinz, our emotional states are enough to warrant the attribution 
of aesthetic properties to, for example, a visually experienced scene before us. As Prinz puts 
it, ‘…we consider our emotional reactions to be good evidence for aesthetic properties, and 
that suggests that our aesthetic terms refer to the power to cause such properties.’ 124 Thus 
the phenomenal difference between E1 and E2 is due to a difference in emotion. The 
phenomenology of E2 differs from E1 since one recognizes the movement as graceful, 
which has an associated emotional response. This emotional response has its own 
phenomenal character. As such emotional reactions can, by themselves, cause phenomenal 
differences. Thus we have another alternative explanation for the contrast that does not 
posit high-level properties. And while these options remain we cannot say with any certainty 
that the representation of high-level properties is the best explanation for the contrast. What 
is needed for the latter conclusion is to close off the alternatives, a task to which I shall now 
turn my attention. 
While I do not doubt that there is some affective story relevant to our aesthetic 
judgments or appraisals, I do not think that the perceptual representation of high-level 
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properties can be dispensed with in the analysis of this case. Again it is the causal story that 
troubles me. As we saw, Prinz thinks that our aesthetic terms refer to the power to cause 
aesthetic properties. But do our emotional reactions cause such properties to exist? Or are 
we merely reacting to the properties that are already seen in the scene before us? And if, as 
has been the case for all contrast arguments, there is no change in the low-level properties 
experienced, why should someone react emotionally in E2? Presumably the acquisition of a 
recognitional capacity is supposed to explain this, and causes an emotional response in us, 
but what are the rules concerning combinations of low-level properties such that one reacts 
emotionally in E2, after acquiring the recognitional capacity, and not in E1?  
The acquisition of a recognitional capacity for ‘gracefulness’ does not seem to fill the 
gap in the aesthetic case given that we are still, according to the conservative, only enjoying 
low-level property experience in E2. It seems that for an emotional reaction to occur one 
must be having a different kind of visual experience in E2, even if in the end it is this 
emotional reaction that causes a phenomenal difference between E1 and E2. Thus again we 
find that a difference between E1 and E2 is predicated on there being a difference in the 
properties represented in those experiences. Without there being some difference in 
properties there is no reason to suppose that someone would react emotionally to the scene 
in E2 and not in E1. Compare the aesthetic case with Siegel’s pine example again. In the pine 
example one attends in E2 to low-level properties such as shape and colour, which one’s 
recognitional capacity has taught one to identify, but in the aesthetic case there are no strict 
rules for identifying gracefulness while enjoying only low-level property experience. I cannot 
point to gracefulness in the same way I can point to a pine. As such it seems that we need to 
posit high-level properties in order to make sense of there being an emotional reaction to the 
visually experienced scene. 
Thus I believe the objections waged against the phenomenal contrast arguments can 
be met for the aesthetic case, and further, that high-level property perception is required to 
explain perceptual differences between E1 and E2, which in turn plays a role in there being a 
phenomenal difference. As such I think there are good reasons to think that aesthetic 
properties are represented in experience, and are within the ‘reach’ of phenomenal content, 
to use Bayne’s terms. And further, that having experiences of them fundamentally changes 
the way in which we perceive artworks.  
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2.4   Style Properties as High-Level Properties 
2.4.1 Style properties as distinct from aesthetic properties 
 
If what has been said so far is convincing, then aesthetic properties are the kind of 
properties that can be visually experienced. The question I now want to ask however is 
whether these are the only high-level properties of artworks that can be visually experienced. 
Are there other kinds of properties of artworks that are high-level but not necessarily 
aesthetic? If there were it would mean that we have a different kind of property that does 
not depend for its ‘high-level-ness’ on being essentially aesthetic. Do such properties exist?  
Here is one suggestion - when looking at a painting one not only sees the property 
of being delicate or vivid, but also the property of being in the style of Picasso, or of being in 
an Abstract style. Thus one very important kind of property of artworks that can be visually 
experienced is stylistic. This is not to deny stylistic properties their aesthetic significance. As 
such I am trying to tread carefully so as not to imply that style properties are unrelated to 
aesthetic considerations, some of which are touched upon by Sibley and developed by others 
in discussions of critical practice and perception of art more generally. My claim is that style 
properties, while they have aesthetic significance, are not necessarily of the same sort as 
those commonly identified as aesthetic properties, even though they play a part in our 
perceptual experiences, and judgements of, artworks. Thus style properties, on my view, can 
be experienced in much the same way as aesthetic properties, and have just as much 
significance, but sometimes they are of a different sort than those traditionally thought of as 
aesthetic; and getting clearer on this will allow for a better analysis of the different kinds of 
properties one can represent in one’s perceptual experiences of artworks.  
I am not convinced that style properties can be equated with aesthetic properties. It 
at least does not seem prima facie obviously true that style properties are necessarily aesthetic 
properties, even though they certainly have an aesthetic significance. To see why this is so I 
will first discuss the kinds of features of artworks we call stylistic, which I think will show 
that they are not necessarily aesthetic. I will then offer some reasons to resist the claim that 
style properties are necessarily aesthetic. In doing so I hope to show that there is a distinct 
kind of high-level property of artworks that can be visually experienced that has not received 
the attention it deserves. 
I argued in Chapter One that style is fundamentally a way of doing something, where 
that way of doing something is highly personal. One motivation for adopting my account of 
style was that it allowed for subject matter to form part of an artist’s style. I claimed, along 
with Goodman, that whether a poet focuses on the fragile rather than the robust is a highly 
personal way of doing something to the artist, and can form part of her style. Thus subject 
matter is integral to artistic style. How does this help challenge the view that stylistic 
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properties are simply aesthetic properties? I do not claim to possess a clear definition of 
what makes a property aesthetic, but aspects of subject matter do not seem to fit neatly into 
the catalogue of the types of property that are often identified as aesthetic. Here are some of 
the concepts Sibley calls aesthetic: ‘unified, balanced, integrated, lifeless, serene, sombre, 
dynamic, powerful, vivid, delicate, moving, trite, sentimental, and tragic.’125 I cannot offer 
any argument to the point that there is something all of these features have in common, 
which would allow for the makings of a definition, but it seems to me that the subject matter 
or content of an artwork is very different from the types of features identified by Sibley. If 
subject matter can be a feature of style then some stylistic features are very different from 
those features that are often identified as aesthetic.  
Consider, for example, the work of photographer Diane Arbus (fig. 3). Arbus is 
known for photographing people who have been described as ‘deviant’ or ‘marginal’. While 
Arbus’s style can be described as tender and moving, that is, as having what we tend to think 
of as aesthetic properties, it is also importantly constituted by her choice of subject matter, 
and the way in which she deals with it. Thus a feature of Arbus’s style, and part of what 
identifies her as the artist, something which is highly personal to her, is her choice of subject 
matter. Furthermore, one could imagine another artist who focuses on the same subject 
matter as Arbus and yet whose photographs have entirely different aesthetic properties. As 
such aesthetic properties are distinct from subject matter while subject matter, and the way 
in which it is dealt with, that is the particular content of the work, can be a feature of style.126 
 
 
(Fig. 3) Arbus, A young man in curlers at home on West 20th Street NYC, (1966) 
 
Thus some style properties are not characteristically aesthetic. Hence, if style 
properties are high-level properties that can be visually experienced then at least some style 
properties constitute some other kind of high-level property that is perceptible in artworks, 
                                                
125 Sibley, Frank. ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, In The Philosophical Review. Vol. 68. No. 4. (1959). pp. 421-40, p. 
421 
126 I would like to thank Keith Allen for this point and for pushing me to be clearer here. 
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and seeing this high-level property, like seeing any high-level property, can depend on a 
genuine piece of learning. Those who know Arbus’s work and know her style will perceive 
her work differently from the novice who simply sees that there is a certain subject matter 
without understanding its significance or seeing it as a style property of the work. The novice 
looking at the Arbus will not perceive the work as having the property of being in the style 
of Diane Arbus. The expert, however, will see that the work has this property and thus what 
it is like to perceive the work for her will be very different from what it is like to perceive the 
work for our novice, and yet this does not obviously depend on the representation of 
properties that are characteristically aesthetic.  
A further reason to think that some style properties might be high-level but non-
aesthetic is that sometimes what would typically be called a low-level or non-aesthetic 
property can be a style property. For example, an artist may use colour in a highly personal 
way, such that the use of colour becomes a way in which an artist does something. That is to 
say that the colour of the work becomes essentially a property of style. For example, 
Matisse’s disregard for the natural colour of objects was a feature of his style and indeed the 
general style category ‘Fauvism’. This highly personal use of colour, this way of doing 
something, seems characteristically non-aesthetic in nature. It is the focus on the highly 
personal way of doing something that marks this out as a feature of style, for of course ‘uses’ 
can be aesthetic e.g. using a sombre or harmonious colour combination.127 However, if using 
colour in this way is highly personal to an artist, and is part of her way of doing something, 
then it is not simply an aesthetic property, it is a property of individual style. Though this 
involves a low-level property, the way in which that property is used and presented is 
distinctly high-level and, in virtue of being used in a highly personal way, non-aesthetic 
insofar as it is now a feature of style. As such, when we gain the recognitional capacity to see 
those colours as essentially stylistic features, our visual experience changes.  
The recognition of style, which can include the way in which a low-level property 
such as colour has been used, changes one’s visual experience to include the representation 
of high-level style properties. The person who is attuned to the style of an artist or a general 
style category sees those colours but also sees the style features, the way of using the colours, 
such that their visual experience goes beyond merely seeing that the work has those colours 
and shapes. Rather they see those colours and shapes differently, that is, as properties of 
style. Again the phenomenology of their experience differs from that of the novice, and this 
change is explained by a change in the visual properties experienced given that there is no 
change in low-level property perception. While the novice simply sees colours and shapes, 
the expert sees style. This, while it may not be a visual experience of aesthetic properties, 
seems to be a visual experience of high-level properties. Thus style properties, while they are 
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high-level properties, are not necessarily aesthetic given that some style properties can be 
properties such as shape and colour, i.e., non-aesthetic in nature.  
 
 
2.4.2   Style Properties and Phenomenal Contrasts 
Are style properties really genuine instances of high-level properties that can be 
perceptually represented if they are distinct from aesthetic properties? In order to motivate 
the thought that style properties can be perceptually represented we need to return to 
Kendall Walton’s ‘The Categories of Art’, which was discussed in Chapter One.128 As we 
saw, the paper was written with an eye to disposing of a certain kind of formalism, i.e. one 
that says that works are to be appreciated and valued merely on the basis of their perceptible 
properties alone. We also saw that, contra Sibley, Kendall Walton argues that aesthetic 
properties cannot be discovered merely by examining the works themselves. We need to 
know some other facts about the origins of works of art, and in particular what category they 
belong to. For example, one could perceive a work under the category PAINTING or 
ABSTRACT, or IN THE STYLE OF PICASSO’S ABSTRACT FIGURES. The thought 
then is that the category in which we perceive the work will affect which aesthetic properties 
it seems to have.129  Thus the perceptual experience of a work can be profoundly affected by 
the category under which the work is perceived. We also saw Walton support this with his 
Guernica example, which, for the purposes of this chapter and what has been discussed thus 
far, can be seen as a type of phenomenal contrast argument. One’s perception of Guernica in 
the PAINTING category is phenomenally different from one’s experience of it in the 
GUERNICA category. I think that something we can derive from Walton’s claims is that if 
one correctly perceives a work in a certain style category, which can be more or less precise, 
at least some of the work’s properties change. This is simply an extension of the claim that 
perceptual experiences of works vary with categories. Our experiences vary because 
perceiving a work under a category changes the properties we perceive in the work.  
As we saw, perceiving ‘Guernica’ under the category PAINTING rather than under 
the fictional category GUERNICA significantly changes the aesthetic properties the work 
seems to have. Our experience of perceiving Guernica under the category GUERNICA will 
be phenomenologically different from our experience of the work under the category 
PAINTING, and what accounts for this difference is a difference in the properties visually 
experienced. When one perceives the work under the category PAINTING, one will have a 
visual experience of the high-level aesthetic property ‘vivid’ or ‘dynamic’ i.e., properties the 
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experience of the work under the fictional category GUERNICA lacks. Accordingly 
perceiving a work under a certain style category will change the properties one visually 
experiences the work as having. But are style properties experienced, and are they high-level?  
I think we can use the method of phenomenal contrast to show that they are. 
Perceiving ‘Guernica’ under no style category intuitively seems rather different to perceiving 
it under the category CUBISM. What accounts for this difference? The style category one 
perceives a work under changes one’s visual experience of the work to include style 
properties. In the same way in which perceiving the work in the correct category will allow 
one to perceive the aesthetic properties of a work, correctly perceiving a style category will 
allow one to perceive the individual stylistic properties of a work. And indeed one might 
think that a style category itself is a property that can be represented in perceptual 
experience. Walton claims that categories are perceptually experienced, which does not rule 
out that they are high-level properties represented in experience.  
Acquiring knowledge of style on this account is like acquiring a new recognitional 
capacity, and this is indeed a genuine piece of learning. As Roger Scruton points out in a 
discussion of critical practice concerning music, ‘Knowledge of a piece of music may provide 
reasons (and not just causes) for my hearing it in a certain way.’ 130 Once one has the 
recognitional capacity to recognize certain styles, one’s current visual experience is 
phenomenologically different from the experience one had before one had that recognitional 
capacity. And this change in phenomenology is due to a change in the visual properties one 
now experiences. So the person without the recognitional capacity CUBISM really does see 
the painting differently from someone who has that recognitional capacity. This is because 
the latter person visually experiences the high-level stylistic properties, such as being in the 
style of CUBISM, and perhaps individual stylistic properties of the category, while the 
former does not. 
Perhaps one way of supporting this argument is to refer to cases in which we get 
style categories wrong.  In Chapter One I cited the example of a critic who described Woman 
in Sunlight by Renoir as a woman whose body was depicted as bruised, as if it were rotting 
flesh, rather than as a woman whose body was dappled in sunlight and shadows.131 Thus the 
critic perceived the woman represented in the painting as having bruised and rotten flesh. 
Clearly this was not the effect Renoir was hoping for, as is evidenced by the title of the piece; 
but suppose we are familiar with Renoir’s methods of painting, and the style of 
Impressionism and its concern with the transience of light. Arguably there is a difference 
now between our experience of Renoir’s painting and the experience of someone who has 
not learnt to recognise these features. Just as the novice who begins to study Picasso comes 
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to see the aesthetic property ‘vivid’, the novice who comes to study Renoir will, withstanding 
any total lack of aesthetic concern, come to see the stylistic properties of Impressionism as 
perceptible in the work of Renoir. Acquiring stylistic sensitivity is like acquiring a new 
recognitional capacity that, in some cases, radically changes our perceptual experience of 
artworks. What changes is how we see the work. Equipped with our recognitional capacity, 
we perceptually represent the high-level properties of style. Perhaps we might even say that 
we literally see the Impressionism or, to go more fine-grained, that we see the ‘Renoir-ness’ of 
the painting. 
We can also return to Jenefer Robinson’s Barnett Newman example discussed in 
Chapter One,132 which again can be framed as a contrast argument. One could plausibly 
imagine some novice stumbling into a Newman exhibition and thinking it was an exhibition 
for interior design ideas. What makes the difference between our novice’s experience of the 
canvas and the experience of a person who has the recognitional capacity for Barnett 
Newman’s style, call it, ‘BARNETT NEWMAN’? It seems plausible to say that these two 
people literally see the canvas differently and thus what it is like to see the canvas is also very 
different for them. Our novice does not see the canvas as having any style properties, nor 
any aesthetic properties, and nor, for that matter, any aesthetic significance whatsoever.133 
Our expert, on the other hand, will see the aesthetic properties and will see the style 
properties. To use a similar phrase: the expert literally sees the ‘Barnett Newman-ness’ of the 
canvas, whereas the novice has no such visual experience. Thus using the notion of 
indiscernible canvases we can see that at base level, at the level of perceiving low-level 
properties, perhaps nothing changes between our novice’s visual experience and our expert’s 
visual experience. Thus what accounts for the difference in our novice and our expert’s 
experiences must be the lack of (for our novice) and the presence of (for our expert) high-
level properties in visual experience. And at least some of those properties appear to be 
stylistic. 
 
 
2.5 Resisting Alternatives Again 
 
One might worry at this stage that one can simply rehearse the objections against 
high-level properties being perceptually represented that we saw previously, i.e., accounting 
for the phenomenal difference in terms of attention or emotional differences. However, I 
think there are good reasons to resist these alternatives. First, while differences in patterns of 
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133 We can compare our novice to Bayne’s visual agnosic. We might think that there is a phenomenal 
‘layer’ missing for the novice, one that the expert has acquired through experience. 
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attention might work for stylistic properties such as subject matter, it will not account for 
those properties of style that are typically seen as low-level, albeit stylistic. This is because 
one’s attention does not cause the low-level properties to look different. In much the same 
way that one’s attention does not change the way a pine tree’s shape or colour looks, 
attention does not change the way properties such as colour or shape appear in the case of 
artworks. In the pine case one has learnt to attend to the low-level properties differently 
without any change in representational content; the trees do not look different, their shape 
and colour do not look different, rather one has learnt to focus on these properties in a 
different way.  
However, in the style case the low-level properties do look different, the colours and 
shapes are properties of style, of a way of doing something, and are visually experienced in 
this way. While there is no change in the low-level properties, they come to look different in 
virtue of our seeing them as properties of style, as a way of doing something. These ways of 
doing something, which are highly personal, are visible in the work, and can be visually 
experienced. Hence, it is the properties represented in my visual experience that have 
changed rather than my attention being directed in some new way. Thus the phenomenal 
contrast cannot be explained by attentional differences. 
 What about emotional differences? As we saw it was unclear that emotional 
differences work to demonstrate that aesthetic properties are not represented. I think style 
properties put further pressure on this idea since in the style case it is not clear what we are 
emotionally responding to. While it is true that style properties have aesthetic significance, 
it’s not clear that they are always aesthetically evaluated or responded to in the same way as 
aesthetic properties. We saw that for Prinz emotional reactions are the litmus test for the 
presence of aesthetic properties, but this seems less plausible for the stylistic properties. 
While I may be moved by a vivid portrayal of loss, it sounds less plausible to be moved by 
the style of an artist, and some aspects of an artist’s style such as subject matter may have no 
emotional significance at all. Thus the emotional difference account of the phenomenal 
contrast looks implausible for stylistic properties. 
 But here is a possible objection to my account of stylistic properties as, at least 
sometimes, distinct from aesthetic properties, and my claim that we can perceive them.134 
Take the aesthetic case again, if there is a phenomenal difference between E1 and E2, how 
can we know it is stylistic properties responsible for this contrast and not aesthetic 
properties? The concern is that it looks difficult to isolate style properties in a phenomenal 
contrast argument involving an aesthetic case. As such I can’t use the method of 
phenomenal contrast to argue for high-level style-property representation. At best I could 
say that there is a phenomenal difference but that this could be due to aesthetic or style 
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properties, not style properties alone. And if I cannot isolate style properties as responsible it 
looks difficult for me to claim, using the method of phenomenal contrast, that they are a 
distinct kind of high-level property that can be perceptually represented. Thus the objection 
proceeds by denying the distinctness of aesthetic properties and style properties and, on that 
basis, puts pressure on my claim that style properties are perceptible. What I need to show is 
that style properties can make phenomenal differences all on their own, which would bolster 
my claim that they are distinct high-level properties that can be perceived.  
 One response I can make is to grant that the phenomenal contrast may not be solely 
due to the representation of style properties in perception. It may be due to aesthetic 
properties or a combination of both aesthetic and style properties. A better response would 
be to attempt to construct a phenomenal contrast argument that isolates stylistic properties 
as responsible for the phenomenal difference between E1 and E2. I think it is possible to 
construct one, and for convenience I will use the already discussed ‘Barnett Newman and the 
novice’ case. Let us reimagine our novice stumbling into an art gallery containing a Barnett 
Newman painting. Add to this that our novice is now aware that they are in an art gallery and 
not an interior design exhibition. So, our novice now knows that the canvas before them is 
in fact an artwork. Knowing this, the novice understands that the painting has aesthetic 
significance, and they notice its aesthetic properties such as its balance, and the subtle 
changes of colour characteristic of Newman’s often-delicate compositions. Still, our novice 
does not know that this is a Barnett Newman painting, nor do they recognize his style.  
Now let us run the phenomenal contrast case. E1 is the experience we have just 
been describing, that is before the novice acquires the recognitional capacity of Newman’s 
style but is capable of seeing that the canvas has aesthetic properties (our novice is not such 
a novice after all). Let E2 be the experience the novice has after they have learnt about 
Barnett Newman’s style; they have seen more of his works in different collections, they have 
some idea of Newman’s way of doing something. In short, they are able to recognise his 
style. Equipped with this recognitional capacity, it is intuitive to say that E2 differs 
phenomenally from E1, and this is not due to any representation of low-level properties, or 
aesthetic properties, since this case was constructed on the premise that these remain 
constant in both E1 and E2. Hence, the phenomenal difference must be accounted for by 
the perceptual representation of style properties.135 
To conclude, I have argued that alternative explanations for the phenomenal 
contrast are unsatisfactory, and I have constructed a pair of experiences that isolate style 
properties as responsible for the phenomenal contrast. If my responses to the objections go 
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through then the perceptual representation of style properties is possible, and is not 
threatened by style properties being unable to make phenomenal differences all on their 
own. Further, if what I have said thus far is convincing, I believe there are some benefits to 
the conclusion that stylistic properties are represented in perception. The first is that it makes 
good sense of expertise. It gives support to the claim that art experts and those engaged in 
critical practice really do perceive works differently from those less experienced. Not only 
this, but experts also perceive works better than those with minimal knowledge or lack of 
recognitional capacities. Allowing for the representation of aesthetic and stylistic properties 
in perception lends support to this intuitive claim about expertise. Second, that experts 
perceive works differently makes sense of critical practice, that our perceptions of artworks 
can provide reasons for our aesthetic judgements and appraisals. If the novice and the critic 
experience the same properties, then there may be no substantive reason to claim that the 
critic’s judgement is more warranted. However, if the critic’s recognitional capacities are 
tuned into identifying, and so representing perceptually, high-level properties that the novice 
cannot, then it adds force to the claim that the critic is a better judge. Further, to anticipate a 
line of argument I will pursue throughout the next few chapters, if style properties are 
perceptible then it should come as no surprise that what we see a picture as depicting is 
affected by perception of style properties. Certain depictions challenge the eye, but this 
challenge becomes surmountable when one perceives them better, when one perceives them 
in their style. As such, the perception of stylistic properties can make sense of some people’s 
ability to see better than others what a picture depicts.  
Thus, now that we have an understanding of the way in which style properties are 
perceived in pictures, we ought now to turn to the nature of pictorial experience itself to see 
how perceiving style can illuminate a theory of depiction. To do so will require a necessary 
excursion through the terrain of an alternative account of depiction, which I will argue 
against. However, first we must get clear on a phenomenon that is central to depiction, one 
that all perceptual theories of depiction make use of. I believe this phenomenon has yet to be 
adequately refined and understood. Thus the beginnings of the following chapter will explore 
the phenomenon in some detail until we arrive at an understanding that I think best captures 
its true nature and its place in a theory of depiction.  
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Chapter Three 
Seeing-in and Resemblance136 
 
‘…Pictorial representation is a perceptual, more narrowly visual, 
phenomenon. Imperil the visual status of representation, and the 
visual status of the pictorial arts is in jeopardy.’ 137 
 
I begin this chapter with a warning from Richard Wollheim, who until recently has been 
thought to have developed the most persuasive account of the phenomenology of our 
pictorial experiences. The above comment is important to the framework within which I will 
develop an account of depiction. That framework is, as is advised by Wollheim, perceptual. 
That the nature of our pictorial experiences, and what secures success in depiction, has at its 
core an experience of seeing the depicted subject may seem trivial. But Nelson Goodman 
has, among other things, taught us much about representation in his Languages of Art, and his 
work reminds us that it is far from obvious that pictorial representation has a distinctly 
perceptual nature. One thing we learn from Goodman is that a theory of pictorial 
representation can be developed along symbolic, rather than perceptual, lines. Goodman’s 
Semiotic theory of depiction, which models the laws of pictorial representation on the laws 
of language, allows that a spectator standing in front of a representational picture need only 
apply these laws to determine what the picture depicts. As Wollheim puts it, about 
Goodman’s theory, ‘the grasp of representational meaning is fundamentally an interpretive, 
not a perceptual, activity.’ 138  
 Safe to say that Wollheim disagrees, and the numerous objections to Goodman’s 
theory of depiction are testament to the importance of the perceptual nature of pictorial 
experience. Enumerating and assessing those objections would require an additional chapter, 
such is their force. I will take it that those objections press the Semiotic theory in ways that 
firmly establish the need to preserve the perceptual nature of pictorial representation; that 
looking, for example, at a picture’s title is not sufficient for depiction. Even though this 
looking might be an alternate species of pictorial identification, it is not what depiction 
fundamentally consists in. I heed Wollheim’s warning in this chapter, and develop an 
account of a visual phenomenon central to all perceptual theories of depiction. With 
Semiotic theories aside, I outline and argue against the most plausible alternative perceptual 
theory of depiction to my own. Pictorial representation is certainly a perceptual 
phenomenon, my task in this chapter is to give the phenomenon its most thorough analysis. 
                                                
136 The first part of this chapter has been published as an article in the British Journal of Aesthetics. See: 
Bradley, Helen. ‘Reducing the Space of Seeing-in’, The British Journal of Aesthetics, vo. 54. No. 4, 
(Oxford University Press 2014), pp. 409- 424 
137 ‘On Pictorial Representation’, In Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic Tradition, P. 
Lamarque and S.H. Olsen (eds), (Blackwell 2004), pp. 396- 405, p. 396 
138 Ibid, p. 397 
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3.1. Seeing-in 
 
 Central to the issue concerning what it is for a picture to be representational lies a 
special kind of perceptual capacity, namely seeing-in. It is seemingly uncontroversial to say 
that we see things in pictures. I can see a lion in a painting of an animal that can, all things 
being equal, be correctly described as a lion. What has become a matter of controversy, 
however, is the specific phenomenology attributed to seeing-in. One of the first attempts at 
elucidating this phenomenology comes from Ernst Gombrich in his Art and Illusion.139 
According to Gombrich, our visual experience of pictures is one that is illusory in nature. 
Thus, seeing a woman in a picture is, in various respects, like seeing that woman face to face. 
How is this possible? Gombrich claims that paintings are able to depict due to failings in our 
visual discrimination, which allow illusory effects to occur. Thus a painting of a landscape 
produces an illusion of seeing a landscape face-to-face, but, if this kind of illusion is to be 
produced, our experience of seeing O in a picture cannot involve an experience of seeing the 
design properties responsible for our seeing O, for that would ruin the illusion.  
 Gombrich uses the ‘duck-rabbit’ illusion to demonstrate this point.140 When looking 
at the illusion one can see it either as a rabbit or as a duck, but, crucially, one cannot see it as 
both a duck and a rabbit simultaneously. One may switch back and forth, and we might 
remember that therein lies a rabbit whilst we see the duck, but we cannot see both animals in 
the picture at the same time. Similarly in pictorial depictions we can see either subject or 
design but never both at the same time. Again one may switch back and forth, seeing design 
and then seeing subject, but one cannot have a visual experience of both at the same time.  
However, Gombrich’s account is surely insufficient in accounting for all kinds of 
pictorial depictions. Do we undergo an illusory experience of face-to-face seeing when 
looking at abstract art? It does not seem as if we do. Moreover, even within straightforwardly 
figurative art, Gombrich’s account proves unsatisfactory given that subjects or items within 
the picture might be represented in unusual colours or at odd angles, precluding an illusory 
experience from ensuing. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that Gombrich’s own 
example of the duck-rabbit illusion fails to establish that design properties are not 
experienced.141 Dominic Lopes claims that the switches between seeing duck and then rabbit 
are better described as switches of contents rather than switches in design seeing. That is to 
say that switching between seeing rabbit and seeing duck does not preclude seeing how that 
animal has come to be depicted, which involves seeing design properties. The example does 
not show that one cannot, at one and the same time, see the rabbit and also see how the 
rabbit is depicted. 
                                                
139 Gombrich, E.H. Art and Illusion. 
140 Ibid, pp. 4-5 
141 Dominic Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, (Oxford University Press 2005), p. 31 
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 Further, if our visual experiences of pictures match in such a way as to be 
indistinguishable from seeing those objects face to face, then it fails to give significance to 
pictures themselves, and the special kind of attention we give them. This concern is termed 
the puzzle of mimesis, which stems from, on the one hand, the thesis that to evaluate a picture 
as a picture is to evaluate it as eliciting experiences of the picture itself and as of the scene it 
depicts (Pictorial Evaluation Thesis)142 and, on the other, the thesis that pictures elicit 
experiences as of the scenes they depict and, as such, resemble in important respects face-to-
face experiences of them (Mimesis Thesis).143  The puzzle is generated when these two 
theses are taken together, along with the fact that we do evaluate pictures differently from 
the way in which we would evaluate our experience of seeing the depicted scene face to 
face.144 Why should this be so, given the two claims? If our experiences of pictures match 
our experiences of objects seen face to face, as proposed by Gombrich, why should we value 
pictures and treat them differently, something which we standardly do? Lopes puts this 
concern nicely. Speaking of Van Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes, he asks, ‘How, for example, can 
anyone be moved by a picture-induced experience of some old shoes unless they are also 
moved by an experience of the shoes seen face to face?’145 Clearly we are moved by pictures 
in ways that we are not moved by ordinary visual experiences; as such Gombrich’s account 
cannot resolve the puzzle. 
Having been found to be unsatisfactory, the task of defining seeing-in, and 
describing its phenomenology, was taken up by Richard Wollheim. For Wollheim, the 
phenomenology of our seeing-in experiences is characterised by what he terms twofoldness.146 
Made up of one experience with two aspects, a recognitional and a configurational aspect, 
twofoldness demands of the viewer of a representational picture that he simultaneously sees the 
subject, what is depicted, and also the marked surface or design properties. Thus in order for 
a picture P to represent a subject S, a spectator must see S in P, which demands simultaneous 
attention to both marked surface and what is depicted. This, he claims, explains much of our 
appreciation of pictures. Thus we can see Wollheim’s theory as addressing the puzzle of 
mimesis outlined above.  
I will say much more about Wollheim’s account of seeing-in below but it is 
important to point out that the supposed failure of Wollheim’s concept of twofoldness to 
adequately describe the nature of our seeing-in experiences has recently prompted a move 
towards an account of seeing-in that divides into kinds. This hinges on the idea that because 
pictures themselves are diverse, indeed pictorial art is something of a motley, an account of 
                                                
142 Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, p. 4 
143 Ibid, p. 12 
144 Ibid, pp. 20 - 21 
145 Ibid, p. 20 
146Richard Wollheim, Art and its Objects. 2nd edition with six supplementary essays, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1980). See also his Painting as an Art, and  ‘On Pictorial Representation’. 
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seeing-in ought itself to be diverse in order to capture what is distinctive about pictorial 
depiction and representation. It is thus claimed that the phenomenology of an experience so 
central to depiction is much more complex than Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness can account 
for. 
 Dominic Lopes proposes to treat seeing-in as a multiple phenomenon. He thus 
suggests five ways of seeing-in that he feels do justice to the variety of pictorial 
representations.147 More recently Dan Cavedon-Taylor has argued that the space of seeing-in 
marked out by Lopes is incomplete, and proposes a sixth kind of seeing-in that fits neatly 
into the taxonomy.148 However, despite the contention that seeing-in admits of kinds, I will 
argue that the phenomenon of seeing-in, though certainly more complex than Wollheim 
suggests, does not divide in as many ways as Lopes and Cavedon-Taylor propose. In 
particular, I will show that the purported cases of pseudo design seeing do not demonstrate 
that actual design properties are not experienced, and as such these cases can be captured by 
the other ‘ways of seeing-in’ that Lopes identifies, notably Naturalism and Twofoldness. I also 
argue against the claim that Actualism is a distinct kind of seeing-in, and as such I conclude 
that the space of seeing-in ought to be significantly reduced. Thus this first part of the 
chapter seeks to refine the notion of seeing-in to ensure we have the correct understanding 
of the phenomenon before delving into a theory of depiction. Establishing the correct 
account of seeing-in is important since it will show the inadequacy of any theory of depiction 
that is not sensitive to its variations. This is, in part, the problem I pose for the Resemblance 
View of depiction, which is addressed in the second part of this chapter.  
 
 
3.1.1   Twofoldness and Inflection 
 
Let us begin by getting a little clearer on what both Wollheim and Lopes mean by 
twofoldness as a description of the phenomenology of seeing-in. Seeing-in occurs in many 
situations that are not representational such as seeing faces in clouds or dancers in marked 
walls, but seeing-in as applied to the pictorial arts is defined by Wollheim as a distinct kind of 
perception that is triggered in the presence of an artwork with a differentiated surface. When 
a surface is suitably marked, an experience, with a distinctive kind of phenomenology, will be 
elicited. Twofoldness, as we have seen, is the name given to this phenomenology, and it 
characterizes the experience one undergoes when before a representational picture. When 
looking at a suitably marked surface, according to Wollheim, ‘we are visually aware at once of 
                                                
147 Dominic Lopes, Sight and Sensibility.  
148 Dan Cavedon-Taylor, ‘The Space of Seeing-in’, The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 51. No. 3 (2011),  
   pp. 271 - 278. 
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the marked surface and of something in front of or behind something else. I call this feature 
of the phenomenology ‘twofoldness.’’ 149  
What exactly is meant by simultaneous awareness? It has been pointed out in a recent 
paper by Bence Nanay that there is an ambiguity in the notion of awareness that results in an 
ambiguity in the notion of twofoldness, which leaves it open to interpretation. Nanay suggests 
two interpretations, both of which we have reason to think can be attributed to Wollheim:150 
 
(i) We consciously attend to both the depicted object and to some properties of 
the surface. 
 
(ii) We perceptually represent both the depicted object and some properties of the 
picture surface (while we may or may not attend to them). 
 
            The reason that both of these readings can be attributed to Wollheim is 
because each is supported by one of Wollheim’s two arguments in favour of the twofoldness of 
seeing-in. The first argument from the perceptual constancy of pictures seems to support 
reading (ii).151 According to Wollheim, upon viewing a picture one could move around from 
what one might call the ‘optimal viewing point’ (perhaps directly in front of, and central to, 
the picture), yet when one makes these moves it does not necessarily bring about perceptual 
distortion. Wollheim claims the reason for this constancy lies in the spectator’s awareness, 
not only of what is represented, but also the surface qualities of the picture.  
However, while an awareness of surface qualities may account for constancy, it does 
not entail that we are aware of the design properties of the picture. Indeed this is a point that 
Dominic Lopes makes against Wollheim’s view, which leads Lopes to divide seeing-in into 
different kinds that depend, in part, on the presence of design properties, and conscious 
attention to them, in our seeing-in experience. However, this point only undermines 
twofoldness in sense (i), it says nothing about sense (ii), which, as Nanay points out, Wollheim 
can be held to endorse given the argument from perceptual constancy, which seems to 
appeal to the concept of twofoldness in sense (ii).  
 But Wollheim can also be read as endorsing twofoldness in sense (i), and as such the 
objection works against it. He can be read as endorsing twofoldness in sense (i) because of his 
second argument in favour of the twofold character of seeing-in, which appeals to the fact 
that a great deal of our appreciation of pictures is bound up with seeing how the surface is 
marked.152 We see not only the subject represented but also how that subject has been 
represented in virtue of the brush strokes and expanses of colour on the picture surface. 
                                                
149 Wollheim, ‘On Pictorial Representation’, p. 221 (my emphasis). 
150 Nanay, Bence. ‘Inflected and Uninflected Experience of Pictures’, In Philosophical Perspectives on 
Depiction, Abell & Bantinaki (eds), (Oxford University Press 2010), pp. 181 - 207 
151 Wollheim, ‘Seeing-as, Seeing-in, and Pictorial Representation’. In Art and its Objects, pp. 215 - 216. 
152 Ibid. 
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Thus, if we are to fully appreciate and evaluate representational pictures our attention must 
be twofold and, crucially, twofold in sense (i). This shows how Wollheim’s view can solve 
the puzzle of mimesis since pictures will not, on the basis of our attention to design features in 
our seeing-in experience, elicit experiences that are indistinguishable from seeing the object 
face to face.  
 With these two readings in place it is important for the purposes of this chapter to 
point out that Lopes attributes twofoldness in sense (i) to Wollheim. Lopes writes that:  
‘Wollheim holds that we always see a picture’s design at the same 
time as we see in it the scene it depicts: the one interpenetrates the 
other in a single experience. Design seeing transforms the content of 
seeing-in so that it no longer matches the content of seeing the scene 
face to face. Design is ‘recruited’ into the depicted scene so that the 
scene no longer looks the way it would when seen face to face.’ 153 
 
While it is clear that there is a weaker construal of twofoldness available to Wollheim, 
and I do not wish to advocate one over the other as the correct reading, the reading of 
twofoldness in sense (i) that Lopes uses will be the focus of this chapter. This strong sense of 
twofoldness has come to be termed inflected seeing-in, and much of the recent literature on this 
topic has been concerned with understanding exactly what this kind of seeing-in is.154 I will 
spend the remainder of this section elucidating this notion since it is crucial to understand it 
in a way that fits with what Lopes says about the phenomenon before we can say anything 
useful about the proposed division of seeing-in. This is because that very division is 
motivated by the supposed failure of inflected seeing-in (or just twofoldness for Lopes) to 
account for all pictorial experience. 
 Inflected seeing-in is marked off from other kinds of seeing-in in virtue of the kinds 
of features or properties, and our awareness of them, that figure in the seeing-in experience. 
Dominic Lopes proposes a distinction between two kinds of features of pictures.155 On the 
one hand there are design properties, which are those visible properties of a picture in virtue 
of which the surface depicts an object or scene. On the other hand there are surface features, 
which can perhaps be characterised as all the other visible properties of a picture that are not 
properties in virtue of which a picture depicts an object or scene.156 
According to Robert Hopkins, paradigm cases of inflection are those in which an 
awareness of design properties transforms other aspects of pictorial experience.157 Thus 
inflection challenges, as Hopkins puts it, ‘the key expectation that in principle the 
                                                
153 Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, p. 40 
154 See, for example, Robert Hopkins, ‘Inflected Pictorial Experience: Its Treatment and Significance’. 
In Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction, Abell & Bantinaki (eds), (Oxford University Press 2010), pp. 
151 - 180, and Bence Nanay, ‘Inflected and Uninflected Experience of Pictures’, pp. 181 - 207 
155 Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, pp. 35 - 36 
156 Examples might include the grain of the canvas or the sheen of the paint. 
157 Robert Hopkins, ‘Inflected Pictorial Experience’, p. 155 
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experienced design and the thing seen in it can be characterized without reference to each 
other’.158 This fits with some of Lopes’s claims about pictures supporting a twofold seeing-in 
experience. For example, he claims that we see the design as ‘undergirding’159 the depicted 
scene, and he cites Michael Podro’s claim that design is ‘recruited’160 into the depicted scene. 
If inflection is possible, design and depicted object cannot be pulled apart and characterized 
independently of one another. 
 What exactly does it mean though to see a design undergirding the depicted scene? 
Does it just mean a mere awareness or a causal influence of design on the whole picture? 
Hopkins does not think so.161 Given that a key motivation of proponents of inflection is to 
use it to explain our appreciation of pictures, these theorists must have something stronger 
than mere awareness in mind. Hopkins considers a series of statements that purport to 
capture what proponents of inflection mean and arrives at the following definition: 
Inflection: Sometimes, what is seen in a surface includes properties a full characterization of 
which needs to make reference to that surface’s design (conceived as such).162 
These properties, namely inflected properties, do not reduce to design properties but they 
are properties visible in a surface that need characterising by reference to the properties of 
the surface that sustain seeing-in. Thus when inflection occurs, an awareness of design does 
not just cause one to see something in it, rather the scene seen in ends up possessing features 
that cannot but be characterized by reference to the design. Design interpenetrates the scene. 
Hopkins claims an example of inflected pictorial experience is Rembrandt’s sketch for the 
posthumous etching of Jan Cornelisz Sylvius (Fig. 4). Talking of the sketch, Hopkins notes 
that our experience of looking at the picture has a double content, of seeing both the pastor 
and the ink marks on the surface of the picture and in seeing that the sketch portrays 
movement of the hand, Hopkins writes that: 
‘The upward thrust of the hand is clearly visible. But to see it one must see 
the ink strokes which depict the hand as themselves driving upwards. Indeed 
the hand seems to be both body part and rising splash of ink…Thus what is 
seen in the picture is a hand composed of rising ink. Since what is seen-in 
needs characterizing in part by reference to properties of the picture’s design, 
prima facie what is seen in the sketch is an inflected property.’ 163 
 
                                                
158 Ibid.  
159 Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, p. 128. 
160 Ibid, p. 40. See also: Podro, Michael. Depiction, (Yale University Press 1998), p. 13 
161 Hopkins, ‘Inflected Pictorial Experience’, p. 156 
162 Ibid, p. 158 
163 Robert Hopkins, ‘Inflected Pictorial Experience:’, pp. 162-163 
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(Fig. 4) Rembrandt, Sketch for the Posthumous Etching of Jan Cornelisz Sylvius, (c. 1646) 
 
Importantly for proponents of inflection, this means that what is seen in a pictorial 
surface cannot be something that can be seen face to face, since only pictures can sustain 
seeing-in experiences of objects or scenes that possess features that involve reference to 
design. As Hopkins notes,164 this allows Lopes to use the notion of inflection to solve the 
puzzle of mimesis. According to Lopes, inflection is the answer to the puzzle165 since, although 
pictures do resemble their objects in certain respects, inflection changes the phenomenology 
of the visual experience such that it differs in a very significant respect from face-to-face 
seeing. The difference is that objects and scenes in pictures possess inflected properties, 
while objects and scenes seen face to face could not be seen to have those properties. This 
explains why we value the two kinds of experience differently and thus the puzzle is solved. 
 We now have an understanding of inflected seeing-in, which for Lopes is simply 
twofoldness. Hence, when I use the term twofoldness in what follows, I will mean twofoldness in 
Lopes’s sense, as inflected seeing-in. We can now turn to Lopes’s arguments for seeing-in as 
a diverse phenomenon. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
164 Ibid, pp. 165 - 166 
165 Ibid, p. 192 
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3.1.2.   Ways of Seeing-in 
 
By conceiving of twofoldness in the foregoing sense, as inflected seeing-in, arguing for 
twofoldness as the definitive phenomenology of seeing-in becomes very difficult. One problem 
in particular immediately presents itself, and it is this problem that motivates the pluralist 
turn with regard to seeing-in. If all representational seeing involves twofoldness then it is clear 
that there are certain kinds of pictures that cannot be representational. Such pictures include, 
though perhaps are not limited to, trompe l’oeil pictures, which repel rather than attract 
attention to their surfaces as marked. Trompe l’oeils, then, are non-representational pictures.  
This, unsurprisingly, has struck many people as an uncomfortable consequence of 
twofoldness. Indeed Wollheim himself seems to acknowledge that the result is rather 
counterintuitive, writing that: ‘No-one (I find) will take it on trust from me that, say, trompe 
l’oeil paintings are not representations…’ 166 As such, recent work on seeing-in has proposed 
to treat our visual experience of trompe l’oeil pictures as a markedly different kind of seeing-in 
experience from twofoldness. With one division in place, the possibility space of seeing-in, 
including its phenomenological description, is thrown wide open.  
In his Sight and Sensibility, Lopes proposes a division of seeing-in across two axes.167 
On one axis seeing-in divides between illusory seeing-in, notably trompe l’oeil, and non-illusory 
seeing-in, namely pictures that demand twofold attention. To be clear, the relevant sense of 
illusory for Lopes describes pictures that engender an experience that is phenomenologically 
indistinguishable from seeing the depicted object face to face. Along the other axis, seeing-in 
divides between being distinct from design seeing, again trompe l’oeil fits here, and being 
doubled with design seeing, again pictures demanding twofold attention slot in here. Filled 
out thus far the varieties of seeing-in can be shown in Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1. Ways of seeing-in 
 
                                                
166 Wollheim, ‘On Pictorial Representation’, p.  217 
167 Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, pp. 39 - 43 
 
Seeing-in Illusionistic Non-illusionistic 
 
Divided from design seeing                 Trompe-l’oeil             
 
 
 
Doubled with design seeing                                                                                  Twofoldness 
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Lopes fills the table with three more ways of seeing-in. Firstly, he proposes that some 
pictures, though they are not illusory, still divide from design seeing.168 That is, one cannot 
see anything in them whilst one is seeing their design as a design. However, in such cases one 
sees the surface of the picture as a surface even when one is seeing what is depicted. This 
means that the seeing-in experiences engendered by these pictures are phenomenally 
distinguishable from face-to-face seeing. As Cavedon-Taylor puts it, ‘when seeing-in 
accompanies seeing a picture’s surface, but not its design properties, one finds a trompe l’oeil-
like inability to appreciate how seeing-in is supported by the picture, but one also finds a 
twofold-like double-awareness’.169 Lopes notes that this fits with Kenneth Clark’s personal 
story, cited by Gombrich, of viewing Velázquez’s Las Meninas. Clark tried to stalk the illusion 
by first standing incredibly close to the painting and then slowly stepping back so that he 
might try and pin down the moment at which the marks and configurations transformed into 
visions, but as much as he tried he could not see both configuration and vision at the same 
time.170 Thus the spectator here is not undergoing an illusory experience of face-to-face 
seeing but nor is he having a twofold experience. Lopes terms this way of seeing-in 
‘Naturalism’.  
Cases of Naturalism seem best explained as instances not just of surface seeing as 
distinct from design seeing but of surface seeing where our attention to design is not 
conscious. We always see the surface of the picture when we see something in it; however we 
do not see its design as a design. This seems to be captured by Lopes’s claim that: 
‘When we look at a picture, we normally see in it the scene it depicts, but 
we may also see its design as a design. Of course, there is a sense in which 
we always see a picture’s design when we see things in it, for we always 
see a scene in a picture by seeing the picture face to face. It is only in 
virtue of seeing the configuration of marks on its surface, and being 
sensitive to visible changes in them, that we see anything at all in the 
picture. However, seeing a pictorial design face to face does not entail 
seeing the design as a design—it does not entail…design seeing.’ 171 
 
Thus we see the pictorial design face to face, and we are not undergoing an illusion due to 
surface seeing, but we do not see the design as a design.  
Perhaps seeing-in experiences that are Naturalistic could be identified with the 
weaker sense of twofoldness discussed earlier, that is as perceptually representing both the 
depicted object and some properties of the surface (while we may or may not attend to 
them). Indeed the weaker construal might be some kind of common denominator between 
                                                
168 Ibid, p. 38 
169 Cavedon-Taylor, ‘The Space of Seeing-in’, p. 273. 
170 Gombrich, Art and Illusion, p. 5.  
171 Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, p. 28. 
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all the ways of seeing-in identified by Lopes.172 However, one might worry that the weaker 
construal does not distinguish enough between trompe l’oeil and Naturalism since, as Nanay 
points out,173 the weaker sense does not exclude the possibility that we represent the surface 
properties of trompe l’oeils without being aware of them. However, while trompe l’oeil paintings 
can engender an experience that is phenomenologically indistinguishable from face-to-face 
seeing, Naturalistic pictures cannot produce this illusory experience because they always 
double with surface seeing. Thus while the weaker construal may be some kind of common 
denominator, and Naturalism seems to share some features with it, I will continue to use the 
term Naturalism in order to be clear that it describes a way of seeing-in distinct from both 
twofoldness (in Lopes’s sense) and trompe l’oeil.174 
It is also important to point out that the difference between Naturalism and 
twofoldness seems to be a difference in the role of design properties in explaining why one has 
the seeing-in experience one does. In cases of twofoldness, the explanation shows up in the 
phenomenology of one’s seeing-in experience; one sees the design as a design, and one sees 
those design properties as undergirding one’s seeing-in experience. Whereas in cases of 
Naturalism the explanatory features do not show up in the phenomenology of one’s seeing-
in experience; we do not see the design as a design. However, the design properties still 
explain why one has the seeing-in experience. Thus there is a difference between Naturalism 
and twofoldness at the level of explanation, that is, as a difference between what actually 
explains our seeing-in experience and what we see as explaining, or as responsible for, our 
seeing-in experience. I will say more about this in section 3.1.3. 
Secondly, Lopes identifies cases where the content of seeing-in transforms design 
seeing itself. Twofoldness describes the way in which design seeing informs seeing the subject, 
but can seeing the subject inform design seeing? Lopes uses the example of the famous 
image of the Dalmatian sniffing the ground (fig. 2 in Chapter Two) to show how this can 
occur.175 When looking at the image for the first time it appears to you as an arrangement of 
unrelated black blotches in no particular configuration. One does not see anything in it, but 
suddenly an image of a Dalmatian sniffing the ground comes forth from the mass of black 
blotches. Now one sees the Dalmatian in the picture.  
However, the contour cannot be described as a design property since, according to 
Lopes, ‘the design features…must be visible independently of seeing anything in the 
picture’.176 But seeing the subjective contour of the dog, seeing the design, relies on seeing 
                                                
172 I would like to thank an anonymous referee at the British Journal of Aesthetics for suggesting this. 
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the dog in the picture. If we do not see the dog in the picture we cannot see the contour. It 
therefore cannot be a design feature. Consequently, since the contour seems to appear as if it 
is a design feature when really there is no design seeing occurring, this is a case in which 
seeing-in is accompanied by an experience of non-actual design properties or pseudo-design 
seeing. Lopes terms this way of seeing-in ‘Pseudo-twofoldness’.  
The final way of seeing-in that Lopes identifies is inserted into the table with a 
question mark next to it, which perhaps demonstrates that it is not clear that it is indeed a 
genuine case of seeing-in. Still, Lopes makes an intuitive case for its place therein. This kind 
of seeing-in is illusory yet doubles with seeing design properties, and concerns the idea that a 
picture can depict what it is.177 Lopes gives the example of Jasper Johns’s paintings of 
targets, in which the painting itself is a target. Thus seeing the target in the painting is illusory 
in Lopes’s sense since our visual experience of it is phenomenally indistinguishable from 
seeing a target face to face, but it also doubles with seeing the picture’s design since one sees 
the surface of the painting, which includes all the properties in virtue of which we see the 
target, and those properties are also properties of the target itself. To use Lopes’s example, if 
the surface of the painting is crumbly or garish then so is the surface of the target: ‘We could 
not see properties of one without seeing the other’.178 Hence the design properties are actual 
properties of what is seen in the surface. Lopes terms this way of seeing-in ‘Actualist’. The 
table filled out with these last three appears as follows: 
 
Table 2. Ways of seeing-in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
177 Ibid, pp. 42 - 43 
178 Ibid. 
 
Seeing-in   Illusionistic Non-illusionistic 
 
Divided from design seeing                    Trompe-l’oeil                                             Naturalism!
 
                                                                                                                      Pseudo-twofoldness!
 
Doubled with design seeing                   Actualism?                                             Twofoldness!
 85 
3.1.3.   Reducing the Space of Seeing-in 
 
What are we to make of Lopes’s case for pseudo-twofoldness as a way of seeing-in that 
doubles with seeing pseudo design properties? Lopes suggests that seeing the contour that 
emerges from the Dalmatian picture is not a design property itself, and I find myself in 
agreement here since there is no real contour on the pictorial surface.179 Furthermore, 
according to Lopes, design properties must be visible independently of seeing anything in the 
picture. But in the Dalmatian case, seeing the contour relies on seeing the dog. However, 
something Lopes says throws suspicion on the claim that we do not experience actual design 
properties when looking at the Dalmatian image. Lopes notes that the Dalmatian image is a 
paradigm example of what he calls ‘a more widespread phenomenon’, namely seeing 
subjective contours. This, he remarks, can be deliberately exploited by artists and picture-
makers, and can form part of an artist’s resources.180 In this sense pictures can be designed 
so that a subjective contour emerges.  
However, if a picture is so designed, then part of seeing the subjective contour, and 
therefore seeing the dog in the picture, must rely on seeing the design properties of the 
picture. When trying to explain why the image depicts the dog it does not seem that we are 
in any doubt as to what makes this so. It is the arrangement of black spots. Images like the 
Dalmatian image are not like the Rorschach inkblots, designed to mould subjectively into 
pictures that vary for each person who looks at them. What can be seen in the Dalmatian 
image is fixed by the way the black mass is arranged, even if the configuration is not seen 
straight away. Thus although one cannot see the contour initially it does not mean that the 
black mass is not informing our eventually seeing it. Consequently the fact that the contour 
is not a design property, despite its appearing as one, does not show that we are not 
undergoing a twofold experience of seeing-in. 
However, one might argue that even though there may be genuine design properties 
available in the Dalmatian case, there does seem to be a difference between pseudo-twofoldness 
and twofoldness proper that rests on what I described as a difference at the level of 
explanation. One might argue that in cases such as the Dalmatian image we seem to have a 
level of explanation that does not figure in the phenomenology of the seeing-in experience; 
we do not see the actual design properties (the black spots) as undergirding our seeing-in 
experience. What we see as responsible for our seeing-in experience is a subjective contour, 
but that subjective contour is not an actual design property. Thus our seeing-in experience of 
the Dalmatian image cannot be a case of twofoldness proper since it is not a seeing-in 
experience that involves seeing genuine design properties. 
                                                
179 Ibid, p. 41 
180 Ibid, p. 42 
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 Hence there is a phenomenological difference between pseudo-twofoldness and 
twofoldness proper, even if there is no real difference in what actually explains our seeing-in 
experience i.e., actual design properties such as black spots in the Dalmatian image and, say, 
brush marks in a painting. In order to demonstrate that pseudo-twofoldness is in fact an instance 
of twofoldness proper, albeit a more complex instance, it needs to be shown that there is no 
substantial difference at the level of phenomenology.181 The question then is whether there 
really is such a large phenomenological difference between pseudo-twofold and twofold 
seeing-in. In other words, can the seeing-in experience in the Dalmatian case be inflected?  
Granted that the configuration of black spots is responsible for our seeing-in 
experience and indeed sustains it but, as we have seen, a genuine instance of twofoldness 
requires much more than this. Twofoldness demands conscious attention to design and 
depicted subject, where design is recruited into the scene and inflects the illustrative content; 
we see the design as a design. What do we see in the Dalmatian image? I think that once we 
have the seeing-in experience it can be described as inflected. For it is not just that we see a 
dog in the picture, rather we see a dog as composed of black spots. We see its leg as defined 
by a mass of blackness, and the shadow it casts in the same way. We see that it is pointed 
towards the ground and sniffing in virtue of the upward thrust of the left part of the black 
configuration, which creates the terrain. The subjective contour is only a part of a larger 
experience of inflected seeing-in. Thus although the subjective contour may not be a design 
property it does not show that our seeing-in experience is not inflected by other, genuine, 
design properties. If what inflection requires is seeing something in a surface that has 
properties that need to be characterized by reference to the surface’s design, then the 
Dalmatian image seems like a genuine case, even if seeing the design depends on seeing the 
dog. 
 Does it matter that seeing the design of the Dalmatian image depends on seeing the 
dog? I think we ought to question Lopes’s insistence that design features must be visible 
independently of seeing the thing depicted by his own lights. On Lopes’s conception of 
twofoldness, which is inflected seeing-in, inflected properties are precisely those that straddle 
the divide between properties belonging to the picture surface and those that belong to the 
object or scene seen in. Thus while the seeing-in experience is not always quick to come 
about, and indeed we cannot experience the black spots as design properties without also 
seeing the dog, this does not show that when the seeing-in experience occurs we are not 
undergoing a twofold experience of both design properties and object depicted. Twofoldness 
requires seeing a design (conceived as such) and subject depicted, which in this case can only 
occur once we see the dog. In fact we ought to expect this if inflection is possible since it 
                                                
181 I would like to thank Paul Noordhof and Ema Sullivan-Bissett for insisting that I be clearer about 
this.  
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challenges what Hopkins described as the ‘key expectation’ that, in principle, experienced 
design and the thing seen in it can be characterized without reference to each other. The idea 
of inflection suggests that this is not always possible, and in the case of the Dalmatian image 
the two are inextricably bound up. 
 Therefore, since the fact that a subjective contour is not a design property does not 
entail that one is not undergoing a twofold, inflected, seeing-in experience, pseudo-twofoldness 
collapses into twofoldness proper. As such it belongs in the bottom right side of the table since 
it is not illusory (in Lopes’s sense) and it doubles with seeing design properties. Though it 
may be a more complex instance of twofoldness given the presence of a non-actual design 
property in the seeing-in experience, this does not show that it is significantly different to a 
twofold experience in Lopes’s sense.  
 What can we say about Actualism? As we saw, Lopes offered an example of 
paintings that might engender Actualist seeing-in. The example was Jasper Johns’s target 
paintings, which engender a visual experience that is phenomenally indistinguishable from 
seeing a target face to face. Thus the painting is illusory in Lopes’s sense, but it also doubles 
with seeing the picture’s design since one sees the surface of the painting, which includes all 
the properties in virtue of which we see the target, and those properties are also properties of 
the target itself. Thus the design properties are actual properties of what is seen in the 
surface. 
 However, it is not clear that a visual experience of Johns’s painting is a seeing-in 
experience, and Cavedon-Taylor points out a potential worry in a footnote to his paper ‘The 
Space of Seeing-in’.182 The concern is that, when we look at Johns’s painting, what we 
actually see is just a target and not, in addition, a depiction of a target. Indeed Lopes remarks 
that, ‘pure actualism may entail the objectionable supposition that a picture may depict what 
it is’ 183 but perhaps this only speaks against pure Actualism. According to Cavedon-Taylor, 
an example John Hyman discusses might be a less contentious case of Actualism.184 The 
example is one of Hogarth’s self-portraits in which one sees Hogarth painting a comic muse. 
Actual blobs of paint depict the blobs of paint on the artist’s palette. Although there may be 
no distinction between the depicted blobs of paint and the actual blobs of paint this does not 
prevent the painting as a whole from being an image so long as the area containing the blobs 
of paint is not, according to Hyman, ‘considered as a self-sufficient whole’.185 Thus the 
painting can depict the blobs of paint but only in a larger context.186 
Perhaps, then, Actualism is a genuine way of seeing-in if it is engendered only by a 
part of a picture. Indeed Lopes proposes that, ‘seeing in a picture need not be purely trompe 
                                                
182 Cavedon-Taylor, ‘The Space of Seeing-in’, p. 274 (Footnote 15) 
183 Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, p. 45 
184 John Hyman, The Objective Eye. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 105 
185 Ibid 
186 Hyman writes that, ‘if we excised it from the painting it would cease to depict anything at all.’ Ibid  
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l’oeil, naturalistic, pseudo-twofold, twofold, or actualist’187 and Cavedon-Taylor agrees.188 
This motivates the idea that variety among seeing-in makes for a variety of seeing-in within 
pictures. Perhaps Actualism is a phenomenon that occurs only in regions of pictures, which 
would allow images that engender this kind of seeing-in to be depictions. Thus while pure 
Actualism may be objectionable, Actualist seeing-in in the context of a picture that admits of 
various forms of seeing-in is perhaps not so contentious. 
 This does indeed sound more palatable, and appears to make sense of an interesting 
phenomenon where a picture depicts using the very same materials depicted. However, I 
think there is still a problem with Actualism concerning where it is supposed to belong in the 
table of ‘ways of seeing-in’, and the features it is supposed to enjoy. Actualism is described as 
a seeing-in experience that doubles with design seeing and is an experience that is 
phenomenally indistinguishable from face-to-face seeing, which warrants it being subsumed 
under illusionistic. It seems odd though to describe Actualism as illusionistic since one is not 
having an experience that is phenomenally indistinguishable from face-to-face seeing; one is, 
so to speak, face-to-face seeing.  
Let us take the Hogarth portrait as our example again since it appeared to be a less 
contentious case of Actualism. According to Lopes’s characterisation of Actualism, when we 
look at Hogarth’s painting, or at least at the region that depicts the blobs of paint, we have 
an experience that is phenomenally indistinguishable from seeing blobs of paint face to face. 
But given that Actualism is also characterised as a seeing-in experience that doubles with 
seeing design properties that are actual properties of the subject depicted, namely actual 
blobs of paint, it seems that we cannot describe our experience as illusory. What we see are 
actually blobs of paint. These are the design properties that figure in our visual experience 
and belong to the object depicted. Thus we acknowledge them both as design properties and 
as properties belonging to the depicted object. But describing them as illusory does not seem 
quite right since we are not having an experience that is phenomenally indistinguishable from 
face-to-face seeing; we are face-to-face seeing. Thus Actualism cannot be classed as an 
instance of seeing-in that is illusionistic.  
 However, with the illusory aspect removed, perhaps Actualism might count as an 
instance of twofoldness, that is, as a seeing-in experience that is non-illusionistic and doubles 
with seeing design properties. Lopes’s twofoldness is inflected seeing-in where what is seen in a 
surface includes properties that must involve reference to that surface’s design (conceived as 
such). Perhaps, then, Actualism fits the bill. However, this move is potentially blocked if we 
remember that inflected seeing-in involves inflected properties, which cannot be represented 
in face-to-face experience. This provided the basis for Lopes’s solution to the puzzle of 
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mimesis, but in cases of Actualism we are not undergoing an experience that is phenomenally 
indistinguishable from face-to-face seeing. Instead we are actually face-to-face seeing. Hence 
the design properties, which are actual properties of the subject depicted, might not count as 
inflected.189 
One might think that this can be resolved by further appeal to the likelihood that a 
single picture will admit of varieties of seeing-in. As such, seeing an object in a picture, which 
has Actualist elements in a region of the pictorial surface, will not collapse into face-to-face 
seeing. This might leave room for the claim that the kinds of design properties attributed to 
Actualism—ones that we see as actual properties of the object one sees in the surface—are 
inflected properties and thus Actualism can be subsumed under twofoldness. Whether a 
proponent of inflection might wish to acknowledge these kinds of properties as inflected 
properties is a question I leave unanswered. Discussion of the notion of inflection and the 
extent to which pictures are inflected is ongoing and thus any answer I could give here may 
seem premature. What I hope to have shown in this section is that Actualism might, at 
worst, fail to count as a genuine kind of seeing-in if one struggles to see a place for it at all in 
the taxonomy. At best, it is an instance of twofoldness and should thus be confined to the 
bottom right of the table drawn up by Lopes. Thus while Actualism might be a striking 
feature of some pictures, it should not hold its own place within the space of seeing-in.190 
 
 
3.1.4   Pseudo-Actualism 
 
Do these five ways exhaust the possibility space of seeing-in? Cavedon-Taylor 
suggests that Lopes’s taxonomy leaves out a sixth kind of seeing-in.191 Prompted by the 
thought that one would expect the possibility space of seeing-in to be symmetrically 
structured, Cavedon-Taylor identifies a gap in the table drawn up by Lopes, specifically the 
gap between trompe l’oeil and Actualism. He proposes that this putative variety of seeing-in 
would mirror its counterpart on the right hand side of the table, namely pseudo-twofoldness. 
Thus we should expect that this variety has Actualist elements, just as pseudo-twofoldness has 
                                                
189 One point worth noting, which I would like to thank Peter Lamarque for, is that one might think 
that the blobs of paint on the canvas are indeed different from the blobs of paint we see in the 
picture. That the blobs of paint in the depiction are part of the work of art, and as such cannot be 
identical to the blobs of paint on the canvas, seen as merely blobs of paint. If this is true then we 
have a case of seeing-in, of seeing blobs of paint in the picture. However, even if one thinks this 
there are still troubles about where to place Actualism in Lopes’s table, since this is not obviously a 
case of illusory seeing-in, which means it is better described as an inflected pictorial experience. 
Describing it as inflected, however, might prove troublesome for the view of Actualism as 
illusionistic. As such the notion of Actualism still proves problematic for the space of seeing-in as 
carved out by Lopes.  
190 I would like to thank an anonymous referee at the British Journal of Aesthetics for pressing me to 
expand the discussion of Actualism. 
191Cavedon-Taylor, ‘The Space of Seeing-in’ 
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twofoldness elements, and that it is illusionistic, and thus divides from design seeing. 
Furthermore, just as pseudo-twofoldness involves an experience of subjective contours, of seeing 
design properties that are not in fact there, so too will this proposed variety of seeing-in. 
From this Cavedon-Taylor concludes that it is plausible that the sixth variety of seeing-in will 
fit the following description: 
1) Seeing-in is accompanied by a non-veridical experience of design properties (i.e. 
seeing-in is accompanied by experiencing the picture to have design properties 
it lacks). 
 
2) The design properties that accompany seeing-in belong to what is seen in the 
picture. 
As such he terms this sixth variety ‘Pseudo-actualism’.192 
 Cavedon-Taylor thinks there are pictures that elicit this kind of seeing-in experience, 
and he appeals to the familiar figure, which was discussed in Chapter Two (fig. 1), of the 
Kanizsa triangle to demonstrate this.193 Presented with three dots spaced equidistant from 
each other with small angles cut from them, along with three small angles in an opposite 
configuration, our perception supplies lines and organizes the configuration into triangles. 
Not only this, but our perception organizes them in such a way as to create depth, tone, and 
brightness where really there are no such features. The ‘top’ triangle formed by the dots 
seems closer and brighter than the one formed by the three angles, and it also appears to 
have a contour. As such we are seeing design properties that are not in fact there and, 
furthermore, we see them as belonging to the triangle that we see in the picture. 
Consequently we have a purported case of pseudo-actualism since what we see are not design 
properties proper, so divide from design seeing, yet the non-veridical seeing of these design 
properties presents them in our visual experience as being identical with what is seen in the 
picture’s surface. 
Cavedon-Taylor’s example is appealing and further demonstrates the complexity of 
our seeing-in experiences. However, it is not clear that cases of pseudo-actualism do not involve 
seeing genuine design properties, even if we do not attend to them. The concern I have is 
that the non-veridical experience of design properties does not establish that design 
properties are not figuring in our seeing-in experience at all. Although the subjective 
contours may not be design properties this does not exclude the configuration of the parts of 
the triangle that are design properties, namely the cut out circles and angles, from figuring in 
our seeing-in experience. The reason our eyes are prompted to supply lines to the 
configuration so as to produce the image of two overlapping triangles is because the relevant 
parts of the picture have been designed in a way that produces this result. It is our experience 
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of these design properties that is responsible for our seeing the triangles. Without an 
experience of seeing these design properties the seeing-in experience of the two triangles 
would not be engendered.  
 However, although genuine design properties do figure in our seeing-in experience it 
is not clear that our seeing-in experience is inflected. Furthermore, it is not clear that we see 
even the non-actual design properties as inflected properties. The design properties, although 
they explain why the seeing-in experience is engendered, do not show up in the 
phenomenology of our seeing experience. We do not see the design as a design. Thus the 
level of description is limited to what actually explains our seeing-in experience rather than 
what we see as explaining it. As such the seeing-in experience does not exhibit a twofold 
character in Lopes’s sense.  
What does seem to be the case, however, is that one is visually representing the 
features of the surface, the design properties, even where one cannot attend to them at the 
same time one is seeing the triangles in the picture. In fact it is quite difficult to look at the 
Kanizsa triangles and see only the configuration. The recognitional aspect of seeing-in 
constantly re-asserts itself almost as soon as we have tried to silence it. Furthermore, it seems 
almost impossible to see the subjective contour as a design property whilst also seeing the 
triangles. So even a non-actual design property, which is supposed to provide a 
phenomenological difference between pseudo-actualism and Actualism, cannot be seen at the 
same time one sees the triangles. Thus if one cannot see anything in the picture whilst 
simultaneously seeing design properties, actual or non-actual, then the seeing-in experience 
seems best characterized by Naturalism.  
As we saw, Naturalism describes those seeing-in experiences that are divided from 
design seeing, since one cannot see anything in the picture whilst one is also seeing design 
properties (conceived as such). However, it doubles with seeing a picture’s surface and is 
thus phenomenally distinguishable from face-to-face seeing. This is what makes Naturalistic 
pictures non-illusionistic, that they fail under any circumstances to trompe l’oeil. The Kanizsa 
triangles image seems to fit this description since one cannot, at one and the same time, see 
both design properties as inflecting the illustrative content and see the triangles. The design 
properties are perceptually represented, and indeed form part of the explanation as to why 
we see the triangles, but they are not, and cannot be, consciously attended to whilst we see 
the triangles in the picture. 
 The Kanizsa image, however, does seem to exhibit something that other cases of 
Naturalism do not. In the Kanizsa image, seeing a non-actual design property such as a 
subjective contour is explained in virtue of actual design properties, which cannot be seen at 
the same time one sees the subjective contour. Thus one ‘quirk’ of the Kanizsa triangles 
image is that it seems to elicit two stages of Naturalistic seeing-in. At one stage one sees a 
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subjective contour in the image but one cannot simultaneously see the design properties 
responsible for seeing it (one is not design seeing in Lopes’s stronger sense). At the other, 
perhaps more sophisticated, stage, one sees a triangle in the image but one cannot 
simultaneously see the design properties responsible for seeing it (again one is not design 
seeing). However, although the Kanizsa image allows for a seeing-in experience of a 
subjective contour, what one describes as the subject of the image are the triangles 
themselves and not the subjective contour. As such we ought to be interested in describing 
the phenomenology of a seeing-in experience of the triangles, which, as we have seen, 
cannot double with actual or non-actual design seeing.  
Furthermore, what actually explains why we see the triangles in the picture are the 
actual design properties of the image, since this is what seeing the subjective contour, and so 
the triangles, depends upon. Hence, a seeing-in experience of the triangles does not differ 
from other cases of Naturalism, which rely on genuine design properties being visually 
represented but not consciously attended to. So, despite an interesting characteristic of the 
Kanizsa image in allowing for two stages of Naturalistic seeing-in, there is no difference, at 
the level of explanation and at the level of phenomenology, between pseudo-actualism and 
Naturalism if it is a seeing-in experience of the triangles and not the contour that is at issue. 
A seeing-in experience of the Kanizsa triangles is thus best characterized as an instance of 
Naturalism, as an experience that includes seeing genuine design properties but without 
design seeing in Lopes’s stronger sense. 
However, there is a potential hindrance to this move. And this is the fact that 
purported instances of pseudo-actualism are illusionistic. While I have argued that genuine 
design properties are experienced, though not consciously attended to, when looking at the 
Kanizsa triangle image, the triangles we see in the Kanizsa image are supposedly experienced 
as phenomenally indistinguishable from face-to-face seeing of triangles. Thus they are 
illusory in Lopes’s sense. But Naturalistic pictures cannot trompe l’oeil under any 
circumstances. Thus there is a danger of being forced to subsume seeing-in experiences 
engendered by images like the Kanizsa triangles under trompe l’oeil.  
 However, there is a possible solution, which rests on the key difference between 
trompe l’oeil and Naturalism. What prevents seeing-in experiences characterized by Naturalism 
from engendering a trompe l’oeil seeing-in experience? The answer, according to Lopes, is 
surface seeing.194 In cases of trompe l’oeil, the reason they are so successful in producing visual 
experiences that are phenomenally indistinguishable from face-to-face seeing is because we 
struggle to see their surfaces. However, to the extent that seeing the triangles in the Kanizsa 
Triangle image is accompanied by an awareness of the picture’s surface, the seeing-in 
experience is not trompe l’oeil. Indeed Cavedon-Taylor affirms this thought in his discussion 
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of the Kanizsa triangles when he says that, ‘we always remain perceptually aware of the 
picture’s surface when we see the triangle in the Kanizsa Triangle’.195 Thus, by Cavedon-
Taylor’s own lights, pseudo-actualism must be an instance of Naturalism since it doubles with 
surface seeing, which means it must be non-illusionistic. The space of seeing-in can now be 
represented as follows: 
Table 3. Ways of Seeing-in 
 
 To conclude the first part of this chapter, the proposed division of seeing-in need 
not go as far as Lopes and Cavedon-Taylor suggest. In virtue of the differences between 
design seeing and surface seeing, and the levels of explanation of the role of design 
properties, I have shown that Naturalism captures pseudo-actualism, twofoldness captures pseudo-
twofoldness, and that the place of Actualism in the taxonomy should be reconsidered. Thus the 
space of seeing-in, while certainly complex, ought to be significantly reduced. These three 
ways of seeing-in do justice to the variety of pictures, and any account of depiction ought to 
be able to accommodate them.  
 
3.2   The Experienced Resemblance Theory of Depiction 
 
Now that we have a better understanding of the nature of seeing-in we can turn to 
its use in the philosophy of depiction, where it forms a central tenet in most theories. 
However, some theorists find seeing-in lacking in its ability to explain how pictures depict, 
and demand more explanatory work to be done. In particular they seek to expand on the 
recognitional aspect of seeing-in, that is, what is involved when we recognize the subject or 
object in the picture. Many theorists defer to the long-standing idea that depiction necessarily 
involves resemblance. That is to say that if we see something, call it S, in a pictorial surface, 
this is due to our seeing a resemblance between the pictorial surface and S itself. These 
theorists thus accept that seeing-in grounds depiction but add that it is resemblance that 
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Seeing-in   Illusionistic Non-illusionistic 
 
Divided from design seeing                     Trompe-l’oeil                                         Naturalism 
 
 
Doubled with design seeing                                                                               Twofoldness 
 94 
grounds seeing-in. The Resemblance Theory of Depiction, I believe, stands as the most 
plausible alternative to the theory of depiction that I will argue for. As such it deserves 
thorough attention and convincing argument against it. This part of the chapter will be 
concerned with this task.  
The Resemblance Theory fell out of favour for a long time, provoked, in part, by a 
crippling critique of it by Nelson Goodman in his Languages of Art. There Goodman brands 
the resemblance view ‘The most naïve view of representation’ and crudely formulating it as 
‘A represents B if and only if A appreciably resembles B’. Goodman claims that, ‘more error 
could hardly be compressed into so short a formula.’196 Ignoring the obvious point that 
perhaps Goodman’s own formulation of the view sets it up to fail, he provides some 
challenging objections to the claim that depiction and representation necessarily involves 
resemblance.   
Goodman points out that resemblance, unlike representation, is a symmetrical 
relation. That is to say that if B resembles A then A resembles B. In depiction though, a 
picture may resemble a subject S, and so represent it, yet S does not represent the picture.  
Goodman writes that, ‘while a painting may represent the Duke of Wellington, the Duke 
does not represent the painting.’197 Furthermore, an object resembles itself to the maximum 
degree but it rarely represents itself. Thus resemblance, unlike representation, is also 
reflexive. Another significant problem is that depiction need not be of some particular, and 
indeed it need not be of some particular which actually exists, but resemblance is a relation 
that only holds between one particular and another. Consequently the resemblance view 
cannot seem to cope with the depiction of some, but no particular, thing with various 
properties.  
 These problems are significant if we take resemblance to be an objective relation 
between one item and another. Recent proponents of the Resemblance Theory have thus 
made a more subtle use of the concept of resemblance, and shifted the relation of 
resemblance between picture and object into the realm of experience. The idea, then, is not 
that there is an objective resemblance between picture and object but rather that we experience 
pictures as resembling the objects they depict. This turn away from resemblance simpliciter 
thus focuses on the experience one has before a picture, which will contain, amongst other 
things, an experience of resemblance between depicted subject and object in the real world. 
This, they claim, is the experience that explains how a picture depicts what it does. Upon 
viewing a picture P depicting some subject S, I experience a resemblance between the surface 
of P and S, which accounts for my seeing S in P.  
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 The denial of a strict resemblance between picture and object remedies the 
problems Goodman waged against the resemblance view. If the resemblance relation 
between picture and object is one that is experienced, there will be no symmetrical relation 
since that requires an actual resemblance relation held between two objects. The same holds 
for the problem that resemblance is reflexive. If it is an experience at issue, then there is no 
strict, fixed, relation to be reflexive. Experienced resemblance also resolves the difficulty that 
resemblance seems able to cope only with depiction of particulars. It allows that I can 
experience something as resembling some, but no particular, thing as when, for example, I 
see a picture of a bird that falls under the genus ‘blackbird’. I can still experience a 
resemblance between the picture and some more general idea, in this example blackbirds.  
 However, one of Goodman’s objections to the resemblance view remains significant 
even after the move to experienced resemblance. This is the objection that paintings, 
according to Goodman, resemble other paintings more than they resemble their subjects: ‘A 
Constable painting of Marlborough Castle is more like any other picture than it is like the 
Castle.’198 But the picture represents the Castle and not another picture. If paintings look 
more like paint covered surfaces than the objects they purport to depict then the 
resemblance relation, experienced or otherwise, holds more strongly between other pictures 
and not the objects they depict, but still we say they represent these objects and not other 
paintings. A converse thought also follows, that where two objects are held up for 
comparison, one is more likely to find more difference than similarity. Thus resemblance 
cannot be a sufficient condition for representation.  
This point proves to be an acute difficulty for any resemblance view of depiction. 
This is because it homes in on an area of indeterminacy within resemblance accounts, namely 
to specify in what respect pictures are experienced as resembling their subjects. The difficulty 
is that resemblance is always relative. That is to say that when asked whether something 
resembles something else, it is perfectly reasonable, and often required of us, to ask ‘in what 
respect?’ Without a decisive respect in which pictures are experienced as resembling the 
objects they depict, Goodman’s objection goes through.  
 
 
3.2.1   Resemblance and Outline Shape 
 
What respect, then, is most apt to capture the way in which pictures are experienced 
as resembling the objects they depict? Experienced Resemblance theorists generally agree 
that it is some form of shape that will provide the best answer, although they differ on how 
this is to be understood. One account of how shape provides the key respect in which 
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pictures look like what they depict is that of Robert Hopkins. He proposes that the 
resemblance relation be cashed out in terms of ‘Outline Shape’ 199  
Using the example of tracing a pyramid seen on the horizon (fig. 5), Hopkins 
proposes that from the point at which the pyramid is traced, the tracing will subtend, in 
every plane (as we move up from the base to the apex), the same angles as the pyramid. Thus 
the tracing will match the angles subtended by the pyramid and as such will resemble the 
pyramid in outline shape. Outline shape, at a point (e.g. the point from which we make the 
tracing) is thus defined by Hopkins as, ‘the solid angle it subtends at that point.’200  And it is 
outline shape that Hopkins proposes provides the respect in which pictures look like what 
they depict. 
 
 
(Fig. 5) Pyramid Tracing 
 
 The point that Hopkins now needs to secure is that we actually do perceive an 
object’s outline shape in the real world. For if they cannot be perceived it is impossible that 
pictures can be experienced as resembling them. Hopkins admits that the definition of 
outline shape he has given makes it seem like a very mysterious property indeed, but he 
appeals to familiar phenomena that he believes shows that we do perceive this property.  
He gives the example of the way in which edges of a road seem to converge on the 
horizon. Our experience of this does not suggest that I have been misled, that is, nothing 
about this makes me believe the road does indeed become narrower and forms a point at 
which I will end up. But Hopkins thinks that this “false talk” of edges converging tells us 
something about the way the world is represented in our experience. In particular, it tells us 
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something about a feature of our experience. Hopkins proposes that when we talk of edges 
converging on a horizon, we are expressing our experience of the outline shape of the road, 
that is, the solid angle it subtends at a point. Hopkins writes, ‘False talk of edges seeming to 
converge is our way of capturing true claims about the decreasing angles subtended, i.e. of 
capturing at least part of the outline shape of the road.’201 Outline shape is thus a feature of 
the way the world is represented in our experience.  
However, talk of subtending angles and the geometrical relations of outline shapes 
causes another concern; that if this feature is indeed there to be perceived by all, its 
complexity makes it difficult for anyone who lacks the relevant knowledge of geometry to 
understand. With this complicated characterization, which limits who can understand it, let 
alone recognize it, it makes it difficult to understand the above phenomenon as a perception 
of outline shape. To resolve this difficulty Hopkins appeals to the notion of non-conceptual 
content, that is, the idea that a subject can have an experience with a certain content despite 
lacking the appropriate concepts to characterize that content. The thought is that an 
experience involving outline shape is available to everyone, even if they do not possess the 
concepts by which to understand the content of that experience. The perception of outline 
shape thus forms part of the non-conceptual content of a subject’s visual experience. 
Hence, according to Hopkins, there is a single respect in which pictures look like 
what they depict. In order for a picture P to depict a subject S, a subject must experience P 
as resembling S in outline shape; but does outline shape provide an adequate account of how 
we see things in pictures? As Hopkins points out, much of this will depend on whether such 
things as outline shapes are perceivable in the real world. That is not to insist that they must 
always be perceived, or that they cannot be misperceived, but rather that they are there to be 
perceived in the first place. 
To begin with, I want to attend to the point just considered, that is the question of 
whether such an esoteric property as outline shape is available even to those who do not 
have the conceptual resources to understand it. Hopkins points out that to object to outline 
shape being non-conceptual would in fact aid his argument for outline shape being accessible 
to all, since this would justify the ascription of the concept outline shape to those who have 
those experiences. This would show that, after all, outline shapes are not as peculiar as 
Hopkins has worried they might be.  
However, there is a tension to be noted here that stems from Hopkins’s own 
characterisation of Outline Shape. This is that the notion of Outline Shape, as characterised 
by Hopkins, looks like it needs to be conceptual if it is to be used in a comparative process 
such as that of experienced resemblance between picture and object. One needs to be able 
not only to see outline shapes, but also to use them in, and allow them to figure in, our 
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perception of resemblances between picture and object. It seems that if outline shapes were 
non-conceptual contents we could not adequately bring them to bear on our perceptual 
experiences of pictures. While it is true that it need not be a wholly articulated concept, the 
notion of Outline Shape, as described by Hopkins, looks too complex to be inherently non-
conceptual. The characterisation of outline shapes given by Hopkins, and the role Hopkins 
claims they play in our pictorial experiences, makes them sound conceptual through and 
through.  
To be clear, I am not claiming that Outline Shapes must be conceptual, rather that 
the characterisation that Hopkins gives of Outline Shapes makes them look like they need to 
be, and as such, Hopkins has not given enough argument to the point that they are non-
conceptual. The onus is thus on Hopkins to provide further detail on the claim that outline 
shapes are non-conceptual contents of experience, despite their complex nature. Without 
further argument, it is difficult to see how an appeal to non-conceptual content can free 
outline shapes from the concern that they cannot be recognized and perceived by everyone.  
Thus Hopkins’s appeal to non-conceptual content to explain our perception of Outline 
Shapes, and their role in pictorial experience, is left wanting. If that is the case then there is a 
significant tension between the fact that the perceptual content ‘Outline Shape’ looks like it 
needs to be conceptual to play its required role in Hopkins’s theory, and the fact that, 
according to Hopkins’s own claims, it does not look as if it can be since it is not something 
that can readily be understood.  
 
 
3.2.2   Pictorial Indeterminacy, Inflection, and Misrepresentation 
 
It is also worth considering further whether we do in fact see such things as outline 
shapes in such a determinate way. This is not to suppose, as Hopkins argues against, that 
outline shapes need have clearly defined contours and edges. He claims that even a patch of 
mist can have an outline shape because it will vary through space and subtend angles at levels 
of density. What I question is not whether outline shapes are clear or faint, but whether they 
are continuous or complete. Consider Impressionist painting. Much of the impetus towards 
that style of painting, that is, proceeding with the open brushing of colours rather than lines 
and contours, stems from the thought that the outline as used in painting does not really 
exist in the world. What the Impressionists tried to capture in their paintings was the 
indeterminate transience of light and colour as it exists in nature. If that is what is really there 
to be seen in the world, then it may seem that one must try especially hard to see an outline 
shape and, moreover, to see it as uninterrupted and closed. 
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There is also evidence of visual supplementation and ‘filling-in’ in ordinary visual 
experience. The most prominent example is that of the subjective lines that emerge from the 
already discussed Kanizsa triangle. The effect is not restricted to triangles or other straight-
line figures. Kanizsa and others have demonstrated it with circles, pear shapes and 
curvilinear free forms. That subjective contours are present to perception leaves open the 
possibility that what we experience as continuous and determinate actually relies in a large 
part on the spectator’s share in the experience, rather than outline shapes existing in the 
world, waiting to be perceived. However, if one is not convinced that this holds true of the 
real world, or at least that the phenomenon is too rare to mitigate against the idea of closed 
outline shapes, perhaps it is enough that this kind of indeterminacy can happen in pictures. 
Indeed subjective contour is an effect that has been exploited by picture makers throughout 
history. The Lascaux cave paintings provide a nice example of this. Many of the figures have 
a gapped outline in order to create depth and perspective. The yellow mare, known as the 
Chinese horse, exhibits gapping typical of the paintings along with variations in colour and 
tone, which break up the outline. Yet despite the discontinuous outline of the horse, our eyes 
glide over the figure and see it as if it were complete, that is, our seeing-in experience is that 
of a horse rather than a horse with a gapped outline.  Without a determinate outline shape it 
seems difficult to apply Hopkins’s geometrical notions and consider the similarity in 
subtending angles at a point since, without a closed outline, the angles of an item depicted in 
a pictorial surface will not be the same as those of its actual outline shape. 
However, Hopkins is likely to subsume cases like the Chinese horse under the 
heading of ‘indeterminate pictorial content’, which poses an acute difficulty for the 
resemblance view, and one which Hopkins proposes can be adequately solved. The problem, 
as Hopkins sees it, is that pictures with indeterminate pictorial content, such as a stick figure, 
depict something with content that is much more determinate. But since the shape of a stick 
figure and the shape of a person differ radically, how can we experience the picture as 
resembling a person? Hopkins’s solution is to advocate a separation between what is seen in 
a surface and what is depicted. In that case we can say that what we see in the picture of a 
stick figure is an oddly shaped, wiry man, without claiming that that is what the picture 
depicts. Hopkins further demonstrates that what is seen in and what is depicted can come 
apart through his discussion of Jacopo Tintoretto’s Seated Man seen from Above (Fig. 6). 
Hopkins refers to the indeterminate portrayal of the right arm of the figure and claims that 
we see in the marks an arm with several different boundaries yet that is not what we take the 
picture as representing. Thus what is seen-in and what is depicted can separate.  
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(Fig. 6) Tintoretto, Seated Man Seen From Above 
 
 But all this is at the cost of denying the central tenet of experiential 
accounts of depiction, of which the resemblance view is one, that what is seen in a picture 
determines what it depicts. However, Hopkins does not see the separation suggestion as 
being as strict as this. He is not advocating that a picture can depict S even though everyone 
else sees T in it, merely that the pictorial content can be more indeterminate than what is seen in. 
As Hopkins puts it, ‘separation does not leave pictorial content entirely free of the content of 
seeing-in. The thought is that the former may be indeterminate in ways the latter is not.’202 
 However, I am not convinced that what is seen-in and what is depicted can come 
apart in the way that Hopkins suggests. Furthermore I believe Hopkins has confused seeing-
in with only one aspect of this experience, which thus leads him to make this mistaken claim. 
Consider again the Tintoretto drawing. Hopkins describes the content of seeing-in as seeing 
an arm with several different boundaries, but this does not seem to be the correct way to 
characterize what is seen in. The content of seeing-in rather, is seeing an arm in the picture, 
not an arm with several different boundaries. That Hopkins picks out the indeterminate 
marks of the arm suggests to me that he is in fact conflating seeing-in, which in this example 
looks like a paradigm case of twofoldness, with its configurational aspect, that is the design 
properties or marks on the surface that sustain the seeing-in experience. The indeterminate 
lines, shading and tone suggest an arm, which we see in the picture, but it seems odd to only 
identify these features with what is seen-in. Rather they are part of the configurational aspect, 
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which indeed we do see, but only in conjunction with the recognitional aspect, which adds 
up to a single twofold experience of seeing-in, the content of which is an arm.  
Consider a slightly different example, one that depicts movement, such as Leonardo 
da Vinci’s chalk drawing Rearing Horse (Fig. 7). This drawing contains indeterminate pictorial 
content. The head of the horse is hard to discern, and it certainly cannot be determined 
where exactly in the picture that head is; it is also relatively indeterminate how many legs the 
horse has given that one can make out at least six rough outlines of a leg. If we take 
Hopkins’s line, all of this must be included in the determinate content of seeing-in; that is, 
we see in the picture the outline of six legs, and a head with no determinate boundary or 
position, along with some curved and dashed lines around the central figure yet what is 
depicted is a horse. But that again seems an extremely odd way to describe what we see in 
the picture.  
There is no doubt that we do indeed see these elements but a more natural way to 
describe the picture is as seeing design properties, the configurational aspect, which, together 
with the recognitional aspect, add up to a twofold seeing-in experience of a horse rearing in 
all its dynamic fullness.203 The content of our seeing-in experience is thus a horse rearing, not 
a horse with indeterminate boundaries and disjointed lines. Thus what is seen-in and what is 
depicted remain as one; as such Hopkins cannot appeal to a separation, based on a false 
claim about the content of seeing-in, in order to explain pictorial indeterminacy and the 
difficulties it poses for a resemblance view. Pictorial indeterminacy needs to be explained in 
some other way, which does not jeopardise the connection seeing-in and pictorial content. I 
suggest an alternative way to understand the phenomenon in Chapter Five.  
 
(Fig. 7) da Vinci, Rearing Horse, (c. 1503) 
                                                
203 It is worth noting here that indeterminate pictures look like cases that engender either twofold or 
Naturalistic seeing-in experiences, since indeterminate pictures are not likely to elicit a trompe l’oeil 
seeing-in experience. 
 102 
A further problem is that these examples of pictorial indeterminacy seem to suggest 
an inability to cope with twofold seeing-in, given that these cases involve seeing design 
properties such as indeterminate lines, which depict the subject. Twofold seeing-in was one 
of the three kinds of seeing-in that I argued for as a genuine possibility, yet these examples 
show that paradigm cases of twofold seeing-in cause problems for the notion of outline 
shape and resemblance. As such there are clear cases of depiction, and the experience elicited 
by them, that the resemblance view cannot accommodate. I will say more about this problem 
in the next section, where I frame it as part of a larger discussion of inflection and the 
problems it poses for the Resemblance Theory.  
 Da Vinci’s horse drawing raises another question for the resemblance view and the 
adequacy of Outline Shape in explaining depiction. This is a question about its capability of 
explaining depictions of events or states, such as a horse in the act of rearing.204 Consider 
Rubens’s painting The Descent from the Cross, in which Christ is depicted as being lowered into 
the arms of nine figures including The Virgin, St John, Magdalene, and workers. It is not 
clear how Outline Shape could aid in understanding why we see this event in the painting. 
Firstly, it is unclear what it would mean for the lowering of Christ into the arms of nine 
figures to have an outline shape. Perhaps it would simply be the tracing of the most 
peripheral parts of the figures. As such we can make sense of the individual Outline Shapes 
of each of the depicted subjects. But this seems far too limited to do justice to the painting 
itself, which incorporates not only colour but also indications of movement that add up to 
the figure of Christ appearing to be lowered. Events, unlike objects, are not depicted as static 
despite the fact that the moment is frozen still in the painting. If we simply focused on 
outline shape we would lose the dynamic nature of depictions of events, which is precisely 
what we are supposed to see.  
Perhaps one might say that there is a resemblance consideration taking place when 
we view paintings like Rubens’s, and that is the observation that the lowering of Christ 
resembles the act of lowering and not, say, throwing or lifting. The nine figures in the 
painting resemble figures in the act of supporting and not, say, dropping or pushing. It is still 
unclear though how Outline Shape would help explain the fact that an act of lowering is 
depicted, and not an act of throwing, since much of the visual evidence for this is bound up 
in the subtleties of the painting such as the textures, brush work, and soft colourings of the 
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clothing that indicate the kind of movement occurring. The serene and loving facial 
expressions of the nine figures also tell us something about the kind of action being 
performed. To anticipate my own claims here, much of the content of our seeing-in 
experiences of the painting seem to rely on stylistic features, which, I have argued, not only 
help us to understand depiction but also prevent vast misunderstandings, such as seeing the 
picture as depicting the throwing of Christ rather than the lowering of Christ. All of this 
would be set aside if we took Outline Shape as our criterion of depiction, which seems 
entirely questionable given their important role in specifying the kind of act being 
performed.  
 A further problem for the Experienced Resemblance view centres on the 
phenomenon of inflection, which, as we have seen in the first section of this chapter, is a 
genuine possibility within the space of seeing-in, and is an experience that only a picture can 
elicit. As such, any theory of depiction ought to be able to accommodate it, but how many 
of, and to what extent, are our pictorial experiences inflected?  
We have already seen that Hopkins thinks there is at least one example of inflection, 
namely Rembrandt’s sketch of Jan Cornelisz Sylvius, and notes that if one is persuaded by 
this case one ought to be willing to accept that there are other cases, and indeed I think there 
are. The Catalan painter Antoni Tapies is just one of many artists who demonstrate a 
preoccupation with the surfaces of their pictures. By burning, scoring, layering, ripping, and 
etching into his works, Tapies’ work has an obvious materiality to it, moving beyond mere 
lines and colours in depicting his chosen subjects (often things which are descried as lowly 
and dirty). A seeing-in experience of his work ‘Matter in the Form of a Foot’ presents us 
with, not simply a foot, but a foot composed of concrete, marble dust, and floor 
sweepings—common materials used by Tapies. If our experience is not so fine-grained as to 
see this then it is at least a seeing-in experience of a foot that needs characterizing in part by 
reference to the picture’s design properties, namely to the inflected properties. Our 
experience of the materials is not a separate experience, they form part of the thing seen-in. 
Seeing a ‘Tapies foot’ is not possible in face-to-face experience. Seeing a ‘Tapies foot’ is an 
inflected pictorial experience, and only a picture can allow us to see a ‘Tapies foot’.  
Another example, which I think is interesting in virtue of the materials used in the 
depiction, is ‘Mes Trophées’ by Annette Messager (Fig. 8). Messager has painted intricate 
landscapes onto the surface of a black and white photograph of a hand, creating a depiction 
on the surface of a photograph. She uses the creases of the photographed hand as part of 
her design, highlighting outlines, and giving depth and tone, while the ink drips down the 
surface of the photograph, as if it were still wet. If we draw our attention only to the 
drawings on the photograph’s surface, rather than the photograph of the hand, the seeing-in 
experience of the landscape on the palm of the hand appears to be inflected by the dropping 
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ink, and the creases of the palm. The veins and terrain of the landscape are formed of 
creases in skin and running ink, the houses are nestled in the fold of the thumb, and the 
wrinkles darkened by ink create a gloomy sky. A seeing-in experience of this peculiar 
landscape is inflected, it includes properties that must be characterised in part by reference to 
the design, and a landscape composed of skin and ink is not the kind of landscape one could 
see face-to-face.  
 
(Fig. 8) Messager, Mes Trophées, (Series of works, 1986-1988) 
 
So, I think there are further examples of inflected pictorial experience, and, crucially, 
there are enough to make trouble for Hopkins and his Experienced Resemblance Theory of 
Depiction. How does inflection make trouble for this view? Given that inflection is possible, 
the first problem is that it looks difficult for the view to accommodate it. Granted that not all 
pictorial experiences are inflected, as such the Experienced Resemblance Theory fares better 
in trompe l’oeil and naturalistic cases of seeing-in. Inflection is possible however, and any 
account of depiction should be able to cope with it, and indeed explain how it fits with their 
proposed theory of depiction. The trouble with inflection for the Experienced Resemblance 
Theory is that its very nature seems quite at odds with the main thrust of the view, namely 
that depiction consists in perceptual matching, in particular a match in Outline Shape 
between object and depicted object. But inflected properties, by definition, are not the kind 
of properties that objects in the actual world could be seen to have, since only pictures can 
sustain seeing-in experiences that involve reference to design. Thus there can be no 
perceptual match between depicted object and object in the actual world in cases of 
inflection, since the depicted object will have very different kinds of properties than those 
found in face-to-face experiences.  
However, granted that some depictions have properties that could not figure in the 
real world, and as such cannot be seen as resembling the objects they depict, the 
Experienced Resemblance Theory maintains that it is a match in Outline Shape that provides 
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the respect in which pictures resemble the objects they depict. Thus if inflection is to cause 
real trouble for the Experienced Resemblance Theory, then it must cause trouble with the 
notion of outline shape. Does it? Well, if we remember that the discussion of pictorial 
indeterminacy hinged on the idea that there are cases in which Outline Shape is not closed or 
uninterrupted, and further, that the examples discussed there looked like paradigm cases of 
twofoldness, I think we can make trouble for the Experienced Resemblance Theory using 
the notion of inflection.  
 If we return to Hopkins’s own example of a picture eliciting an inflected pictorial 
experience, namely the Rembrandt sketch, where the hand, and its upward thrust, was seen 
as composed of rising ink, we have an example where outline shape does not figure in our 
seeing-in experience. It does not figure in our seeing-in experience because it cannot do so. 
This is because the Outline Shape of the depicted hand, by being inflected, will not match 
the outline shape of an actual hand seen in the real world. The problem is similar to the 
problem of pictorial indeterminacy, where what we saw in the picture was obscured and 
indeterminate, a non-matching outline shape, and yet we still had a seeing-in experience of 
the subject depicted despite this. Inflection can, though of course not always, preclude a 
determinate outline shape from figuring in our experience of pictures, and without this it is 
difficult to see how pictures can be seen as resembling their subjects in Outline Shape. As 
such, inflected pictorial experience can include experiences that preclude Outline Shape from 
playing its fundamental role in Hopkins’s theory. Thus there are pictures, and seeing-in 
experiences, that the Resemblance Theory cannot accommodate. 
The main problem that inflection poses for Hopkins can be constructed as a 
dilemma in the following way: on the one hand, if Outline Shape is too restrictive it cannot 
explain inflection (or pictorial indeterminacy), and on the other, if it is not restrictive enough 
in allowing for inflection and pictorial indeterminacy (as would be the case if Hopkins’s 
claims about separation of pictorial content and what is seen-in go through) it cannot do any 
work as the basis for the Experienced Resemblance Theory as a theory of depiction. Thus 
the Experienced Resemblance theory is either unable to accommodate a wide range of 
depictions or risks losing a grip on the very thing that does the work for the view in 
explaining depiction and our seeing-in experiences. The view thus produces very 
unsatisfactory results regarding indeterminacy and inflection, and there exists another 
troubling problem for the view, which I will now turn my attention to. 
 This problem for the Experienced Resemblance theory concerns misrepresentation. 
The problem of misrepresentation and Hopkins’s proposed solution forms a crucial part of 
his overall account of depiction. This is because the solution he proposes involves the 
abandoning of a deep-seated assumption, one that has played a central, if not vital, role in all 
other resemblance accounts of depiction. In order to locate what this assumption is it is 
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important first to clarify the nature of the problem misrepresentation poses for the 
resemblance view.  
Hopkins uses a caricature of Tony Blair to illustrate how misrepresentation poses a 
difficulty for his account.205 In order to misrepresent Blair, the picture surface must enable us 
to see him with properties he does not in fact have e.g. a huge mouth, ears, wild eyes etc. 
However, those properties will not correspond with Blair’s outline shape. Consequently, if 
we are to see Blair with these properties we must, at one and the same time, see Blair in the 
picture, that is, see the surface as resembling Blair in Outline Shape, and see something with 
a huge mouth, wild eyes etc., and see the surface as resembling that in Outline Shape too.  
Put simply the problem is this: when something is misrepresented as having 
properties it does not in fact enjoy, the Outline Shape of the misrepresented item will not 
match the Outline Shape of the item in actuality. Thus we cannot reconcile two very 
different Outline Shapes. If this is the case it is not possible for the resemblance view to 
allow such properties to be seen as features of what the surface is seen as resembling. In 
short, the view cannot explain why we can see in surfaces a particular with a property, or 
properties, it does not possess. As such, it does not look as if the view can accommodate 
misrepresentation.  
Before we consider Hopkins’s proposed solution to this problem I think it is 
important to get a little clearer on what misrepresentation consists in for Hopkins. There is 
one phrase that stands out in his discussion, which provides a neat way of summarising his 
view: ‘[a] picture is not bound to ascribe only properties which the item actually enjoys. 
When the picture does not do so, we have pictorial misrepresentation—as in a picture which 
depicts the Eiffel Tower as blue, or as standing on the banks of the Ganges.’ 206 Thus we end 
up with a definition of misrepresentation that can be formulated as roughly this: 
misrepresentation occurs when a picture ascribes properties to its subject that it does not really enjoy. I 
reserve the question of whether this is an adequate definition for the final chapter, where I 
suggest it is indeed inadequate and formulate my own definition which relates to my account 
of style developed in Chapter One. For now, let us consider Hopkins’s proposed solution to 
the problem of misrepresentation for the Resemblance Theory. 
How is the problem to be resolved? Hopkins points out that in the case of 
misrepresentation, the crux of the problem is to make good the claim that a picture is seen as 
resembling in Outline Shape what it depicts for two resemblances, that is one resemblance to 
the misrepresented particular (Blair), and one to the way in which he is misrepresented 
(having a huge mouth, wild eyes etc.). Thus resemblance enters into our experience of 
depiction twice. Consequently the path to solving the problem must lead us to resemblance 
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entering the content of our experience of depiction only once; one outline shape, one 
resemblance.  
Here is where Hopkins suggests abandoning a significant assumption within theories 
of resemblance. The assumption is that if resemblance is to play a role in depicting an item, it 
is resemblance to the item as it really is. That is to say that if P resembles S, it resembles S as it 
really is, but, Hopkins claims, this assumption is not necessary. According to Hopkins, what 
matters with regard to resemblance in depiction is resemblance to the item as it is depicted as 
being, and that allows that it may be depicted with properties it does not really enjoy. In the 
Blair example what is required is not that the marks be seen as resembling Blair as he really is 
but that they be seen as resembling Blair with certain properties. This solution thus makes 
the real Outline Shape of the item extraneous to our seeing it in a pictorial surface. Hence we 
have only one Outline Shape, the one the item is depicted as having, and so the concept of 
resemblance enters the content of our experience of depiction once.  
However, there is a significant worry, and one that Hopkins himself raises, that 
stems from abandoning the assumption that the resemblance at work in depiction is 
resemblance to the item as it really is, and this is that without resemblance to the item as it 
really is we lose any kind of restriction on what has been depicted. If the resemblance 
involved in depiction is not resemblance to the item as it really is, then the view cannot offer 
an explanation why, when such properties could easily be enjoyed by both, we should see 
Blair with those properties and not, say, Clinton. What limits the possible experiences of 
resemblance?  
To solve this difficulty, Hopkins appeals to the contents of one’s visual experience 
more generally. Ordinary visual experiences contain complex contents. For example, seeing a 
dog is not just having an experience the content of which includes a dog shape, fur texture, 
or size, from which you form a belief that there is a dog before you. Rather one’s experience 
must be characterized in part as an experience as of such a thing, namely a dog. If one’s 
experience only included the former features, colour, shape, etc., you would have had a 
different phenomenological experience. That is to say what it was like to have that 
experience would have been different. From this, Hopkins claims that there is some 
plausibility in the thought that experiences of resemblance will share the features that figure 
in standard visual experiences, that is to say they too will have complex contents.  
This observation leads Hopkins to conclude that the reason an experience of 
resemblance of Blair with certain properties differs from one of Clinton with those same 
properties is because it will differ phenomenologically. That is to say that one’s experience of 
resemblance will involve the complex content Blair rather than Clinton. The concepts of 
particular things thus enter into experiences of resemblance and provide the 
phenomenological criterion of difference between an experience of Blair with certain 
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properties and Clinton with those same properties. This, Hopkins proposes, solves the 
difficulty and explains what it is to see Blair with certain properties in a picture rather than 
Clinton with those same properties.  
However, there is a large problem with this solution in that it does not tell us why 
the concept of Blair should enter our experience of resemblance between the pictorial 
surface and Blair himself rather than Clinton. If, as Hopkins proposes, Blair with those 
features and Clinton with those features, ‘would share every property of their appearance…’207 
why should it be the case that the concept Blair enters our experience, and thus why should 
we see Blair and not Clinton in the pictorial surface?  
Hopkins claims that this is not a question that needs to be answered by the view, 
designating it the task of art historians and psychologists. If there is no reason why though, 
on the basis of the visual evidence, the concept of Blair should enter our experience rather 
than Clinton, it looks as if the view does need to answer this question since it has not 
explained how it is that that concept plays its vital role in determining what it is to see Blair 
in the pictorial surface. It seems that, on a resemblance view, if Blair resembles Clinton in 
that they share every property of their appearance, there is no reason, based purely on the 
visual information available (and we must remember it is a visual experience we are 
maintaining accounts for depiction) that the concept of Blair should enter our experience of 
resemblance and, furthermore, there is no reason why that experience should lead us to see 
Blair in the picture rather than Clinton. As such it seems that the view has a large lacuna in 
its account of misrepresentation and, consequently, its explanation of what it is to see Blair 
in a picture.  
I will return to the topic of pictorial misrepresentation in Chapter Five, which will 
mount further pressure on the plausibility of the Experienced Resemblance view. It will be 
considered in detail once I have offered my own account of depiction. So to conclude this 
chapter, I have pointed to various ways in which the notion of experienced resemblance and 
Outline Shape prove problematic in explaining pictorial depiction. There are several 
phenomena it cannot accommodate, notably inflection, pictorial indeterminacy, and pictorial 
misrepresentation. Thus we must construct an account of depiction that, once assembled, 
can provide the materials with which to explain these phenomena. In the next chapter I 
defend and develop an account that can do this. 
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Chapter Four 
The Aspect-Recognition Theory of Depiction and the Significance of Style 
 
‘At the core of depiction is the recognition of its subject and this 
remains so even when the subject is radically transformed and 
recognition becomes correspondingly extended; it remains so not 
because we seek the subject matter despite the complications of 
painting but because recognition and complication are each furthered 
by each other.’ 208 (Michael Podro) 
 
The problems for the Experienced Resemblance theory resulted from a criterion of 
depiction that was too restrictive. Thus when it came to problem cases, the notion of 
Outline Shape needed loosening to an extent that it lost its explanatory value. The move was 
thus from a strict criterion to a loosened one; one that eventually gave out. With this in 
mind, I think a better way to begin to understand the nature of depiction is to start with the 
sparseness of some depictions; those with seemingly impossible configurations, and those 
with blurry and indeterminate content. If we can get an account of depiction that makes 
sense of these difficult cases then the easy ones, the paradigm cases of highly determinate 
depictions, will follow suit. Thus the method here, to put it crudely, is to move from 
looseness to strictness in accounting for the diversity of depiction. 
 Indeed, the account I will now begin to defend and develop is almost predicated on 
the idea that pictures are indeterminate in many respects. They are often hazy, ambiguous, 
stubborn in what they reveal and what they don’t, and they are, at times, certainly puzzling 
for a viewer. As Wölfflin put it:  
‘The eye enjoys overcoming difficulty. One must set it solvable tasks, it is true, 
but…the visual arts can dispense with the partial obscuring of form or 
confusing the eye, as little as music can dispense with dissonance and an 
interrupted cadence.’209  
 
If pictures often confuse the eye then the best place to start in explaining depiction is with 
the source of that confusion. 
 
 
4.1 Aspects and Commitments 
 
Since the demand for a perceptual match between depicted object and object in the 
real world was the source of our troubles with the Experienced Resemblance View, a theory 
of depiction that abandons this demand is likely to be an improvement. So what we need is a 
non-matching perceptual theory of depiction. What does this alternative look like? One non-
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matching perceptual theory, proposed by Dominic Lopes, is called the ‘Aspect-Recognition 
Theory of Depiction’. Lopes’s view has its basis in the idea that pictures present aspects of 
their subjects, which viewers can recognize since the presentation of those aspects engages 
their recognitional capacities. 210  Recognitional abilities are dynamic, such that one can 
recognize an object in front of you as a previously seen object with a certain set of properties 
as being that same object with a different set of properties. Building on the dynamic nature 
of recognition, Lopes proposes that different ways of depicting objects capture different, 
recognisable, aspects; we can recognise that a picture is a depiction of S, even if S is depicted 
as having a different combination of properties than observed in previous encounters with S.  
According to Lopes, the mistake made by previous accounts of depiction, including 
the Experienced Resemblance view, was to assume that a picture’s content is determinate in 
all respects. Matching theories of depiction, according to Lopes, ‘indulge in what may be 
called the figurative fallacy’. 211 The root of this fallacy is to assume that pictures are 
determinate regarding all of the properties of the depicted subject in the same way an 
ordinary visual experience of that subject is determinate. But this is a mistake, since if 
pictures were determinate in this way then they would all be determinate in the same way. This 
is clearly false, since pictures present subjects in remarkably different ways, with varying 
degrees of determinacy. In place of determinacy, Lopes, drawing on the work of Gombrich 
in Art and Illusion, claims that pictures are essentially selective in the aspects they present of 
their subject. Any picture must depict its subject as having some properties but not others, 
having this property but not that property, and, for all other properties that the picture is not 
specific about its subject having, the picture remains non-committal. According to Lopes, 
pictures may be committal and non-committal in various ways: 
‘A representation (of any kind) is ‘committal’ with respect to property 
F provided that it represents its subject as either F or not-F. If it does 
not go into the matter of F-ness, it is ‘inexplicitly non-committal’ 
with respect to F. Finally, a representation is ‘explicitly non-
committal’ with regard to F when it represents its subject as having 
some property (or properties) that preclude it from being committal 
with regard to F.’ 212 
 
 For example, when a woman is depicted as having red hair, this picture is committal 
about the redness of the depicted subject’s hair. It ‘says’ to the viewer that this subject does 
indeed have red hair. But pictures can also be ‘inexplicitly non-committal’, as, say, when a 
charcoal drawing neither depicts nor does not depict a woman as having red hair. The matter 
of the colour of the subject’s hair simply isn’t gone into since the limitations of the medium 
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prohibit these kinds of commitments from being made. Further, pictures can also be 
‘explicitly non-committal’ such as when a picture depicts the right side of a woman’s face at 
the expense of depicting the left side. Thus the picture is explicitly non-committal, it refuses 
to make a commitment about the appearance of the woman’s left side since it represents her 
from the right side, which precludes the picture representing the left side.213 
What is an aspect according to Lopes? For one thing, pictorial aspects are not 
reducible to visual aspects. Thus the Aspect-Recognition theory is not a version of what is 
commonly called ‘Pictorialism’, the view that pictures are in some way equivalents to visual 
experiences.214 Importantly, for Lopes, the selective nature of pictorial content undermines 
an Albertian model of depiction, which holds that pictures ought to present their subjects as 
having properties that they could be seen to have in actuality, and from some determinate 
point of view. Lopes thinks that the aspects presented by pictures expand on those presented 
in ordinary visual experience. Pictures can represent objects as having combinations of 
properties that they could not normally be seen to have. The consequence of this is that 
pictures need not necessarily be viewpointed, as in a Cubist painting that depicts a complex 
of parts seen from no particular point of view. As such, pictorial content, rather than being 
specific and determinate, is aspectually structured (more on this shortly); it is the combination of 
visual commitments made by a picture. 
Thus a pictorial aspect, rather than being modelled on visual aspects, is, according to 
Lopes, ‘… [a] pattern of visual salience, a pattern as much of what a picture leaves out as 
what it includes.’215 An aspect is thus individuated by the kind of commitments it makes 
about its subject. ‘The totality of a picture’s commitments’, Lopes writes, ‘comprise the 
‘aspect’ it presents of its subject…’216 Thus we can think of an aspect as being the many 
different commitments and non-commitments a picture makes about the visual properties of 
its subject. For example, I may depict a landscape as having a certain terrain, and in depicting 
it I may make commitments about this terrain such as its having twists and turns in certain 
places, and as having a certain colour of foliage, and as having patterns of interweaving 
footpaths. The ‘aspect’ this picture presents would be the totality of all of these 
commitments to the visual properties of the landscape. The structure of the picture, then, is 
determined by these commitments (explicit or inexplicit).  
Thus, to say pictures are aspectually structured is to say that pictures present aspects of 
the depicted subject by being committal and noncommittal in various ways about the visual 
properties of that subject. As such, a picture is a construction of these various commitments, 
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some of which are more sparse and indeterminate than others. These commitments, when 
assembled together, comprise the aspect of the depicted subject.   
Although aspects are not always spatial (a picture can be committal, inexplicitly non-
committal, or explicitly non-committal about colour or texture), Lopes claims that a picture 
is a representation that presents spatially unified aspects of its subject. That is to say that a 
picture represents parts of objects as spatially related to each other, such as a Cubist painting 
of a body, where parts of the body are spatially related to each other despite being presented 
in a configuration that is wholly different from our actual perceptual experiences of bodies.  
Thus pictures, and so pictorial content, are spatially unified configurations; they 
present aspects (the totality of the picture’s commitments) of their subject that are related to 
one another spatially, even if that relation undermines the actual relation those parts of the 
subject have in actuality. Furthermore, Lopes writes that:   
‘Some pictorial aspects are essentially pictorial; a picture may make a 
combination of commitments and explicit non-commitments that 
cannot be made by any visual experience…Pictures [can] often 
represent objects as having combinations of properties that no 
ordinary (non-pictorial) experience could represent them as 
having.’217  
 
An example Lopes uses to demonstrate this is pictures in split-style, where, for example, an 
animal may be depicted as seen from several viewpoints e.g. from above, from the side, or 
head on. These viewpoints are spatially integrated and related to one another to form a 
complete depiction that is aspectually structured given the picture’s various commitments or 
non-commitments to features enjoyed by the depicted subject.  
One important feature of a theory that determines what pictures represent in virtue 
of selected aspects presented by the picture, rather than perceptual matching between 
depicted subject and the subject in actuality, is that it does justice to the thought that both a 
finely detailed drawing of an eagle, and a split-style native painting of an eagle, are both 
depictions of eagles. There are two benefits to this. Firstly, it allows for pictorial diversity 
since some pictures make numerous commitments while others make very few, and some 
make commitments that would not match any ordinary visual experience of the depicted 
subject in actuality.  
Secondly, given the aspectual structure of pictures, there is a clear method for 
distinguishing systems of depiction. Styles of picturing, according to Lopes, are characterised 
by the kinds of properties with regard to which pictures are committal, inexplicitly non-
committal, or explicitly non-committal. Hence, for Lopes, two pictures are in different styles 
if they are committal and non-committal concerning different properties altogether. Works 
in the same style are both committal and non-committal about all the very same kinds of 
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properties.218 As such, Lopes’s account makes sense of pictorial diversity, and has the 
resources with which to individuate systems and styles of picturing. But given the aspectual 
structure of pictures, which sometimes combine properties that no visual experience could 
represent a subject as having, how is it that we see in pictures the subjects they purport to 
depict? 
 
 
4.2 The Dynamism of Recognition 
 
Having established the essentially selective nature of pictorial content, Lopes 
proposes that what explains our ability to see subjects in pictures is a certain kind of 
perceptual mechanism, namely recognition. According to Lopes, identifying what a picture 
represents exploits ‘perceptual recognition skills’, that we can recognise objects previously 
encountered, even if those objects have undergone radical changes.  
‘A creature is said to possess a recognitional ability when, on the basis of 
perceptual encounters with the objects, it assembles dossiers of 
information enabling it to identify those objects as ones previously 
encountered.’ 219  
 
It is this skill or ability that underlies our being able to determine what pictures represent. As 
such, this explains the diversity of depiction, given that we can see subjects in pictures 
despite ambiguity or indeterminacy. 
Lopes’s account of pictorial recognition has its basis in a framework of pictorial 
identification, which is modelled on Gareth Evans’s account of information-based 
identification. This forms part of Lopes’s account of pictures as bearers of information, 
which makes use of the notion of the information system, as developed by Evans. According 
to Lopes, pictures are information-transmitting devices; they are what Lopes terms 
‘Evansian’ information states. Information states are those belonging to the ‘informational 
system’, which Evans thinks characterises the foundation of our mental lives. 220  The 
informational system comprises perception, memory and communication, and information 
states are those that are ‘of’ the object that is the causal input to the information system. The 
object is the source of the information state. Picturing, Lopes claims, is an informational 
system, and pictures are caused by their sources. ‘What a picture represents’, Lopes writes, ‘is 
its source, the object or the scene that played the required role in its production.’221 Given 
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Lopes’s commitment to an Evansian account of pictures as information systems, pictorial 
recognition, for Lopes, has its basis in the thought that a picture conveys or ‘transmits’ 
aspectual information from its subject to the viewer. On the basis of this information, 
viewers recognise its source, i.e., they recognise the subject in the picture. However, we need 
not be committed to this view of pictures; the role of recognition can be established without 
making any claims about pictures transmitting information from their sources to their 
viewers. As such, while it is important to note that Lopes develops his account of pictorial 
recognition against this backdrop, I leave the task of assessing the plausibility of his view of 
picturing as an information system to the final section of this chapter where the contrast 
between Lopes’s views and mine will be fully illustrated.  
We do need however to better understand the nature of recognition and the role it 
plays in the Aspect-Recognition Theory of depiction. There are two features of ordinary 
perceptual recognition that are important to understanding pictorial recognition. The first is 
that recognition, for Lopes, is dynamic, that is, one can recognise objects across what Lopes 
calls ‘dimensions of variation’. For example, my recognition of a face might be dynamic 
across viewpoints (one dimension of variation), and ageing processes (another dimension of 
variation). The more dimensions of variation one can recognise an object in, the more 
dynamic one’s recognition ability is. As such, having a dynamic recognitional ability depends 
on one’s ability to make connections between currently perceived objects that have 
undergone radical changes with previously perceived objects and, for Lopes, ‘to say that 
recognition is dynamic is to say that features, objects, and kinds of objects can be recognised 
under different aspects.’222 
However, the dynamism of recognition has limits. Firstly, an object can change in 
ways that strain a dynamic recognition ability, such as an object that has undergone very 
radical changes. Secondly, recognitional abilities are relative to kinds of aspects e.g. an ability 
to recognise an aged face does not extend to being able to also recognise it in a distorted 
mirror. Recognition, Lopes writes, ‘is not boundlessly elastic’. 223  There is thus a limit 
imposed by an inability to recognise objects across different dimensions of variation. Given 
this, there will be a point at which recognition gives out, and so a seeing-in experience of a 
subject in a picture will not be engendered. More will be said about this limit and its 
explanatory value in the theory below. 
The second feature of recognition, which is intimately related to the dynamism of 
recognition, is what Lopes, drawing on the work of Flint Schier, terms ‘generativity’. 
According to Schier, ‘natural generativity’, with regard to pictures, describes the process by 
which, having had success in recognising an object in one picture, one is naturally led to an 
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ability to interpret, and so recognise objects in, many other pictures.224 As such, generativity 
describes the ability to recognise different objects under a new kind of aspect, that is to say 
that recognitional competency at recognising one object under a new aspect suffices to 
recognise other objects under that same new aspect. For example, recognising a three 
dimensional shape from above or from the side, under different aspects, will allow one to 
recognise other shapes as seen from above or from the side. To use a pictorial example - 
recognising a pipe in a Cubist style, under a certain aspect, will allow one to recognise other 
objects such as violins or fruit in a Cubist style. Thus the dynamism of recognition, and 
competency at recognising objects across dimensions of variation, allows for generativity, for 
being able to recognise different objects altered in similar ways. One advantage of the 
Aspect- Recognition theory is thus that it can make sense of highly abstract pictures, since 
recognition is generative once we are competent within a system of depiction, such as a 
Cubist style.  
This is how perceptual recognition in ordinary perception functions. How does this 
translate onto the pictorial case? According to Lopes, and others, pictorial recognition is an 
extension of ordinary perceptual recognition. It is dynamic across variations, that is, one can 
recognise objects in pictures under different aspects, and it is generative, that is, one can 
recognise objects under new aspects. On this latter claim about generativity, Lopes writes 
that:  
‘Once a viewer has gained the ability to recognise some objects with 
which she is acquainted when they are presented in split-style aspects, 
she is then, in principle, able to recognise any object with which she 
is acquainted under split-style kinds of aspects.’ 225  
The thought that pictorial recognition exploits similar perceptual mechanisms to those found 
in ordinary perceptual experience is affirmed by Karen Neander, writing on the role of 
likenesses in depiction and recognition, claiming that:  
‘When we recognise a picture of our friend the process is very much 
the same, except that there are additional factors to be taken into 
account. We take into consideration the fact that we are looking at a 
picture; we compensate for the medium and the style.’ 226 
 
This claim about recognition, and its importance to our perceptual experiences of artworks, 
is also found in Gombrich. Writing on our ability to recognise objects across what have been 
identified as dimensions of variation, Gombrich claims that:  
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‘Without this faculty of man and beast alike to recognise identities 
across the variations of difference, to make allowances for changed 
conditions, and to preserve the framework of a stable world, art 
could not exist.’ 227   
 
Further, describing our ability to compensate for differences, he writes that:  
‘Every time we meet with an unfamiliar type of transposition, there is 
a brief moment of shock and a period of adjustment—but it is an 
adjustment for which the mechanism exists in us.’ 228  
 
This faculty is thus necessary for our seeing-in experiences of objects in pictures, as such 
pictorial recognition, and its dynamism, is a fundamental part of understanding the nature of 
depiction and our ability to see objects in pictures. Perceptual recognition is the fundamental 
mechanism that allows seeing-in experiences to occur, and therefore undergirds all pictorial 
experiences. 
However, Lopes is quick to point out that, while pictorial recognition may be 
modelled along the same lines as perceptual recognition, it has important differences. Lopes 
claims that ‘pictorial recognition, unlike ordinary recognition, operates at two levels’.229 The 
first is ‘content-recognition’ which consists in recognising a design as making up an aspect of 
its subject. When one looks at a picture, unlike ordinary perceptual experience, one is 
presented with a two-dimensional surface covered with marks. Explaining the relation 
between seeing those marks and seeing the subject was the task of Chapter Three, where we 
saw that there are three distinct modes of seeing-in that explain this relation. Hence, the first 
level of recognition may be described as recognising the configurational aspect of seeing-in, 
and identifying it as salient to the subject depicted. Pictures’ designs on the Aspect-
Recognition Theory’s view present recognisable aspects of their subjects, and the first level 
of recognition is recognising that design as a pictorial aspect.  
The second level is subject-recognition, where one recognises the picture’s contents, 
the design that makes up the aspect of the subject i.e., the totality of the picture’s 
commitments, as being of their subject. Thus one not only recognises the design as a 
configuration of features that comprise an aspect of a man, one, at the second level, sees that 
aspect as being of a particular subject, say, Clinton. This could, of course, fail. As Lopes 
points out, one who had never seen a particular man, say Clinton, may succeed in content-
recognition yet fail in subject recognition. ‘This’ Lopes writes, ‘makes sense of the fact that 
there are two ways to fail to grasp a picture. You can fail to grasp the picture’s content—it 
looks just like a jumble of shapes and colours—even though you know it represents a 
familiar object. Or you can tell what kind of object is represented, yet fail to grasp that the 
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object is that familiar object.’ 230 Given this two-level structure to pictorial recognition, while 
it may exploit perceptual recognition skills, it outstrips the limits of recognition in ordinary 
perception in virtue of the aspectual structure of pictures. 
 
 
4.3 Benefits and Problems 
 
One benefit of the view that pictures are aspectually structured and selective is that 
it makes better sense of the phenomenon of inflection (i.e., twofoldness), which was 
discussed in Chapter Three. There it was refined and subsequently proved problematic for 
the Experienced Resemblance view. I suggested that, given inflection is possible, it is a kind 
of litmus test that will tell against a theory of depiction should it be unable to cope with it. 
The account I have been outlining is much better placed to accommodate inflection; as such 
it ought to count in favour of adopting it. 
Let us remind ourselves of the phenomenon of inflection. As we saw, inflected 
seeing-in is marked off from other kinds of seeing-in in virtue of the kinds of properties, and 
our awareness of them, which figure in the seeing-in experience. Here is our definition of 
inflection again: 
 
Inflection: Sometimes, what is seen in a surface includes properties a full characterization of 
which needs to make reference to that surface’s design (conceived as such).231 
Thus inflected pictorial experiences are those in which an awareness of design 
transforms the seeing-in experience to include an awareness of design properties. Consider 
Maurice De Vlaminck’s Paysage de Bougival (fig. 9). This painting arguably engenders an 
inflected seeing-in experience. We do not simply see in the picture clouds and trees, rather 
we see in the picture clouds composed of brushstrokes and dabs of paint. This picture 
presents certain aspects of the scene, some of which are inflected by design properties. One’s 
attention is drawn to the design properties, as what we see in the picture needs characterising 
by reference to the design properties.              
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(Fig. 9) de Vlaminck, Paysage de Bougival, (1906) 
 
The Aspect-Recognition Theory of depiction’s talk of some pictures engendering a 
seeing-in experience of an object with impossible combinations of properties, or properties 
that no ordinary visual experience could represent an object as having, I think captures, in 
part, the notion of inflection. If we remember that inflected properties are not the kinds of 
properties that could be seen in ordinary visual experience since only pictures can engender a 
seeing-in experience of properties that involve reference to design, then the Aspect-
Recognition Theory’s claim that there are some aspects that are essentially pictorial seems to 
capture the idea and description of inflection and inflected properties. Inflected properties 
are essentially pictorial and as such, I propose, can be considered as pictorial aspects within 
Lopes’s account. Thus there are some pictures that present aspects of objects in the world in 
combination with aspects that are essentially pictorial such that they could not be seen in 
face-to-face experience. As such, the Aspect Recognition Theory can accommodate 
inflection.  
Further, inflection itself seems to occur most often in highly stylised depictions such 
as Vlaminck’s. It is when one is presented with a seeing-in experience that is distinctly non-
matching that inflection is said to have occurred. Thus the Aspect-Recognition Theory, 
which can accommodate styles of picturing given its commitment to the claim that pictures 
are aspectually structured (structured by various commitments and non-commitments), 
allows for depictions that are highly stylised, such as those engendering an inflected seeing-in 
experience. Inflection, which draws a viewer’s attention to the design properties of the 
picture, forms part of an artist’s resources, and if it is used in a distinct way, as may be the 
case for Vlaminck, then it can be a feature of style. Inflection, then, can be a feature of an 
artist’s individual style, that is, part of their highly personal way of doing something. The 
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Aspect-Recognition Theory makes sense of this resource, of inflection being part of a 
picture’s aspect, and as such it makes sense of artistic styles.  
Not all pictures are inflected of course. In Chapter Three we identified two other 
ways of seeing-in, namely Naturalistic and trompe l’oeil. While the Experienced Resemblance 
View looked capable of accommodating Naturalism and trompe l’oeil, it failed to 
accommodate inflection. The Aspect-Recognition Theory has the advantage of not only 
accommodating inflection but also makes good sense of the other two distinct modes of 
seeing-in. Pictures that engender a Naturalistic seeing-in experience of their subjects are not 
illusory yet they divide from design-seeing, that is, one cannot see the subject in the picture 
and see the design as a design at the same time. The Aspect-Recognition Theory, by claiming 
that pictures are aspectually structured, accommodates this kind of seeing-in, since it does 
not limit in any way which aspects of a subject can be presented. A picture can, on the 
Aspect-Recognition Theory, closely model the aspects of a subject that one would ordinarily 
perceive them as having.  
Thus while it makes no commitment to an Albertian model of depiction, the theory 
allows for pictures that are structured in this way, as might be the case in Naturalism. Indeed, 
trompe l’oeil, which approaches illusion in its ability to engender an experience qualitatively 
similar to face-to-face seeing, is an experience that is engendered by an aspectually structured 
picture. It is simply that that structure closely models the experience of seeing the depicted 
subject face to face. Thus the Aspect-Recognition Theory can accommodate our three ways 
of seeing-in. Pictures are aspectually structured, and this structure can engender any of the 
three kinds of seeing-in experiences depending on its selection of aspects to present to a 
viewer.  
A further advantage of the Aspect-Recognition Theory is that it seems to resolve, in 
part, the puzzle of mimesis, which was discussed in Chapter Three. If pictures do not match 
exactly their subjects in the real world, despite triggering perceptual recognition, then this 
explains our unique interest in pictures. The puzzle of mimesis is a puzzle about why we value 
pictures differently from the objects they depict in the real world. We find no interest in 
looking at a bedroom, yet Van Gogh’s depiction of his bedroom holds our interest in a 
unique way. We saw that inflection helped to resolve the puzzle of mimesis given that inflection 
changes the experience we have of objects in pictures from that of ordinary visual experience 
of the objects. Add to this the claim that pictures are essentially selective and aspectually 
structured, and as such need not accurately match an ordinary perceptual experience of the 
subject, then pictures become more interesting by their unique presentation of aspects. That 
Van Gogh’s bedroom is depicted from this angle and not that angle, in this colour and not 
that colour, peaks our interest in it as a picture.  
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We can enumerate the benefits of the Aspect-Recognition Theory as follows: it can 
make sense of highly abstract and indeterminate pictures, it can make sense of styles of 
picturing and individuate them, it can accommodate inflection, and it seems to resolve, in 
part, the puzzle of mimesis.  This theory, then, is pointing in the right direction. However, there 
is reason to pause here. First, while I have claimed that the theory looks better equipped to 
deal with the puzzle of mimesis, I have been careful to note it only solves it in part. The reason I 
claim it is only in part a solution to the problem is that something else is needed to make 
sense of our pictorial interest. For, while an Aspect-Recognition Theory makes good sense 
of our interest in perceptually non-matching pictures, it does not fully explain those that 
remain good ‘likenesses’ of their depicted subjects. That is to say that while it can explain our 
interest in ambiguous and complex pictures, it does not say why we ought to be interested in 
pictures that more closely match the object in actuality.  
Inflection, we saw, explains some of this interest, but not all pictures are inflected. 
Seeing-in that is Naturalistic or trompe l’oeil, as we have already noted, does not involve an 
awareness of design properties in the same way as inflected seeing-in. As such, what 
accounts for our interest in these pictures, given that our seeing-in experiences can closely 
match those visual experiences of their subjects in the real world? Granted that pictures are 
aspectually structured, but if that structure closely matches the object in actuality, why should 
the picture be of any interest? Hence, while the theory can accommodate the variety of 
seeing-in experiences, it struggles to make sense of our interest in pictures that engender 
Naturalistic or trompe l’oeil seeing-in experiences. Something else is needed to bolster the 
claim that Aspect-Recognition adequately deals with the puzzle of mimesis. This ‘something 
else’ will be added in the next section of this chapter. 
A further problem encountered by the theory concerns the dynamism of 
recognition. As we have seen, recognition is not boundlessly elastic, it can fail when vast 
changes overstretch the capacity, or where a dimension of variation fails to be crossed. We 
already know that certain pictures challenge the eye, are represented in complex 
configurations, and can be vague and ambiguous. The Aspect-Recognition Theory’s 
advantage was that it could seemingly explain why we see things in these kinds of pictures 
using the perceptual mechanism of recognition. However, recognition can fail, and it remains 
to be seen when and why recognition should fail. There seems to be a lacuna in the 
explanation of why we see things in picture in the Aspect-Recognition Theory if, as is 
sometimes the case, pictures are so complex that recognition gives out. What aids 
recognition where it would otherwise fail? 
 Lopes anticipates this and identifies two additional pictorial modes of identification. 
The first is information-based, that is, if one has independent information, perhaps from 
testimony, then one can identify the subject in the picture. For example, verbal descriptions 
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of the fictional character Peter Pan may help us identify pictures of him. The second is 
conventional, where certain conventions identify depicted subjects. For example, the Virgin 
Mary is often depicted as wearing blue clothing, a convention that allows us to pick her out 
and so identify her in pictures.  Iconographic pictures often function in this way. Thus Lopes 
has recourse to other modes of pictorial identification to allow for pictorial recognition.  
However, to return to a warning from Wollheim, Lopes’s modes of identification 
are information-based and conventional, not perceptual. As we saw at the beginning of 
Chapter Three, any theory of depiction ought to preserve the distinctly perceptual nature of 
our experiences in front of pictures. The two ways identified by Lopes are distinctly non-
perceptual. If we could add to our account of pictorial recognition a purely perceptual 
phenomenon we would do better in developing a perceptual account of depiction. What we 
want to know is why, on the basis of our visual experiences of pictures, recognition does not fail in 
certain cases, and to answer this without bringing in non-perceptual criteria with which to 
solve problem cases. If we could do this then we can preserve the distinctively perceptual 
nature of the theory of depiction I have been outlining.  
To do this requires revising the Aspect-Recognition Theory of depiction, and 
revising it to include certain phenomena for which I have been arguing throughout this 
thesis. In what remains of this chapter I will modify the Aspect-Recognition Theory, 
building into it my account of style and our perceptual experience of style properties, which, 
I claim, better explains how the phenomenon of pictorial recognition functions. By adapting 
the Aspect-Recognition Theory in the way I propose, we can not only better understand 
pictorial recognition, but also better equip the theory to adequately deal with the puzzle of 
mimesis, which I have claimed is not yet resolved. 
 
 
4.4  Aspect-Recognition and Style 
   
What aids recognition such that, when it looks as if it is about to stumble, it actually 
triumphs and one undergoes a seeing-in experience? The answer, I propose, is intimately 
related to artistic style. The reason we recognise a Cubist portrait as a portrait of a person, 
despite the minimal information and its obscure configuration of aspects, is because we are 
familiar with this style of picturing. In chapters One and Two I developed an account of 
style, and of our perceptual experiences of stylistic properties that I believe can now be 
brought to bear on the Aspect-Recognition Theory of Depiction. What I will now do is build 
this account of style into the Aspect-Recognition Theory, and in doing so construct the 
materials with which to further explain the ability to recognise pictures that have minimal or 
obscure information, or depict a subject with inflected properties.  
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 As we have seen, seeing things in pictures depends on our recognitional capacities, 
which are dynamic in various ways. However recognition has its limits. So what explains our 
ability to see things in pictures when their configurations are obscure or indeterminate? I 
suggest that it is our knowledge of an artist’s style, of their highly personal way of doing 
something, that aids recognition where it would otherwise fail. Style, then, is the key to the 
dynamism of our recognitional abilities. The more we know about an artist’s style, the more 
dynamic our recognition will be. This is an extension of Lopes’s claim that: 
 ‘Once a viewer has gained the ability to recognise some objects 
with which she is acquainted when they are presented in split-style 
aspects, she is then, in principle, able to recognise any object with 
which she is acquainted under split-style kinds of aspects.’ 232  
 
Thus a knowledge of style extends our recognitional abilities across dimensions, making 
them generative and more dynamic. The task now is to make good this claim and 
demonstrate its plausibility and utility in explaining recognition. 
 How are styles related to aspects? The claim about knowledge of style and 
recognition will only work within the framework of the Aspect-Recognition Theory if styles 
are suitably connected with the aspectual structure of pictures. Thus, what is needed to 
secure the claim that style promotes pictorial recognition is for style to be a significant part 
of the theory. I think it can be made significant in the following way. My suggestion is that 
selecting and making explicit certain aspects of the world, which is how a picture depicts its 
subject, is part of an individual artist’s style. Pictures, as we have seen, are selective; they are 
committal and non-committal in various ways, but while we may describe a picture as 
containing the selected aspects, it seems only natural, to my mind at least, to ask - who is 
doing the selecting? The answer to this can give a clue as to how individual style ties into the 
Aspect Recognition Theory.  
It is the artist who is doing the selecting. Thus my suggestion is that the selection of 
aspects to make explicit, or to be committal or non-committal in various ways, forms part of 
an artist’s individual style. The ‘choice’ of aspect, on my view, is thus inherently personal. I 
use the term ‘choice’ hesitantly here, since we have seen that my account of style allows that 
an artist’s style need not be consciously chosen. However, the way in which the artist does 
something is highly personal to her, and this way of doing something involves selecting aspects 
of her subject to depictively commit to, while remaining non-committal about others. We 
need not make any claims about the actual underlying psychological states of the artist to 
claim that aspect selection is personal even if it is not consciously done.  The idea that the 
aspectual structure of pictures is inherently bound up with the activity of the person who 
made the work accords with some of Lopes’s claims about his Aspect-Recognition theory. 
                                                
232 Ibid, p. 148 
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He writes that, ‘pictures are frequently made precisely in order to make explicit certain aspects 
of the world’ 233 Pictures are thus made to demonstrate a preference, and are suited to 
different aims and purposes; to different ways of doing things. But perhaps one might think it is 
a leap to connect styles with aspects. However, I think Lopes would not find this too great a 
step given his claim that pictorial styles are individuated by the kinds of aspects they 
represent. Further, Lopes does not seem closed to the idea that pictorial styles are connected 
to aspects. Indeed he writes that, ‘We capture what is distinctive of a style through a 
description of the types of properties with regard to which they are inexplicitly or explicitly 
non-committal.’ 234 And further, that ‘our familiarity with the similarities typical of style is a 
familiarity with the intentions of the artists working in that style.’ 235 Thus Lopes, who 
conceives of depictive styles as aspectually distinguished, ought to be receptive to the idea 
that depictive styles connect up to artists’ intentions in the way I have proposed.  
 As such we can plausibly connect styles and aspects such that they can do the work 
in aiding recognition. The first thing to note about this suggestion is that it preserves the 
perceptual nature of pictorial recognition. I argued in Chapter Two that we could 
perceptually represent style properties when looking at a representational picture. This, in 
part, explained expertise in art, that the expert actually sees pictures differently from the 
novice. Our expert perceives the stylistic properties of the work. Given this, it is seemingly 
natural to extend this claim to a claim about the dynamism of recognition. The expert, in 
being suitably informed and so visually experiencing style properties, has more dynamic 
recognitional abilities. They have acquired, through experience, the recognitional capacities 
for certain styles such that when a picture represents its subject in complex ways, this is seen 
as a feature of style and allows the expert to recognise, and so see, the subject in the picture. 
As such, the expert need not have recourse to other, non-perceptual, modes of recognition. 
A perceptual experience of style properties, which makes a recognitional ability more 
dynamic, secures pictorial recognition.  
The second thing to note about connecting styles with aspects in the way I have 
proposed is that it gives further strength to the Aspect-Recognition Theory’s ability to 
accommodate inflection, and, importantly the puzzle of mimesis. First, inflection, I claimed, can 
form part of an artist’s resources, it can be part of their way of doing something. Hence, 
when inflection occurs, if I am familiar with the style, of the way in which inflection is being 
used, I may be better positioned to undergo a seeing-in experience. Recognition in cases of 
inflection is, in part, dependent on familiarity with styles, which explains why it does not give 
out when faced with inflected pictorial experience. Secondly, and crucially, connecting 
aspects with style in this way better resolves the puzzle of mimesis and the Aspect-Recognition 
                                                
233 Lopes, ‘Pictures, Styles, and Purposes’, p. 339 (my emphasis). 
234 Ibid, p. 338 
235 Lopes, Understanding Pictures, p. 19 
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Theory’s ability to explain our interest in pictures that more closely match the subjects they 
depict in actuality. If aspects are the result of ways of doing things, of selecting this aspect 
and not that aspect, on the part of the artist, then it explains why we are interested in 
pictures that engender Naturalistic and trompe l’oeil seeing-in experiences. Objects in the 
world do not have a style, pictures do, and this is the product of an action on the part of the 
artist; it is the product of her highly personal way of doing something. As such, even where 
depicted subjects closely match, in terms of aspects, the object in the world, we see this as 
aesthetically significant to the picture. It is significant because it is stylistically significant.  
This explains our interest in pictures that engender Naturalistic or trompe l’oeil seeing-
in experiences, and as such better accommodates them within The Aspect-Recognition 
Theory. If we take the case of trompe l’oeil, and our understanding of style, we can see how 
our interest in pictures that engender this kind of seeing-in experience is different from our 
interest in ordinary perceptual experiences of the objects depicted. If trompe l’oeil pictures 
present selected aspects, and this is a feature of style, then our interest in them is bound to 
be different from our interest in ordinary visual experiences of their subjects. For there is still 
a selection among aspects, which has a significance not found in our ordinary perceptual 
experiences of objects.  
Some of the things masters of trompe l’oeil tell us about their work also square with 
this reasoning. For example, William Harnett, one of the famous trompe l’oeil artists from the 
Second School of Philadelphia remarked that ‘In painting from still life I do not closely 
imitate nature. Many points I leave out and many I add.’ 236 He also gives an example of 
painting a flute and adorning it with glints of gold not seen in the rather modest object in 
front of him but on a gold coin he had studied. Hence, although a trompe l’oeil seeing-in 
experience of a trompe l’oeil painting may closely match our visual experience of seeing that 
object face-to-face, the choice of aspects presented is still intimately related to the artist and 
their way of doing something. Trompe l’oeil pictures are aspectually structured in ways that 
reflect artistic choices and selections, which explains why our interest in them is 
fundamentally different from our interest in ordinary visual experiences of their depicted 
objects.  
That depicted objects match in various ways the object in the world is an important 
feature of the way in which an artist has done something. Further, as I have argued, those 
features are high-level properties, which can be perceived in the work by those who have the 
suitable recognitional capacities. Thus, even where a picture closely matches its depicted 
subject in actuality, on my view the match is only part of the perceptual story. For despite a 
match in some respects, there are properties perceptually represented in our visual 
                                                
236 Mastai, M.L. d’Otrange. Illusion in Art: Trompe l’oeil A History of Pictorial Illusionism. (Abaris Books 
Inc. 1975), p. 293 
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experiences of pictures that are not represented in our visual experiences of the objects 
themselves. These properties are style properties. As such the content, and by consequence 
the phenomenology, of our experiences of pictures and our experiences of the objects they 
depict in the real world, are significantly different with respect to the properties represented. 
This explains why pictures, despite close matching, hold our interest differently from a visual 
experience of the depicted object in the real world. Consequently, by building my account of 
style, and our perception of style features, into the Aspect-Recognition Theory, it gives 
added force to the theory’s ability to resolve the puzzle of mimesis.  
Finally, by connecting styles with aspects, the claim about the generativity of 
recognition is made more robust. That one can be familiar with an artist’s way of doing 
something, and that one can perceive features of this in the work, gives a backstory to the 
claim that seeing an object under a new aspect will allow one to recognise other objects 
under that same aspect. According to the modified Aspect-Recognition Theory I have 
outlined, an aspect, while it is in Lopes’s terms ‘a pattern of visual salience’, is salient because 
it is a feature of style. This is the reason the aspect is significant, and allows one to recognise 
subjects in different pictures in that same style. As we saw in the discussion of high-level 
properties in Chapter Two, acquiring a recognitional capacity is a genuine piece of learning, 
one that transforms future experiences of objects that one can now recognise. As such, 
acquiring a recognitional capacity for a certain style will transform one’s experiences of other 
pictures when one sees them in that style. One can learn about an artist’s style, about their 
way of doing something, which, within the framework of the Aspect-Recognition Theory, is 
aspectually presented through choice and selection. These properties are firmly rooted in the 
works themselves, and are there to be perceived. Learning to see those properties thus gives 
force to the claim that once this is achieved one will be able to recognise other objects in that 
same style. That aspects are connected with styles explains generativity in recognition.  
The claim that styles be considered within the framework of the Aspect-Recognition 
Theory is somewhat opposite to Neander’s claim about pictorial recognition that we 
‘compensate’ for style. Rather, my suggestion is that style, and knowledge of style, forms an 
integral part of the process by which one can undergo a seeing-in experience of a subject. 
Recognition, I claim, cannot dispense with style, or to somehow see through it. Instead it is a 
fundamental part of pictorial recognition, one that allows it to prevail where it would 
otherwise give out. That I am familiar with the way in which an artist does something allows 
me to interpret pictures accordingly, and to be competent at recognising the subject. 
Knowledge of style, and thus having a recognitional capacity, informs my seeing-in 
experiences. 
We are, of course, not all experts; as such, the dynamism of recognition is only 
extended in those cases where we are suitably informed. Others will have to rely on non-
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perceptual modes of pictorial identification. My claim here is that there can be further 
explanation of the dynamism of recognition, which is available by connecting styles and 
aspects in the way I have proposed. One might wonder though how easy it is to extend one’s 
recognitional abilities. I think that knowledge of, and so perception of, style is not an 
overwhelmingly difficult achievement, though it may take some effort. As Gombrich writes, 
speaking of the limits of likeness in his Art and Illusion:  
 
‘…We can attune ourselves to different styles no less than we can 
adjust our mental set to different media and different notations. Of 
course some effort is needed. But this effort to me seems eminently 
worthwhile…’ 237  
 
Indeed Gombrich cites this worthwhile task as one of his principal reasons for selecting 
pictorial representation as the subject of his lectures. Thus, while we can adjust ourselves 
perceptually to see stylistic features that aid pictorial recognition, improving the dynamism of 
our recognitional abilities is, of course, a genuine piece of learning that, if achieved, will make 
us more competent in depiction.  
 
 
4.5 Potential Objections 
 
So far we have seen how my account of style can be built into the framework of the 
Aspect-Recognition Theory. I have argued that by doing so the theory is improved in its 
ability to explain the diversity of depiction, in explaining both complex and determinate 
depictions, and that adapting it to give style significance can better place it to resolve the 
puzzle of mimesis. However, there are objections to my view that immediately present 
themselves, which I will now address. By answering these objections I will add further force 
to the significance and plausibility of the view of depiction I have modified and developed, 
and in doing so ready the view for its final task, namely resolving familiar problems in the 
philosophy of depiction. 
 The first objection one might wage against the Aspect-Recognition Theory, and the 
way in which I have adapted it, is that it is not sufficiently different from the other 
perceptual theory of depiction I have rejected, namely the Experienced Resemblance View. 
One might, given the claims about recognition, wonder why the two theories are posed as 
opposites, and argue that they are indeed highly similar, that recognising objects in pictures is 
simply noticing resemblances. In short, the worry is that the Aspect Recognition Theory is 
simply a ‘re-hash’ of the Experienced Resemblance View, and, as we saw, that view was 
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unconvincing, which might make my view guilty by association. Is it sufficiently different 
from the Experienced Resemblance View? I think so, and I offer two main reasons why we 
ought to reject the above objection. 
 The first is that the premise and commitments from which each theory starts are 
remarkably different. Resemblance views begin with a claim about the perceptual matching 
of our experiences of pictures to experiences of object in the real world. The Aspect-
Recognition Theory begins with a claim about the non-matching nature of our perceptual 
experiences of pictures to the perceptual experiences of their objects in the real world. As 
such, Resemblance views restrict pictorial recognition to pictures that match, in Outline 
Shape, their subjects in the real world. Hence, they model pictorial aspects on visual aspects, 
to those that can be presented in ordinary perceptual experience. While the Aspect-
Recognition Theory allows for vast changes in the way a subject is depicted, over which 
recognition can prevail, Hopkins’s resemblance view requires a very close match in Outline 
Shape between the pictorial surface and the depicted subject in actuality. As Lopes puts it, 
‘resemblance theorists wrongly restrict the range of recognizable aspects that pictures may 
present to those that could be presented in ordinary perception.’238  
As we have seen this does not do justice to the variety and diversity of pictures, 
especially given that some pictorial aspects are essentially pictorial e.g. inflection. The 
Aspect-Recognition Theory, by contrast, does not model pictorial aspects on visual aspects, 
claiming instead that what can be seen in pictures often outstrips what can be seen in 
ordinary visual experience. Thus, the premises from which each theory begins are radically 
different, which results in a highly distinctive account of depiction. 
Granted that each theory begins from different theoretical commitments, one might 
still contend that recognition is essentially involved in noticing resemblances. This brings me 
to my second main reason for resisting the claim that the two theories are too similar. This 
reason is that recognition, fundamentally, expands on resemblance. Recognizing an object in 
a picture is not dependent on seeing that it resembles the object in reality. If it were, it would 
fail on multiple occasions. Recognition, as has been claimed, is dynamic, and can range 
across dimensions of variation, to an extent that it can become generative. Hopkins’s 
Resemblance view, which posits a close match between the Outline Shape of the depicted 
subject and the subject in actuality, is more restrictive than pictorial recognition, since 
resemblance in Outline Shape demands the kind of perceptual matching that pictorial 
recognition does not require. As we have seen, objects change in vast ways and yet 
recognition is still triggered. A vast change for a Resemblance View would hinder the 
perception of resemblances in Outline Shape, on which the theory crucially rests. The vast 
changes over which recognition prevails would undermine the perception of resemblances, 
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especially where resemblance in Outline Shape between picture and depicted object in the 
real world is demanded. As Lopes writes,  
‘... it is crucial to recognition that recognizable aspects of an object 
need not be similar in a uniform sense—objects can change in 
remarkable ways and yet remain recognizable.’ 239  
Hence, while seeing resemblances requires uniformity—uniformity in Outline Shape—
recognition operates differently in being dynamic.  
 However, a recent paper by Robert Briscoe threatens the inseparability of 
resemblances and recognition, and we may find ourselves plunged into a ‘chicken and egg’ 
scenario here, or at least into a situation that does not allow for the two to be pulled apart. 
According to Briscoe, who closely examines the psychological literature on recognition and 
resemblance, influential Prototype and Exemplar theories take visual object recognition to 
be, at core, a similarity-based process. Briscoe writes that:  
‘According to prototype theories, for example, ascertaining whether 
a perceived object O belongs to a certain category C involves 
generating an internal representation of O’s visible properties; 
retrieving from long-term memory a representation of the visible 
properties statistically associated with C’s membership; computing 
the degree of similarity between these two representations; and, last, 
applying a decision rule that specifies the degree of similarity 
required for membership in C. Exemplar theories primarily differ 
from prototype theories in treating stored object representations 
involved in recognition as representations of previously 
encountered category members. That said, the categorization 
process is no less similarity-based. Identifying an animal as a cat, 
e.g., involves computing the degree of similarity between the 
animal’s perceived properties and those of previously encountered 
cats.’ 240 
 
Given that object-recognition in ordinary perception functions in this way, Briscoe thinks 
there are good empirical reasons to think that pictorial recognition also has this same 
underlying psychological process; that we ‘compute’ some degree of similarity between a 
depicted object and previously encountered objects in the real world. As such, computing 
similarities i.e., resemblances, underpins perceptual recognition, and so pictorial recognition. 
If this is correct then we cannot disentangle recognition and resemblance, which means that 
                                                
239 Lopes, Pictures, Styles, and Purposes, p. 337 
240 Briscoe, Robert. ‘Depiction, Pictures, and Vision Science.’ Manuscript. (2013) Available at: 
http://philpapers.org/rec/BRIVRI, p. 23. It’s worth noting that Briscoe’s description of the process 
of seeing resemblances in this way seems to bolster the objection I waged against the resemblance 
view in Chapter Three, namely that the experience of seeing resemblances between the picture and 
the depicted subject in actuality looks conceptual through and through, and yet for Hopkins they are 
supposedly non-conceptual, which allows him to appeal to them in explaining depiction. If this 
analysis of the empirical literature is correct then Hopkins cannot appeal to non-conceptual content 
to secure the claim that a resemblance in Outline Shape between picture and depicted subject 
secures depiction. 
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my view and Lopes’s are, at bottom, ‘re-vamped’ Resemblance Theories. If Briscoe is right 
then it would turn out that all the objections I waged against the Experienced Resemblance 
Theory in Chapter Three apply equally to my own view.  
 However, while I find Briscoe’s analysis of the empirical data on object-recognition 
illuminating, it is not clear that object-recognition maps onto pictorial recognition in the way 
he suggests. The first thing to note is that while Lopes uses basic perceptual recognition, and 
our perceptual mechanism of recognition, to inform recognition in the pictorial case, he is 
clear that pictorial recognition is not identical to ordinary visual recognition. As we saw, 
Lopes claims that pictorial recognition has a two-level structure which involves content-
recognition and subject-recognition. This ensures that pictorial recognition, while exploiting 
the same perceptual mechanisms found in ordinary object recognition, is distinct from 
ordinary perceptual recognition. Thus, while it makes use of the perceptual mechanism of 
recognition, the Aspect-Recognition Theory is not committed to the claim that pictorial 
recognition is identical to ordinary perceptual recognition. Given this, we need not be 
committed to any claims about the psychological process in pictorial identification being 
identical to that of ordinary perceptual recognition. If pictorial recognition is not exploiting 
exactly the same psychological processes as perceptual recognition, which involves the 
computing of similarities, then we needn’t suppose that pictorial recognition also involves 
the computing of resemblances. As such, we needn’t worry that pictorial recognition needs 
an experience of resemblance in order to function; thus the first objection turns out not to 
be as troublesome as it first appears. 
The second objection one might wage against my view is that it over-generates cases 
of pictorial recognition, that is, on my view, if one is suitably informed one will always 
recognise an object in a picture, and undergo a seeing-in experience. This, prima facie, seems 
false. One could have all the knowledge and perceptual recognitional abilities required and 
yet still fail to see the subject in the picture. Is this true of my view, that we will always see 
what a picture depicts? My answer is, unsurprisingly, no, and this is because recognition still 
has its natural limits. The claim is that knowledge and perception of style aid recognition, not 
that it secures it in every case. We may be fully informed about caricatures and yet fail to 
recognize their subject. There are no guarantees for seeing-in, but there are tools and aids.  
But perhaps this answer is not enough, in fact it may reveal a further weakness in its 
admission that perception of style does not secure recognition, and so seeing-in. If it doesn’t 
secure it then doesn’t it show my account of style and recognition to be false, given that 
there could be a suitably informed observer who, despite having all the requisite materials to 
recognize S in P, does not have the appropriate seeing-in experience of S in P? I have two 
suggestions that provide a negative answer to this complaint against my view. The first is that 
I could simply dig my heels in regarding this objection and claim that any case where the 
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spectator is apparently suitably informed yet does not have the seeing-in experience is, 
despite appearances, not really a case in which the spectator is suitably informed.  Thus the 
conditions for knowledge of style and perception on my account have not been met, which 
explains why no seeing-in experience is engendered.  
While this is a possible explanation, and one I might be entitled to pursue, it seems 
unsatisfactory. So here is an alternative explanation: we attribute any kind of failure here not 
to the observer but to the artist. They have failed to depict the subject since no suitably 
informed perceiver can perceive the picture as a depiction of the subject it purports to 
depict. This is an extension of Wollheim’s claims about appropriate experiences engendered 
by pictures:  
‘Such an experience will elude even the suitable spectator, and that 
is because the artist failed to make a work that tallies with the 
intentions that he undoubtedly had. In such cases the work, we 
must conclude, represents nothing…’ 241  
 
Thus there is now a shift to the artist in being responsible for the failure of a seeing-in 
experience, or the appropriate experience, since what I have said here does not show that no 
seeing-in experience occurs, rather that the appropriate one has not occurred. The spectator 
may have a seeing-in experience, say, of a man, but not of, say, a specific man e.g. Blair.  
Hence, failures in recognition have two sources: (1) failure on the part of the 
spectator, and (2) failure on the part of the artist. No account of depiction can predict the 
outcome of such failures, that is, what perceptions or seeing-in experiences might occur; it 
can only make suggestions about how to deal with them should they occur. My own account 
makes the suggestion that when they do occur then they are due to the occurrence of either 
(1) or (2). Recognition is not ‘boundlessly elastic’, and (1) and (2) place limits on this. 
The final problem, the solution to which I will leave until the final chapter where it 
will be framed as part of a larger discussion of the difficulty, is that arguably the Aspect-
Recognition Theory entails that all depictions are, in theory, misrepresentations. If depictions 
are precisely non-matching then it turns out they are not faithful representations of their 
subjects. Mismatching is precisely that, and an account of misrepresentation that is 
predicated on misattribution of properties to subjects will result in over-generating 
misrepresentations for the Aspect-Recognition Theory. My answer to this problem is fully 
argued for in the next chapter, since I think an adequate reply to this objection must first 
delve into the issue and ultimately decide what misrepresentation consists in. As it turns out, 
it does not, on my view, simply consist in wrongly attributing properties to depicted subjects. 
This gives a clue as to how the Aspect-Recognition Theory can meet the objection. Further 
though, I demonstrate how building in my account of style and so adapting the theory better 
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explains the nature of misrepresentation, demonstrating how it poses problems for the 
Experienced Resemblance View, whilst allowing my adapted version of The Aspect-
Recognition Theory to escape unscathed. 
 
 
4.6   Picturing as an Information System: Conceptual vs Non-Conceptual Depiction 
 
We have now seen how my account of style can be built into the Aspect-
Recognition Theory, and the advantages it can bring. Before I move on to the final chapter, 
and answer in full the last objection I posed for my account, it is important to differentiate 
my account of picturing from Lopes’s in one further respect. This is because, while I find 
Lopes’s account of the aspectual nature of depiction convincing, I find his wider account of 
picturing as an information system problematic. One need not be committed to such a view 
of picturing, even if one is committed to claims about the aspectual nature of depiction. And 
it is important for my view to hesitate on this wider claim about picturing as information 
systems, since the way in which I have developed the Aspect-Recognition theory undermines 
many of the claims that the theory of pictures as information systems allows. Indeed my 
account moves in the opposite direction to one of the most controversial conclusions Lopes 
reaches. I will spend the remainder of this chapter assessing the claims made by Lopes, in 
particular his claim that handmade pictures can exhibit belief-independence, and, as such, 
depiction can be non-conceptual. I want to distance myself from such claims since I think 
they are false, and my adapted Aspect-Recognition theory that gives style its proper 
significance is not committed to them.  
The theory that pictures are information-transmitting devices has a number of 
theoretical consequences. For one thing, it allows Lopes to argue for the belief-
independence, and so transparency, of handmade pictures. This claim has its roots in the 
debate concerning the transparency of photographs, an argument most systematically 
presented by Kendall Walton.242 Walton claims that photographs are transparent. That is to 
say that when we look at photographs we literally see the objects photographed. This is not 
to say that we see the objects directly as we see objects in the real world. Rather we see 
through photographs, we see the objects by seeing a photograph of them. However, seeing an 
object through a photograph is still a way of really seeing it, even if that seeing is indirect in 
being mediated by a photograph.  
Walton offers two arguments in favour of the transparency of photographs and the 
claim that we see through them to the objects. The first is a kind of slippery slope argument 
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that appeals to the way in which we talk about seeing through spectacles and mirrors. The 
suggestion is that we can extend this to our talk of seeing someone through a photograph. If 
we see through spectacles and telescopes why not also say that we see through photographs? 
Seeing through spectacles may be indirect but it is, for Walton, still a case of seeing. The 
second argument rests on the idea of seeing as a causal process whereby one has visual 
experiences that are counterfactually dependent on the visible properties of objects. This 
means that one’s visual experiences would change only if the visible properties of the object 
changed, but, crucially for Walton, these counterfactual relations must be independent of 
other beliefs (and other intentional states). If a person’s eyes were disconnected, and instead 
a scientist supplied them with the visual experiences corresponding to what they would have 
seen were there eyes connected, then this does not count as an instance of seeing for Walton. 
This is because the visual experiences are dependent on the scientist’s beliefs and not directly 
counterfactually dependent on the features of the scene before them. 
Now, so the argument goes, if belief-independence is constitutive of genuine seeing, 
then photographs can satisfy this requirement. The dependence of the photograph on the 
scene is not mediated by any beliefs anyone may have about how that scene appears. Once 
the camera is set up and the shutter released, the image that appears on the film is in no way 
dependent on the beliefs of the photographer. Thus, when we look at a photograph we 
literally see the object through it. Belief-independence secures this for photographs. 
Conversely, for handmade pictures the counterfactual relations between picture and scene 
are mediated by the picture maker’s beliefs. Thus we do not see through handmade pictures 
to the world.  
However, Lopes’s account of pictures as information systems challenges this, and he 
claims that we ought to slide further down the slippery slope and maintain that we do indeed 
see through handmade pictures. According to Lopes, ‘there is as much reason to believe we 
see through paintings and drawings as through photographs.’243 Lopes thus argues that 
handmade pictures meet the belief-independence requirement for transparency. One way in 
which he argues for this is to use the Evansian notion of an information state in ordinary 
experience and, given his commitment to a picture being an information state, then claim 
that picturing shares important features with ordinary information states. One of the key 
features of information states is their belief-independence. For example, a perception caused 
by perceiving an object is an information state that is carried to the information system, and 
is independent of the content of one’s beliefs. That one knows and believes that the squares 
in Adelson’s chessboard are two different colours does nothing to stop our perceiving them 
as the same colour. Hence the perceptual state exhibits belief-independence.  
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According to Lopes, pictures function similarly in being informational states caused 
by the objects, which are their source. ‘What a picture represents’, Lopes writes, ’is its source, 
the object or the scene that played the required role in its production. And a handmade 
picture’s subject is no more determined by the artist’s intentions or beliefs than is a 
photograph’s.’ 244 A picture is an informational state, which has as its cause the object it 
represents, and this state is not mediated by any beliefs about the object itself. Thus there is 
no disanalogy between photographs and handmade pictures for Lopes; they both exhibit 
belief-independence, and so transparency.  
 A further argument for the belief-independence of handmade pictures rests on 
Lopes’s conception of the process of drawing. According to Lopes, drawing is simply a 
recognition-based skill, and recognition is a perceptual, experiential process. Lopes claims 
that ‘we can recognize objects without the benefit of beliefs about their properties’,245 and 
the process of drawing, according to Lopes, is simply applied recognition. In drawing, one is 
simply required to make marks that are recognizably of the appearance of the object that is 
guiding your drawing movements. Beliefs are dispensable in this process. As Lopes puts it, 
‘A belief that one is drawing Piccadilly Circus is not required in order to make an object that 
can be recognized as of Piccadilly Circus.’246 
Furthermore, making a picture, Lopes claims, is making something with non-
conceptual content. He claims that, insofar as drawing is a recognition-based skill, that it 
requires the picture maker to be guided only by the appearance of an object; it does not 
require that the properties of what is drawn be conceptualised. An artist’s drawings may 
simply reflect her experience of the world. And since beliefs are composed of concepts, it 
follows that the process of drawing has non-conceptual content that one can experience, and so 
one can draw something without having any beliefs about that thing. Lopes writes that, ‘in 
drawing the eye and the hand work together, perhaps bypassing the mind, or rather that 
portion of the mind that deals in concepts and beliefs.’247 Pictorial contents are belief-
independent because they are non-conceptual, and there are no beliefs without concepts. 
Consequently both photographs and handmade pictures maintain belief-independent 
patterns of counterfactual dependence on their subjects. Handmade pictures thus satisfy the 
belief-independence requirement for transparency.  
 These two arguments taken together provide a powerful argument to the point that 
handmade pictures are transparent. Thus if there is a difference between handmade pictures 
and photographs it cannot consist in the uniqueness of belief-independence to photographs. 
However, Lopes is careful to add that he is not suggesting that drawing never engages our 
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conceptual repertoire, or that artists never form any beliefs about the objects they are 
drawing. The claim is that concepts, and so beliefs, are dispensable in this process, and as 
such it is not a necessary condition on the act of drawing that our conceptual repertoire be 
engaged.  Still, the claim Lopes makes is a very strong one. He claims that he sees, ‘no reason 
why an artist must bring to bear any concepts about the content of a picture he is making. It is 
possible to draw something, guided by the look of the thing…without having a concept of 
it.’248 So the claim is that having a belief about an object is not a necessary condition for 
drawing it, and that any kind of concept about the object whatsoever is also dispensible.  
 Berys Gaut objects to this conception of drawing, appealing to the conceptual 
nature of action itself (and drawing is certainly an action of some kind). ‘Drawings’, Gaut 
writes, ‘by definition, are the product of an action, the act of drawing something…One 
wants to draw a cat, for example, and believes that by making such-and-such marks, one will 
do so.’ 249 Action is distinct from mere behaviour because the action is intentional under 
some description, and is thus brought under a concept by the agent. ‘Actions’, Gaut 
continues, ‘have intentional explanations: every action is to be explained by the agent’s 
beliefs and desires. Beliefs and desires are constituted by concepts. So if a drawing is made, 
the process of its making must be governed by concepts.’250  
These intentional explanations are what make the difference between actions and 
mere behaviour. My turning on the light can be explained in terms of the beliefs and desires 
I have, it can be explained intentionally. However, my action of turning on the light may also 
startle the cat but I did not intend to startle her since I was not aware of her presence. As 
such, startling the cat is not an intentional action since it cannot be explained by any of my 
beliefs or desires. Thus drawings are the products of the action, or series of actions, of 
drawing, and their content is explained by an ineliminable appeal to artist’s beliefs and 
desires. These beliefs and desires explain why the drawing has the content it does.  
 Gaut does not claim that every feature of an action is intentional; just as startling the 
cat was a feature of my action of turning on the light that was unintentional. Likewise, not 
every feature of a drawing-action need be intended and as such not every feature of a scene 
an artist is drawing need be conceptualised. The claim is only that some content must be 
brought under concepts by an artist, that their drawing-action is explained in part by their 
beliefs and desires. This is enough however to undermine Lopes’ argument since belief-
independence for Lopes rests on the claim that no concepts at all are present in the act of 
picture making. However, it is a necessary feature of the action of drawing that some 
concepts be brought to bear since that action is to be explained in part by reference to the 
                                                
248 Ibid. 
249 Gaut, Berys. A Philosophy of Cinematic Art, (Cambridge University Press 2010), p. 87 
250 Ibid 
 135 
beliefs and desires of the artist. The mediation cannot be experience alone, as Lopes claims, 
since this would not be the action of drawing. 
Perhaps one might defend Lopes by granting that drawing is an action but asking 
the following question - is drawing necessarily the product of an intentional action? It 
doesn’t look like drawings, by definition, are the products of intentional actions. One could 
absent-mindedly produce a drawing, or perhaps by intending to do something else one’s 
actions produce a drawing. But even if drawings need not be the product of an intentional 
action, it isn’t going to help Lopes much. Presumably Lopes is applying his arguments to 
those drawings that are the products of intentional actions since it proves very little to say 
that a drawing produced unintentionally can involve no beliefs or concepts. If we’re talking 
about drawing as an unintentional action then plausibly no beliefs or concepts need be 
involved as explaining that action. As such we have an example of drawing that does not 
necessarily involve reference to beliefs or concepts. But if we’re talking about drawing as an 
intentional action it seems implausible. It is drawings of these kinds, as the products of 
intentional actions, that are of interest here. Indeed the nature of drawing as discussed by 
Lopes suggests that indeed he is talking about drawings as the product of intentional actions:  
‘The artist looks at an object, marks a surface, checks to see 
whether the result is recognizable as of the object, and then revises 
the drawing until a recognizable aspect emerges.’ 251 
 
This is to talk of the intentional action of drawing, and indeed the checking in this example 
illustrates one’s desires to accurately represent the subject, and that the artist has the belief 
that in marking the surface an accurate drawing will be produced. Gaut’s point still holds 
since it seems highly implausible that one intends to produce a drawing, guided by our 
experience of the subject, and intentionally makes marks on a canvas such that a drawing will 
be produced, without bringing to bear any beliefs or other intentional states whatsoever.  
 Related to this notion of checking, Gaut has a further argument against Lopes. 
According to Lopes, experience could be the only thing guiding one’s drawing actions and 
not beliefs. So beliefs drop out as playing a necessary role. In response to this claim, Gaut 
asks us to consider the following: 
 ‘How, on this account, is the artist supposed to adjust the drawing 
in order to capture the appearance of its subject. Since only 
experience may be involved, she just sees, presumably, that, say, a cat 
drawing is not as black as the cat and alters the drawing 
appropriately. But this claim occludes the role of beliefs and desires 
in the drawing process. To see that P, a picture, is blacker than O, 
its object, is to make a type of judgment: Seeing that involves a 
judgment, in a way that simply seeing an object does not.’ 252 
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In order to adjust one’s drawing one must see that ϕ is the case, which is to make a type of 
judgement, and hence to hold a perceptual belief that ϕ is the case. Thus belief must be 
involved in the drawing process where that process involves adjusting one’s drawing 
appropriately.  
Something Gaut does not discuss but I think is important and related to seeing that 
concerns how seeing that the object one is purporting to depict relates to other objects in the 
scene and, believing that things are so, one attempts to capture those spatial relations in 
one’s drawing. However, while in photographs this point of view and the spatial relations 
between objects depicted depends in no way on an artist’s beliefs, in a handmade picture that 
point of view and the spatial relations between the object depicted and the other objects in 
the scene rests entirely on how the artist believes those spatial relations to be, even if, in the 
end, she decides to thwart them in her depiction. One sees that an object is at such-and-such 
a distance from another object, forms the belief that such-and-such is the case, and if one 
wants to induce a perceptual matching seeing-in experience, checks to see whether one’s 
drawing accurately represents this, and adjusts it accordingly. It might even be the case that 
one needs to see that certain spatial relations hold in actuality in order to be able to 
aspectually structure one’s picture differently from the actual scene.  
One can also construct an epistemic argument against the transparency of 
handmade pictures. There is an epistemic difference between photographs and handmade 
pictures such that, while photographs are in some way constrained to represent the facts, 
handmade pictures are not as reliable in this way. Robert Hopkins cashes out this difference 
by maintaining that photographs allow for what he terms ‘factive pictorial experience’253, that 
is to say that what is seen in a picture is indeed how things really were when the picture was 
made, and so, as a matter of necessity, its accuracy is guaranteed. Thus while photographs, of 
necessity according to Hopkins, accurately represent that such-and-such was the case at a 
time, handmade pictures are not constrained in this way and are liable to misrepresent, even 
if that misrepresentation is minimal. Handmade pictures never support factive pictorial 
experience since, when they are accurate, they are so only in virtue of how someone took things to 
be. For traditional photography, on the other hand, seeing that something is the case in no 
way determines what appears on a photographic film. For handmade pictures, seeing that, 
which involves a judgment about how things appear, forms the very basis of our ability to 
draw.  
Thus, while the Aspect-Recognition theory of depiction has multiple benefits, 
committing it to claims about information transmission, and, in virtue of this, transparency, 
is problematic, and it is problematic independently of the fact that this claim about 
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transparency fundamentally does not fit with my own view. On my view pictures are 
aspectually structured, but this structure is selected by the artist, and forms part of her way of 
doing something. Her way of doing something is highly personal, and our knowledge of this, 
and our perceptual experience of stylistic features, aids pictorial recognition and seeing-in. A 
consequence of this is that handmade pictures are fundamentally the products of intention, 
of choices and selections, which is predicated on the idea that they have a style. Whatever is 
involved in this process, of seeing the world and depicting it in one’s own way, I think it is 
conceptual through and through.  
Of course a personal style can be unconscious, it can be habitual and instinctual, as 
we saw might have been the case for Matisse. 254  While one’s actions may not be 
preconceived or ‘held in one’s mind’ this does not rule out the aspects of style that are, and 
further, the simple fact that one is trying to depict a recognizable subject, even if the resulting 
depiction is obscure, seems necessarily to involve some beliefs about the object when one is 
trying to capture it on a two-dimensional surface. Thus, while I do not beg the question 
against Lopes, his claims are implausible independently of any claims I make about 
depiction; my view is at odds with his in an important respect - that individual style precludes 
the belief-independence of the act of picture making.  
Hence, to conclude this chapter, we have arrived at a theory that is distinct from 
Lopes’s but bears important similarities with regard to aspect-recognition. I have adapted the 
theory, and the claim that pictorial recognition exploits certain perceptual skills, to include 
my own account of style, claiming that it makes better sense of our ways of seeing-in 
established in Chapter Three, and the puzzle of mimesis. This view has further advantages 
however, to which the next chapter is dedicated. We have seen that it resolves some puzzles 
about depiction, but I have left the most troublesome until last, namely pictorial 
misrepresentation and pictorial indeterminacy. These problems have put considerable 
pressure on other accounts, and indeed formed part of my main criticisms of the 
Experienced Resemblance View. As such, the view I have developed ought to be able to 
better explain them. I think it can, and in the next chapter I demonstrate how it does so. 
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Chapter Five 
Misrepresentation, Pictorial Indeterminacy, and the Significance of Style 
 
Having argued for a theory of depiction that incorporates my account of style, I will 
now turn my attention to two phenomena that all accounts of depiction ought to be able to 
explain, and indeed where the view I have developed fares better. The first is pictorial 
misrepresentation, and the second is pictorial indeterminacy. We saw that these phenomena 
caused trouble for the Experienced Resemblance Theory. But in order to be sure that they 
do not trouble my view we must consider them in detail and adequately define them. In this 
chapter I begin by describing what pictorial misrepresentation is not, arguing against a 
definition of misrepresentation that can be plausibly drawn out of Hopkins’s defence of his 
Experienced Resemblance view. This definition has as its basis the view that representation 
involves inaccurately ascribing properties to a depicted subject. However, I show that a 
proponent of the view is forced to claim that misrepresentation is absolutely rife among the 
arts, and to maintain a very limited conception of the representational capacities of pictures. 
As such, I claim that we ought to resist this definition as it stands, and that incorrectly 
ascribing properties to the depicted subject is only a necessary condition for 
misrepresentation. Something else is needed for sufficiency.  
To argue against the adequacy of the initial definition of misrepresentation, I 
introduce an account of pictorial realism, in particular Dominic Lopes’s account, which 
satisfactorily explains the diversity of judgements of realism. This view of realism mounts 
further pressure on the plausibility of Hopkins’s account of misrepresentation by severing 
the connection between realism and accuracy. With this in place, and having rejected the 
view of misrepresentation as inaccurately ascribing properties to a depicted subject, I suggest 
that misrepresentation is intimately related to artistic style, such that it can provide the 
required sufficiency condition with which to correctly determine cases of misrepresentation. 
Thus my account of depiction, which gives style its proper significance, can explain pictorial 
misrepresentation. The final part of this chapter addresses the problem of pictorial 
indeterminacy, as it was discussed in Chapter Three. There we saw that it made trouble for 
the Experienced Resemblance view with its reliance on Outline Shape as a criterion of 
depiction. The sparseness of some depictions confirmed the inadequacy of Outline Shape, 
and in this chapter I again show how connecting an Aspect-Recognition Theory with my 
account of style can better explain the phenomenon.  
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5.1 What Misrepresentation Is Not 
 
What is misrepresentation? Misrepresentation in the pictorial arts is a curious case. It 
is curious because for a picture to misrepresent one must simultaneously see it as 
representing the subject depicted and see the depicted subject as enjoying properties it does 
not in fact enjoy. Misrepresentation is in some sense a failure but it is not a failure to 
represent at all. Hence typically, and perhaps intuitively, misrepresentation describes those 
cases in which something is represented but not represented, or depicted, accurately. There 
are many kinds of misrepresentation. I can misrepresent a person’s character by describing 
them as unfriendly when in fact they are perfectly pleasant, I can misrepresent the facts of 
this or that situation, and I can misrepresent the distance between landmarks on a map by 
using a faulty key. In cases of misrepresentation, then, something has gone awry, or wrong, 
or has misfired. But what is pictorial misrepresentation? What has gone ‘wrong’ in a picture 
that misrepresents its subject?  
Here is where the situation becomes tricky. The term ‘misrepresentation’ has a 
negative sting, and we often use it in a normative sense to describe cases where something 
has gone wrong. However, I do not wish to make any normative claim about 
misrepresentation. To be clear, what I am interested in here is whether something depictively 
misrepresents i.e., involving visual properties of the depicted subject; it is possible that 
something can depictively represent a subject while misrepresenting it some other way. 
Consider the following example. I decide to depict someone who, despite their kind-hearted 
nature, has upset me in some way. I create a depiction of them, and anyone looking at that 
picture will recognise my kind-hearted enemy in the picture; that is to say that anyone who 
looks at my picture will undergo a seeing-in experience of that person. As such I have 
successfully depicted my kind-hearted enemy. However, what I have thus far withheld from 
the story about my depiction is that I depict my kind-hearted enemy as committing some 
terrible act, one that anyone who knows my kind-hearted enemy would know she would not 
do because she is kind-hearted.255  
Now, what I have ‘done’ in my picture, among other things, is to say something 
false about this person. One might thus plausibly say that I have misrepresented my kind-
hearted enemy; and in saying this one means it in a negative sense, that I ought not to have 
done this. Here is the normative sense of the term ‘misrepresentation’. While I am of course 
interested in cases where pictures misrepresent their subjects in this sense, my primary 
interest in this chapter is to describe the nature of depictive misrepresentation, which, insofar as 
everyone sees my kind-hearted enemy in the picture, my picture is not guilty of. 
Furthermore, as will be established in more detail in this chapter, even if inaccurate 
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properties are ascribed to the depicted subject, in this case my kind-hearted enemy, insofar as 
everyone sees my kind-hearted enemy in the picture, my picture depictively succeeds. As 
such, inaccuracy is consistent with depictive success, a claim that this chapter aims to make 
good.  
Thus, on the one hand, we have what can be termed ‘normative misrepresentation’, 
connected with the negative complaint about my picture showing my kind-hearted enemy 
committing some atrocity, and on the other, depictive misrepresentation. My primary concern is 
with the latter kind since it is this kind that causes problems for theories of depiction, and 
the notion that inaccuracy is consistent with depictive success will distance myself from other 
accounts of depictive misrepresentation. This distinction will be important throughout this 
chapter, since objections to my positive account of pictorial representation are likely to hone 
in on this area of ambiguity in the meaning of the term ‘misrepresentation’.  
Now that I have outlined the kind of misrepresentation I am interested in, namely 
depictive misrepresentation, how should we define it? Perhaps the best way of characterising 
pictorial misrepresentation, which we intuitively take to be in some sense a distortion of the 
facts, albeit visually rather than descriptively, is as inaccurately ascribing properties to a 
depicted subject. Again, saying that a picture has inaccurately ascribed properties to the 
depicted subject is not meant to make any normative claim, rather it simply describes the 
visual properties enjoyed by the depicted subject as compared with the visual properties the 
subject has in actuality. Let us take as our starting point then the following definition: 
 
(D1) misrepresentation occurs when a picture ascribes properties to its subject that it does not really enjoy. 
Something akin to this definition can be found in Robert Hopkins’ discussion of 
misrepresentation in his Picture, Image, and Experience. He writes that: 
 ‘[a] picture is not bound to ascribe only properties which the item 
actually enjoys. When the picture does not do so, we have pictorial 
misrepresentation—as in a picture which depicts the Eiffel Tower 
as blue, or as standing on the banks of the Ganges.’ 256  
 
Indeed it is a definition that crops up later on in Hopkins’s defence of his Experienced 
Resemblance view of depiction since, as we have seen, it looks difficult for the view to 
explain how we can see in surfaces a particular with a property it does not possess. Here we 
find our initial definition of misrepresentation surfacing again because, according to 
Hopkins, ‘such seeing-in is the basis of pictorial misrepresentation.’257 Given the view’s 
commitment to depiction consisting in an experienced resemblance in Outline Shape 
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between depicted subject and object in the real world, it does not look as if the Resemblance 
View can allow for misrepresentation at all.  
 As we saw in Chapter Three, Hopkins proposed a solution to the problem 
of misrepresentation by suggesting that we abandon the core assumption of Resemblance 
Theories of depiction, namely that if resemblance is to play a role in depicting an item, it is 
resemblance to the item as it really is.258 However, I argued in Chapter Three that Hopkins’s 
proposed solution does not work, since abandoning this core assumption leaves the view 
open to the objection that without it the view cannot explain why we should see one 
particular subject and not another. If both of the subjects are depicted as possessing the 
same properties, then Hopkins’s suggestion that a concept of one particular will enter at the 
exclusion of the other does not do the explanatory work. The arguments in this chapter can 
be seen as, in part, bolstering that concern, and putting further pressure on the idea that the 
Experienced Resemblance Theory can cope with pictorial misrepresentation.  
Aside from the difficulties with Hopkins’s proposed solution to the problem of 
misrepresentation, we might still ask whether the above definition, (D1), provides us with a 
sufficient condition for misrepresentation. To answer this question I will again take a cue 
from Hopkins and begin with the case that he identified as problematic for his resemblance 
view. The case in question was caricature, in particular a caricature of Tony Blair, who is 
depicted with wild eyes, huge ears, and an eccentric hairstyle. These are all properties that the 
real Blair does not possess. As such, according to Hopkins, the caricature misrepresents 
Blair. But, Hopkins claims, this is not to suggest that caricatures do not tell us something 
genuine about the person depicted. In fact a caricature may often tell us more about the 
person by exaggerating certain features. ‘But’, Hopkins writes, ‘It does so precisely through 
distorting his physical features…’ 259 Thus by misrepresenting Blair something profound can 
be expressed by the caricature. 
It is important to note that Hopkins is focusing entirely on depictive 
misrepresentation here. He claims that through misrepresentation, through the inaccurate 
ascription of properties to the depicted subject, something profound can be said about the 
subject. What is expressed or said about the subject seems different from what is depicted. 
As we have seen, we can be successful in depiction and yet misrepresent our subject, or 
conversely for Hopkins’s example, we can depictively misrepresent yet say something true 
about our depicted subject. While depictive misrepresentation and misrepresentation in some 
other sense i.e., the normative sense, might be intimately related, one can commit one kind 
of misrepresentation but not the other. As such we ought to put claims about true or 
profound things being said about the subject to one side and hone in on the claim that the 
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inaccurate ascription of properties to the depicted subject constitutes depictive 
misrepresentation. 
 While my purpose in this chapter is not to directly challenge the Experienced 
Resemblance view (that was the concern in Chapter Three), I do think it is important to 
point out that the characterisation Hopkins gives of misrepresentation presupposes a 
Resemblance View of depiction. This is because it turns out that any picture that does not 
resemble its subject—a picture that does not accurately ascribe properties−is a 
misrepresentation. Thus if we accept this account of misrepresentation it looks as if we are in 
some way committed to a resemblance view of depiction. But perhaps this will not be 
troublesome for many. As such we cannot challenge this definition of misrepresentation on 
pain of committing ourselves to a Resemblance View of depiction. Arguments against that 
view, while intimately related to the concerns in this chapter, have been considered 
elsewhere. 
However, what is significant for my purposes here is that thus far no argument has 
been given for this definition of misrepresentation that does not presuppose a Resemblance 
View. As such it remains to be seen why we should conclude on the basis of wrongly 
ascribed properties that pictorial misrepresentation has occurred. The appeal to caricature 
seems to suggest an intuition about caricatures- that they are misrepresentations and, in 
virtue of this, they say something true about their subjects. But why can’t the intuition go in 
the other direction? Why not suppose that caricatures are successful depictions, since 
everyone sees the subject in the picture despite inaccurately ascribed properties, and they tell 
us something true about their subjects?  
Resemblance theorists cannot answer this without presupposing their own view. So 
perhaps the real difficulty for a Resemblance View is not that the caricature misrepresents 
Blair but rather that it quite adequately represents him whilst at the same time looking 
different from Blair in actuality. The onus is then on the Resemblance View to explain how a 
representation that does not resemble Blair is indeed a representation of Blair. If the only 
argument against the point that our intuitions about caricatures can go in the opposite 
direction presupposes that a Resemblance View is correct, then perhaps we ought to throw 
suspicion on (D1).  
 Indeed I believe that there are many reasons we should resist it. Firstly, if 
(D1) is correct then it turns out that depictive misrepresentation is absolutely rife among the 
arts, since many pictures do not accurately ascribe properties to their subjects. I would 
contend, however, that the distortion of physical properties is an important way in which 
artists faithfully represent their subject. In fact it might even be the case that such distortion 
can get us closer to our actual experience of subjects. We have already encountered examples 
of this, such as split-style depictions, but some of the things artists tell us about their work 
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also support this. For example, Picasso said of his painting of his lover Dora Maar that his 
use of the double profile stemmed from his keeping his eyes always open.260 Because of this, 
when he kissed her, this was how she appeared to him. As such, despite depicting her with 
properties she does not actually possess, for Picasso, the painting captures something true of 
his experience of her. Her face is, for him, truly represented. With distortion functioning as a 
significant artistic device that strives to get closer to our experience of the subjects depicted, 
it seems odd to call Picasso’s painting a misrepresentation. Yet if depictive misrepresentation 
consists in wrongly ascribing properties to a subject then this is what his painting must be. 
Without wishing to presuppose my own view about depictive misrepresentation, it is worth 
noting that distortion can be a stylistic feature, that is a way of doing something. As such, if 
Hopkins’s view of depictive misrepresentation turns out to be correct, we would also have to 
claim that stylistic features significantly contribute to a picture’s being a misrepresentation. 
Again this sounds odd given that in creating a work artists are, I think it is safe to assume, 
trying to depict rather than misrepresent their subject in their own way i.e., in their own style.   
 Though perhaps Picasso’s style is a strong case of distortion. As such some 
further examples might better illustrate the point that the subject matter can look to us 
nothing like the actual object yet we see in it the very thing it purports to depict. Somehow 
the distortion evokes in us a seeing-in experience that is closer to our experience of seeing 
the subject face-to-face. Consider Van Gogh’s painting Wheat Field with Crows (fig. 10). The 
painting depicts the sky using sharp, harsh lines of colour, something that ordinary visual 
experience does not, and could not, involve an awareness of. The sky is distorted by these 
features, which, given that they are the kinds of properties that cannot be seen in face-to-face 
experience, look apt to be described as inflected properties. We see in the picture a sky as 
composed of black and blue shards jarring against, and colliding with, one another. Yet skies 
do not enjoy the property of sharp, distinguishable lines of colours, what we describe as 
brush marks. But something about that very distortion, about the way the distinguishable 
shards of blues and blacks impact with each other, evokes in us a seeing-in experience of a 
tempestuous sky similar to that of an actual sky threatening thunder. And if this case of 
inflection proves troublesome for our initial definition, then I suspect other inflected 
pictures will put a similar strain on it, which I will discuss in due course. As such, despite 
inaccuracy, Van Gogh’s painting proves itself to be a faithful representation of its subject; of 
the experience one would have in front of the real scene.  
 
                                                
260 Levy, Julian. Memoir of an Art Gallery, (Putnam, 1977), p. 177. 
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(Fig. 10) Van Gogh, Wheatfield With Crows, (1890) 
 
 The thought that distortion, or embellishment, in art can get us closer to an actual 
experience of a depicted subject is expressed by Ruskin in his discussion of ‘Turnerian 
Topography’, which is described as an imaginative art that goes beyond simple topography. 
Ruskin begins by discussing a simple topography of the Pass of Faïdo, in the canton of 
Ticino in Switzerland, which is neither interesting nor impressive, and would not serve to 
evoke in the viewer the sensations of actually seeing this beautiful and awe-inspiring ravine. 
From this Ruskin goes on to claim that: 
 
‘[And] the aim of the great inventive landscape painter must be to 
give the far higher and deeper truth of mental vision, rather than that 
of the physical facts, and to reach a representation which, though it 
may be totally useless to engineers or geographers, and, when tried 
by rule and measure, totally unlike the place, shall yet be capable of 
producing on the far-away beholder's mind precisely the impression 
which the reality would have produced, and putting his heart into the 
same state in which it would have been, had he verily descended into 
the valley from the gorges of Airolo.’ 261 
 
While we may want to claim that an artist inaccurately depicted the subject, thereby 
enhancing what was really there before them, to say that they have misrepresented their 
subject seems to miss the point that Ruskin is articulating so eloquently.  In fact, to complain 
that this picture misrepresents its subject seems precisely that- a complaint. This brings us 
back to the point about the normative sense of misrepresentation. Criticising Turner for 
misrepresenting the landscape implies he has does something wrong, that he has made a 
mistake. This sounds odd, and the point that Ruskin seems to be getting at is precisely that 
‘mistakes’ and inaccuracies can be intentional; they can enhance the composition and help to 
achieve individual creative goals. They can be indicative of an artist’s style, which makes their 
work their own and issues in a personal vision of their subject. While one might claim that 
Turner has misrepresented the scene in some normative sense, depictively speaking, which is 
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the sense we are interested in here, if one has a seeing-in experience of the subject in the 
picture despite the inaccuracies then the depiction is successful.  
Some of these considerations also show up in our appreciative responses to 
artworks. One could imagine two identical canvases, one painted by an artist, the other by a 
child. Both incorrectly ascribe a property to their depicted subject. However, though we 
might want to apply a standard of correctness to the child’s depiction it would be highly 
inappropriate to suggest to an artist that she has made a mistake. The distortion of physical 
features in most pictures does not suggest something has gone wrong, nor do we respond to 
them as if it had. As such our appreciative responses do not involve standards of 
correctness, and we do not recognize most paintings to be misrepresentations despite the 
fact that (D1), taken literally, entails that most are. Part of this seems premised on the idea 
that artists have depictive and artistic intentions, they are aiming not only to depict 
something but also to depict it in their own way. Again we might take into consideration that 
an artist has an individual style, which precludes one from inappropriately applying standards 
of correctness (though of course one might still choose to do so). 
Further, (D1), which is premised on a Resemblance View, is also troubled by the 
phenomenon of inflection, which was discussed in detail in Chapters Three and Four. How 
does inflection make trouble for this view? In short, the demand for a perceptual match 
causes further problems in considering which pictures are misrepresentations. As we have 
seen, inflection, by definition, means that pictures engendering an inflected seeing-in 
experience have features that could not be seen in face-to-face experiences. As such, pictures 
that engender inflected seeing-in experiences amount to misrepresentation if (D1) is true. 
Thus inflection is tantamount to misrepresentation. This outcome is predicted by (D1), 
where misrepresentation consists in an inaccurate match between depicted object and object 
in the real world given the misattribution of properties. The phenomenon of inflection thus 
puts further pressure on the plausibility of (D1).  Given that inflected seeing-in is a species of 
representational seeing, since it is agreed by most (including Hopkins) to occur at least 
sometimes, a better move would be to claim that (D1) is false, as it stands. Inflected seeing-
in, then, does not amount to misrepresentation, contra (D1). 
Part of the problem with this definition of misrepresentation is that it assumes a 
very narrow conception of pictorial realism. Our initial definition, (D1), like the 
Resemblance View, assumes some kind of matching between depiction and depicted object, 
which rests on the idea that the properties depicted must match those enjoyed by the object 
in actuality. The more it matches, the more realistic the picture. As we have seen, Hopkins’s 
Resemblance View is a matching perceptual theory of depiction, since he claims that the 
Outline Shape of a depicted subject and the Outline Shape of the actual subject will match 
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given that they subtend the same angles.262 However, that assumption is false. Pictorial 
realism need not consist in this kind of matching between depiction and depicted object. If 
this is true, and inaccurately ascribing properties to a depicted object does not threaten its 
realism, then again this ought to put pressure on the idea that misrepresentation solely 
consists in misattributing properties to a depicted object. In the next section I introduce an 
account of pictorial realism, which adequately explains pictorial diversity and mounts 
pressure on the idea that matching the depicted properties of the subject with the properties 
the subject actually enjoys amounts to realism. In denying this is sufficient for realism, the 
materials with which to construct an argument in favour of disposing of the view of 
misrepresentation that consists in the misattribution of properties become available.   
 
 
 
5.1.1   Pictorial Realism and Accuracy 
 
At first sight, pictorial realism seems to be understood as in some way involving 
accuracy or informativeness; the more accurately a picture depicts its subject, the more 
informative it is about that subject, and thus the more realistic it is. This seems initially 
appealing, and perhaps pictorial realism only ends where illusion begins, as might be the case 
in viewing highly successful trompe l’oeil paintings. Dominic Lopes calls this view of pictorial 
realism the ‘traditional or ‘simple’ account of pictorial realism, and his description of the 
view immediately echoes the sentiment expressed by our initial definition of 
misrepresentation.263 According to Lopes, on this ‘simple’ view, ‘To say representational 
realism depends on accuracy is to say that a picture is realistic to the extent that its subject 
has the properties it is depicted as having’.264 Hence an unrealistic picture, one that is 
inaccurate in the properties it ascribes to its subject, is, on the view of misrepresentation 
characterised by (D1), a misrepresentation. Thus, on that view, the connection between 
pictorial realism and pictorial misrepresentation is firmly established, since pictures that are 
unrealistic turn out to be misrepresentations according to (D1) alone. My strategy here is to 
reject the connection between unrealistic pictures and misrepresentation by rejecting the 
‘simple’ account of pictorial realism. If there is no connection between accuracy and realism, 
and so no connection between realism and misrepresentation, then (D1) is false since it 
commits us to claiming that unrealistic pictures are misrepresentations. 
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 Indeed, the connection between accuracy and realism is not only tenuous but also 
fundamentally flawed. As the art historian Linda Nochlin notes: 
 ‘The commonplace notion that Realism is a “styleless” or 
transparent style, a mere simulacrum or a mirror image of visual 
reality, is another barrier to its understanding as an historical and 
stylistic phenomenon.’ 265  
 
There is a history of thinking in this way. Nelson Goodman’s work reminds us that this 
transparency does not exist, and that everything is seen through a conventional lens. 
Similarly, Ruskin and Gombrich affirm the myth of the innocent eye, while Constable 
compares seeing nature to learning to read hieroglyphs. Realism then, is not simply the 
styleless default.266  
Dominic Lopes goes some way towards disposing of the view that accuracy is 
sufficient for realism. To use his example, the ‘happy face’ drawing that consists of two dots 
for eyes and a curved line for a mouth is accurate to the extent that all faces have two eyes 
and a mouth. However, as he rightly notes, there is more to faces than the characteristically 
‘happy face’ depicts.267 Thus while we may intuitively feel that accuracy is important, it is 
certainly not sufficient for realism. Furthermore, the ‘simple’ view of realism, which often 
combines accuracy and informativeness, fares no better. Lopes proposes three 
counterexamples that ought to make us reject the idea of pictorial realism consisting in 
accuracy and informativeness. Firstly, Lopes claims that accuracy is not only insufficient for 
realism but also is not even necessary. Some realistic pictures may misrepresent their subjects 
by, Lopes writes, ‘attributing to them properties they do not have’.268 What Lopes says here 
will likely be ringing alarm bells regarding the distinctive similarity with (D1) above; more on 
this in a moment. Secondly, Lopes raises the counterexample of fictional pictures which are 
neither accurate nor inaccurate; and fictional pictures can certainly be realistic. Thirdly, in 
another counterexample, a cartoon or simple sketch may be more realistic than a Cubist 
painting, which Lopes thinks can disclose plenty of information.269 
 To return to the similarity between the sentiment expressed by (D1) and the thought 
expressed by Lopes in his first counterexample. I think this is unfortunate, and a point at 
which my thinking departs from Lopes. According to Lopes a picture can misrepresent by 
inaccurately ascribing properties to the depicted subject, and that picture can still be realistic. 
But if realism is not tracking accuracy, why must we conclude that in this case we have 
pictorial misrepresentation? If accuracy is not required for realism, why make the further 
claim that the inaccuracy of ascribed properties amounts to misrepresentation? It seems that 
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if Lopes relinquishes accuracy as a condition for realism there is no additional motivation to 
call this picture a misrepresentation. If inaccuracy is tolerated by realism then there does not 
seem to be any reason why we ought to conclude on the basis of inaccuracy that 
misrepresentation has occurred. Hence, while I agree with Lopes’s claim that accuracy 
certainly isn’t necessary or sufficient for realism, I do not accept the further claim that 
misrepresentation has occurred since I have argued thus far that an acceptance of (D1) 
entails implausible consequences. Something else is needed to establish that this picture is a 
misrepresentation if inaccuracy is permitted in pictorial realism.  
But still we may feel the intuitive pull of Lopes’s example. The picture is realistic but 
it has made a mistake of some kind; it has failed in some way. Surely this failure constitutes 
misrepresentation? Hence one may feel that the desire to call this picture a misrepresentation 
is telling in itself, and a significant drawback to denying the further claim is that it cannot 
make sense of this intuition. No matter, I think our claim to misrepresentation happening in 
some pictures can be secured in other ways, ways that do not depend solely on inaccurately 
ascribing properties. I go on to defend a different way of conceiving of misrepresentation in 
the next section. Thus, for now at least, the claim can be maintained that Lopes’s motivation 
to call this picture a misrepresentation is unwarranted. 
 Differences aside, I think that Lopes’s counterexamples do show that a 
combination of accuracy and informativeness does not suffice for pictorial realism. Since a 
realistic picture might be inaccurate, a fictional picture neither accurate nor inaccurate, and a 
picture with relatively minimal detail may be more realistic than a picture that offers up an 
abundance of information, the simple view of pictorial realism ought to be rejected. I think it 
is this view that underlies the definition of misrepresentation characterised by (D1), and is 
thus too narrow, resulting in a view of misrepresentation that belies our experiences of 
pictures and what we see them as representing. So much, then, for the simple view. How, 
then, should we characterize pictorial realism if not in terms of the accuracy with which 
pictures depict their subjects? An answer to this question will require a return to the themes 
of Chapter Four, since the Aspect-Recognition theory discussed there motivates the view of 
pictorial realism that I believe to be correct. It is this view that connects with issues of artistic 
style, the concept of which will form part of the positive account of misrepresentation in this 
chapter.  
 As we saw in Chapter Four, Dominic Lopes proposes a non-matching 
perceptual theory of depiction, which has its basis in the idea that pictures present aspects of 
their subjects, which viewers can recognize since the presentation of those aspects engages 
their recognitional capacities.270 Hence different ways of depicting objects capture different, 
recognisable, aspects. We also saw that pictures are not determinate in all respects, pictures 
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may be committal and non-committal in various ways. From this theoretical background, 
and taking a cue from Nelson Goodman’s views on convention, Lopes proposes that realism 
is relative to the system (or modes or styles) of representation.271 Hence, pictures that are 
inaccurate, fictional, or minimally informative may be realistic interpreted within some 
system of representation. Again Lopes makes use of his claims concerning aspects of 
pictures, proposing that we individuate systems on the basis of the aspects presented. Hence 
different systems of picturing present different aspects. Given this variance, pictures in 
different systems of representation also vary in informativeness. Perhaps, then, the more 
properties regarding which pictures are committal the more realistic they are, since this 
system will be more informative.  
However, Lopes rightly points out that some pictures are realistic despite being 
minimally informative. Some pictures make few commitments about certain properties e.g. a 
line drawing. Hence Lopes proposes that pictorial realism does not depend on the degree of 
informativeness that a picture offers; rather pictorial realism is to be understood in terms of 
appropriate informativeness within a context of use. 272 To use Lopes’s example, the split-style 
pictures of the Haida (fig. 11) are more realistic to them because they inform the Haida 
about the structure of the body of the animal.273 Realism is judged on the extent to which 
pictures realise their intended aim of conveying the appropriate information for the purposes 
they serve in certain contexts. Thus Lopes claims that, ‘a picture is realistic to the extent that 
it belongs to an appropriately informational system.’ 274 
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(Fig. 11) Rover Davidson, Split Style Beaver, (1975) 
 
 The advantage of conceiving of realism according to how successful a 
picture is in informing its viewers appropriately is that it can explain why there is diversity in 
judgements of realism across different cultures, times, and contexts. Furthermore, it explains 
why cartoons or line drawings can be realistic. They are embedded in an appropriately 
informative system of representation, Lopes contends, because of the narrative context in 
which they usually occur.275 Despite the scant amount of properties, or the amount of 
inaccurate properties the subject is depicted as having, they convey information that plays a 
role in the narratives in which they occur. Lopes also suggests that this is why caricatures can 
be realistic. The satirical narrative within which they occur, that is of mocking and shaming 
their subjects, makes them appropriately informative. Thus realism does not consist in the 
accuracy of ascribed properties to the depicted object. Realism, like depiction, is dynamic 
and shifting, and the history of style itself documents these gradual changes in what we see 
pictures as representing realistically.  
This, among other things, is what we learn from Ernst Gombrich. That art 
progresses by trial and error, beginning with some initial schema that is adjusted and 
corrected. Pictures, for Gombrich, are ‘an end product on a long road of schema and 
correction’ and ‘the form of representation cannot be divorced from its purpose and the 
requirements of the society in which the given visual language gains currency.’276 Hence the 
rules of realism, of realistic schemata, are conventional, and realistic representation depends 
on the kinds of requirements that we as viewers have. The point that accuracy does not often 
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figure in our pictorial experiences of realism is captured nicely, and also amusingly, by 
Gombrich in the remark that follows his discussion of learning to draw a human head: 
‘We have come to accept certain forms in pictures as representing 
heads, and we are not troubled before our attention is roused—
though if somebody entered the room with an egg-shaped head, or 
even with a mouth misplaced like Preissler’s, we would be sure to 
notice something wrong.’ 277 
 
What I hope to have shown thus far is that if realism is relative to a system, and 
systems are characterized by the aspects represented, which need not match those of the 
actual object as experienced in ordinary perception, then we need not conclude that 
misrepresentation has occurred solely on the basis of inaccurately ascribed properties. In 
short, if inaccuracy in property ascription is tolerated by pictorial realism then it ought to be 
tolerated by pictorial representation. The assumption that realism consists in accurately 
ascribing properties underlies (D1), since the inaccuracy of ascribed properties is supposed 
to determine misrepresentation, and the definition itself is borne out of a matching theory of 
depiction. However, this assumption is false. As such inaccurately ascribing properties 
cannot be distinctive of misrepresentation, since it is compatible with realism. Despite 
Lopes’s thought that a picture can be realistic and still misrepresent, we saw no argument for 
this claim, and given the consequences of adopting (D1) we ought to reconstruct our 
definition of misrepresentation, as we did our definition of pictorial realism, without building 
in any conditions of accuracy. If we do not it will result in a very limited view of the 
representational capacities of pictorial art, and would entail some odd results in determining 
whether a picture is a misrepresentation.  
I hope to have demonstrated also that due to the insufficiency of wrongly ascribed 
properties for misrepresentation, and the relativity of realism, it must be the case that there is 
nothing prima facie about the way pictures look that determines whether a picture has 
misrepresented its subject. Perhaps my example of identical canvases (one by an artist and 
one by a child) can be seen as pushing the often-made point in aesthetics that we need to 
know more about the history and conditions of the production of an artwork before we can 
determine how we ought to respond to it. If we want to find a further condition that is 
sufficient for misrepresentation then perhaps we ought to go beyond mere appearances. The 
next section, in which I outline my own view, is a move in that direction. 
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5.2   Misrepresentation and Artistic Style 
 
What I want to suggest is that determining whether a picture is a misrepresentation 
is intimately related to artistic style. In short, if a picture incorrectly ascribes properties to its 
subject, yet they fall within the remit of the artist’s style, then the picture is not a 
misrepresentation. This, I contend, will limit the scope of misrepresentation such that we do 
not have to conclude on the basis of wrongly ascribed properties that, say, Picasso has 
misrepresented his subject. That he has not done so is a consequence of his style. This 
additional claim, that style is significant to misrepresentation, thus also distances my view 
from Lopes’ and his notion that a picture may misrepresent its subject by inaccurately 
ascribing properties. Of course the challenge now is to pin down exactly what my account of 
pictorial misrepresentation amounts to, which makes use of the conception of style I have 
been defending by putting it to work in accounting for pictorial misrepresentation in a way 
that makes better sense of the phenomenon.  
 Perhaps the best way to demonstrate what I have in mind is to return to the 
caricature case. Why might our intuition tell us that this is not a misrepresentation? I believe 
it is because we are familiar with the general style of caricature and the kinds of aims and 
intentions artists working in this style might have, and these are seen in the work. In 
caricature it is often some kind of satirization of the subject depicted, and our knowledge of 
this informs our experience of the picture. It is because I recognize the style of caricature, 
and see the picture as having that style, that I see the picture as a representation of Blair and 
I appreciate its humour. Knowing about caricature, that typically it involves satirising its 
subject by exaggerating certain features, guides us in how to respond. As Lamarque points 
out, ‘styles have a function, they contribute to meaning and effect, they have a point.’ 278 The 
‘point’, then, in our example is to mock Blair. Thus style considerations get us the right result 
for caricatures.  
 This also returns us to the distinction in Chapter One between individual and 
general styles, where I claimed that individual style is internal to the artist, while general 
styles are external to the artist.279 As such we can also recognise the individual styles of 
caricaturists, since they will have highly personal ways of mocking and satirizing their 
subjects. For example, Gerald Scarfe has a highly distinctive style, which is often very dark in 
its portrayal of his subjects; their appearance is almost grotesquely exaggerated and, in several 
depictions, they are spattered with blood. As Scarfe puts it, ‘An artist's job is to present a 
new view of the world, seeing things anew for other people. With people in power, I use the 
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worst techniques I can find.’ 280 Of course one might disagree with Scarfe’s depictions, one 
might even say he has grossly misrepresented his subject, but this is misrepresentation of a 
kind similar to my picture of my kind-hearted enemy. Scarfe’s pictures are depictively 
successful but he may still be guilty of misrepresentation in some other normative sense. 
Everyone can see Tony Blair in Scarfe’s picture, but we might think he ought not to be 
depicted as he is. Thus, again, even in cases of an individual, highly personal, style of 
caricature, giving style its proper significance gets a better result.  
However, while style considerations get us a good result for determining when 
misrepresentation has not occurred, we also need a way of determining when it has. While 
(D1) is vastly inadequate, we ought, after having considered the significance of style, be able 
to use the concept of style to give a better definition of pictorial misrepresentation. I think 
we can do just that. In fact a better definition might be formulated as follows: 
 
(D2) Depictive misrepresentation occurs when a picture incorrectly ascribes properties to a depicted subject and 
this cannot be explained by appeal to general or individual style. 
 
It should be clear that this will significantly limit the scope of misrepresentation, and will 
help us avoid the conclusion that far too many works are misrepresentations. It also 
preserves the thought that the representational capacities of pictures go beyond correctly 
ascribing properties to their subjects. Furthermore, it explains the fact that we do not 
consider most art to be misrepresentation and why such considerations do not enter into our 
appreciative responses. It allows for pictures that engender an inflected seeing-in experience, 
and gives further support to the view of realism as informativeness within a context of use. 
Having knowledge of style can allow for pictures that inaccurately ascribe properties to the 
depicted subject to be realistic, and so not misrepresentations. As such my claim that artistic 
style connects up with pictorial representation gives further detail to the notion of a context 
of use.  
Also, this extra condition that must be met for a picture to misrepresent also allows 
my view to escape the objection I posed at the end of Chapter Four that, like the 
Experienced Resemblance view, the Aspect-Recognition Theory allows for too much 
misrepresentation. Having argued for an adapted Aspect-Recognition Theory, which has the 
concept of style that I have argued for built into it, my view avoids the objection by requiring 
that further conditions be met for misrepresentation to occur. The Aspect-Recognition 
Theory as developed by Lopes does not make this connection between depiction and style, 
as I have developed it, and is thus still vulnerable to the problem of misrepresentation in 
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much the same way as the Experienced Resemblance view. (D2) better describes 
misrepresentation, and avoids many of the troubles (D1) encountered. As such adopting this 
view of misrepresentation, which is predicated on my account of depiction as ‘aspect-
recognition plus style’, allows one to avoid uncomfortable consequences in determining 
which pictures are misrepresentations.  
This does raise the question, however, of which pictures turn out to be pictorial 
misrepresentations. Perhaps we will be hard pressed to find genuine instances of pictorial 
misrepresentation, and I will consider this potential objection shortly. However, I have 
provided a description of what conditions need to be met for pictorial misrepresentation to 
occur, and I think we can see where those conditions might be met by considering non-
stylistic features. What is a non-stylistic feature? A feature that falls outside the characteristic 
way of doing something—in the case of individual style this will be highly personal to the 
artist—will not be a feature of style. Perhaps an example might be found in the distinction 
proposed by Wollheim,281 and by Goodman282, between style and signature. For Goodman, 
although style is a matter of characteristic features that serve to identify a work’s origin, 
certain features contribute to its ‘symbolic functioning’ while others do not.283 The latter 
might include chemical properties of the paint and the actual signature of the painter. 
Though these features might serve the purpose of identification they are not stylistic 
features.  
However, in addition to properties such as the signature of the artist we might also 
say that a feature that seems out of place in a general style, or is uncharacteristic of the 
individual style of an artist, is also not a style feature. This might consist in wrongly ascribing 
a property to a particular. For example, we might again consider two identical canvases, 
where one is by a well-established artist, the other by a novice. While we would be reluctant 
to say that the artist has misrepresented her subject in her picture (perhaps a well-known 
person or place), I think we would be right to reserve the term misrepresentation for the 
novice; in the latter case we might be inclined to criticise the inaccuracies in the depiction as 
an example of incompetent draughtsmanship. The novice’s picture inaccurately ascribes 
properties to the depicted subject, and this cannot reasonably be explained by appeal to 
either general or individual style. As such I think it would be correct to say that the novice 
has pictorially misrepresented her subject. While we allow inaccuracies in the artist’s case, 
assuming they form part of her highly personal way of doing something, which guides our 
experience of the picture, we ought to be less tolerant of inaccuracy regarding the novice’s 
depiction. Of course, that novice might improve, and a style may emerge, but we would still 
need to know more about the work, and more about the style, to avoid seeing it as a pictorial 
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misrepresentation. Thus I think there are examples of pictorial misrepresentation that my 
view can make sense of. How much misrepresentation there will be is another question, and 
one that motivates one of the main possible objections to my view, which I will now 
consider.  
 
 
5.2.1   Potential Objections 
 
There are several objections that might be made to my characterisation of 
misrepresentation. The first turns on the idea that my view allows for too little 
misrepresentation to occur. One worry is that it might even turn out that there will be no 
misrepresentation under an assumption that mature artists, i.e. those with established styles, 
cannot make pictorial or depictive errors.284 That is, there looks to be significant pressure to 
explain all apparent misrepresentation as a matter of style. This means that an artist with an 
established style could ascribe any property she likes to a subject and it will be a 
representation if it is in her style.  
I have two possible replies to this objection. The first is to simply bite the bullet and 
accept that mature artists cannot make mistakes. If what I have said about style and 
misrepresentation is correct then perhaps it is not such a bad outcome to insist that an artist 
with an established style is almost outside the remit of depictive misrepresentation, even if 
they can be guilty of the other normative kind. Thus the very little room my account leaves 
for depictive misrepresentation among mature artists may be seen as a positive result if we 
find ourselves hesitant to say that those artists make mistakes when they inaccurately ascribe 
properties. This route is further tempting if one takes the principle of functionality, discussed 
in Chapter One, to be significant. That principle stated that what is in a work is there for a 
purpose, and in the case of depiction we might say that everything in a picture is there for a 
depictive purpose. If this principle is taken seriously then we ought to be less worried about 
the possibility that mature artists can’t make depictive ‘mistakes’. 
The second reply turns on what I said in the beginning about misrepresentation 
being a failure of some kind but not a failure to represent at all. Misrepresentation must 
allow that one sees in the pictorial surface the subject depicted, and see it with properties it 
does not enjoy. On my account such seeing-in does not determine misrepresentation unless 
the wrongly ascribed properties seen cannot be explained by appeal to style. However, if an 
artist ascribed any property she liked to an object such that the pictorial surface no longer 
engendered a seeing-in experience of the subject at all, then the artist has not misrepresented: 
she has failed to depict the subject altogether. I cannot ascribe just any property I wish to the 
                                                
284 I would like to thank Keith Allen for this objection. 
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Eiffel Tower whilst purporting to depict it. To do so would be to fail to depict the Eiffel 
Tower.  
Of course we might still allow that in some way the picture still represents the Eiffel 
Tower, but this would not be representation in any significantly visual sense. Thus while my 
account may increase the amount of wrongly ascribed properties one is willing to tolerate 
before a subject is no longer depicted, it does not entail that there are no limits whatsoever. 
Thus no appeal to style will allow that a picture that purports to depict the Eiffel Tower, yet 
has every feature of Big Ben, is a depiction of the Eiffel Tower. And further, though my 
view is more tolerant of depictive misrepresentations, this does not mean it is more tolerant 
of the normative sense of misrepresentation. So while a picture, despite inaccuracies, is a 
successful depiction it might still misrepresent in some other deeper sense. As such one 
should not be troubled by having more often to withhold the term misrepresentation if one 
adopts my view. The normative sense, the critical complaint about a picture, is still available 
to ascribe to many depictions despite their depictive success.  
 A further objection is that one might simply reject my account of stylistic 
features as having any explanatory value in seeing pictures as misrepresentations. One might 
think that Hopkins could claim that the picture depictively misrepresents to make an 
expressive point, as might be the case in caricature, yet it still depictively misrepresents since 
we see the depicted subject as enjoying properties it does not actually have. However, this 
objection only seems to work if my account has no story about how we visually experience 
style properties, and how style connects up with recognition, and so depiction. Chapters 
Two and Four were devoted to giving substance to my claims in Chapter One about the 
concept of style itself, demonstrating how it integrates into an experiential theory of 
depiction. Thus it is not the case that the concept of style is somehow ‘outside’ of our 
experience of pictures. Not only can we see stylistic features, i.e. perceptually represent them 
in our experiences, but having that experience also aids pictorial recognition such that we see 
in pictures the objects they purport to depict.  
I have argued that style is inexorably bound up with depiction in an experiential way. 
As such a picture that inaccurately ascribes properties, on my view, does not depictively 
misrepresent if one sees those properties as properties of style, of ways of doing things. 
Depiction itself is inherently tied into artistic style as experienced by the viewer, and thus 
there is no room for Hopkins to claim that my view is talking about some other kind of 
misrepresentation that has something to do with expression rather than depiction. I have 
shown that artistic style is of great significance to our experience of pictures, and my view of 
misrepresentation is thus tied into the way in which we experience pictures as depicting their 
subjects. 
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Therefore I think I can cope with the objections outlined. As such my account 
better captures the nature of pictorial misrepresentation, which ought to tempt one to adopt 
it. However, there remained a further persistent problem for the Experienced Resemblance 
View, namely pictorial indeterminacy. If the view I have been arguing for can be shown to 
cope with this phenomenon better then we have further reasons to adopt it. I think it can, 
but in order to show why we must return to the problem itself and the difficulties it caused 
for the Experienced Resemblance View. 
 
 
5.3   Pictorial Indeterminacy 
 
Some pictures depict subjects in great detail, with clear outlines and from a 
determinate point of view. But not all pictures do, and it is in these cases that the problem of 
pictorial indeterminacy arises. How is it possible to see a subject in a picture if the surface of 
that picture is vague, abstract, and indeterminate? We saw in Chapter Three that an artist’s 
sketch provided an example of pictorial indeterminacy, where the pencil marks on the 
pictorial surface were scattered and faint, and yet we saw in the picture the body of a man. 
Take another example though, again one introduced by Hopkins, namely a stick figure. A 
stick figure depicts a person, but it does so through very little detail. According to Hopkins, 
‘The picture is…simply silent about the person’s shape, in any but the roughest terms.’ 285 
This silence proved problematic for Hopkins since his view demanded a match in Outline 
Shape between depicted object and object in the real world. It is difficult, then, to perceive a 
match in Outline Shape between persons and stick figures in any determinate way. And stick 
figures are but one example of this kind of indeterminacy, and demonstrate, ‘in an extreme 
way an important feature of depiction’ 286 according to Hopkins.  
 The solution for Hopkins was a separation between seeing-in and pictorial content, 
that while seeing-in could be highly determinate, the pictorial content could be 
indeterminate. This meant that pictorial content is not identified with what is seen-in. The 
claim that seeing-in determines pictorial content is one of the key assumptions of any 
experiential theory, and one that Hopkins was willing to sacrifice in order to resolve the 
problem of misrepresentation and pictorial indeterminacy for his view. However, as I argued 
in Chapter Three, it’s not a claim that I think can be dispensed with, and I argued there that 
Hopkins’s belief that he could do without it stemmed from his confusing the recognitional 
aspect of seeing-in with the configurational. As such separation will not do the work of 
solving the problem of pictorial indeterminacy, and further, given any experiential account of 
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depiction’s commitment to the centrality of seeing-in, it’s not one that we should give up 
willingly. 
 Does the view I have argued for fare any better? Well, for one thing, it does not 
demand the separation advocated by Hopkins in order to resolve the problem. What one 
sees in a picture is what the picture depicts; the phenomenon of seeing-in, on my view, thus 
remains central to determining pictorial content. Rather than looking outside the experience 
to determine what a picture depicts, I hold that what is seen-in is dependent on other 
experiential factors, in particular a perceptual awareness of style features. This is what allows 
pictorial recognition to function smoothly. As such resolving the problem of indeterminacy 
via separation is not the strategy I will adopt here. Instead we can look to the already 
assembled resources within my view of depiction that connects aspect-recognition with 
artistic style.  
 According to Lopes’s view, and mine, pictures are aspectually structured, and make 
various commitments about a depicted subject. My account adds that artistic style is tied into 
aspect selection, and thus the resulting array of commitments a picture presents comprises 
part of an artist’s style, which aids pictorial recognition and engenders a seeing-in experience. 
Thus if we can explain pictorial indeterminacy as falling into the structure I have just 
outlined then we need not look to the separation of seeing-in and pictorial content to bridge 
the gap. Let us again take an artist’s sketches as our example. There are certain conventions 
that sketches usually adhere to. They are often in black and white, the subject depicted is 
vague, or roughly outlined, with various lines and dashes comprising the depicted subject. 
These are conventions we are familiar with, and we have certain expectations of sketches 
that we do not have of, say, watercolour paintings. We look for things in the marks if they 
cannot at first be seen, and if it is a study in preparation for a painting we may look for early 
signs of the finished artwork. We are often more tolerant of indeterminacy in sketches since 
we do not expect it; the rules of sketching, and looking at sketches, seem different from the 
rules of painting, and looking at paintings.  
 The commitments that sketches make, then, might be far less than other kinds of 
depictions, and we might struggle to see depicted subjects in the indeterminate haze they 
present. However, we are familiar with these conventions, and we are aware that sketches 
can often puzzle the eye if they are quick renderings of a subject. It is part and parcel of our 
experiences of sketches that they have certain characteristic, often stylistic, features, and 
knowing this we look at them differently than we do other pictures. Sketches can also exhibit 
very individual styles, evidenced by the way in which art historians identify sketches as being 
by this or that particular artist. Again, the lesson from Walton’s ‘Categories of Art’ that the 
category we perceive the work to be in affects how we respond to it seems appropriate. 
There are standard, variable, and contra-standard properties for sketches that warrant our 
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judging them to be in that category and not another. The aspects that sketches present, the 
standard properties of the category ‘sketches’, are steeped in style or convention and, without 
wanting to give some complete list of the criteria a depiction must meet to be defined as a 
sketch, we know when the surface we are looking at is a sketch.  
Given these conventions, these ways of doing things that all sketches share, when 
looking at a sketch we allow for indeterminacy and sparseness, and let it inform our 
experience of the picture. We know that sketches do not depict arms in highly determinate 
ways, and we do not expect of sketches the kind of commitments about arms that we might 
expect from a finely detailed ink drawing. That we are familiar with the style of sketches 
aligns our expectations, and the aspects presented, though sparse, are understood to 
comprise a particular subject, and, even though we might struggle for some time, the 
pictorial surface engenders a seeing-in experience of the subject. Though the surface features 
are sparse, our familiarity with the style ensures pictorial recognition and the resultant seeing-
in experience.  
 On this account there is no misalignment between the determinacy of seeing-in and 
the determinacy of pictorial content. Rather, knowledge of style secures the determinacy of 
what is seen-in despite the pictorial surface, the two-dimensional configuration of design 
properties, being indeterminate. As such, while the configurational aspect of seeing-in can be 
indeterminate, knowledge of style and our perceptual experiences of style ensure that the 
recognitional aspect of seeing-in functions smoothly such that the seeing-in experience 
engendered is highly determinate and, as a consequence, means that the pictorial content is 
also determinate. Seeing-in fixes pictorial content, something that Hopkins wants to deny at 
the expense of losing this central claim of all experiential accounts. However, we need not 
deny this if we adopt my account and tie seeing-in and style together. By doing this we can 
attribute any indeterminacy to the configuration on the surface of the picture, to the design 
properties, rather than to the content of the picture or the seeing-in experience. Knowledge 
and experience of style secures the determinacy of both seeing-in and what the picture 
depicts. Hence we can explain why we see-in pictures something that is highly determinate 
despite an indeterminate configuration by an appeal to our knowledge of the stylistic 
conventions governing pictures, in this example sketches.  
 Thus pictorial indeterminacy, and accounting for it, is not so troublesome if one 
adopts the view that depiction is inherently bound up with artistic style. Our experiences of 
pictures are informed by style, and I have argued that properties of style are the kinds of 
properties that can be experienced. One can see that by refining the concept of style, and 
giving an account of how we experience it, it can come to play a significant role in the 
philosophy of depiction. I have adapted an Aspect-Recognition theory in order to give style 
its proper significance, and this last chapter has shown that within this theory the materials 
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with which to explain persistent problems for other views can be found. Giving style its 
proper significance is crucial to understanding pictures and pictorial experience, and I have 
in this thesis provided an account of a way in which it can be done.  
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